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Intertheoretic Reduction: A New Look at ami Old Project 
Hoseyn Sheykh-Rezaee 
Abstract 
This thesis argues that the core idea of intertheoretic reduction in science is still 
defendable. The thesis is divided into three parts. In Part One, comprising five 
chapters, a positive account of reduction is discussed. In Chapter 1, Nagel's classic 
account of reduction is considered. There are two central themes in this survey: 
Nagel's account of bridge principles and his non-formal conditions. The former 
shows that bridge principles are not limited to identity statements, while the latter 
shows that almost all later philosophers (whether reductionists or anti-reductionists) 
have ignored these central conditions of reduction. 
In Chapter 2, the first wave of objections to Nagel's account, including the problems 
of meaning variance and inconsistency, are central issues. It will be argued that the 
former is not a serious objection. However, the latter leads us to Chapter 3, in which 
reductionists' responses to the problem of inconsistency are considered. 
The main tool used to remove the problem of inconsistency is the notion of 
approximation. I defend approximate reduction, but it needs further metaphysical 
clarifications to survive the second wave of objections. Before these metaphysical 
points are addressed, the rest of Chapter 3 is devoted to showing that identity 
statements between things are one kind, but not the only acceptable kind, of bridge 
principle, and that identity statements between properties are not required for 
reduction. 
The central notion in the second wave of objections against reduction is 'multiple 
realization'. In Chapter 4, I present a causal analysis of properties and realization, 
and show that (a) a version of the unity of science is defendable within the causal 
framework, and (b) arguments against the possibility of general and autonomous 
special sciences are not valid. 
In Chapter 5, an alternative flat analysis of properties and realization, based on the 
notion of similarity, is discussed. Firstly, I argue that this alternative can save a 
version of the unity of science. Secondly, I show that both of the discussed 
metaphysical analyses remove the second wave of objections against reduction. 
Part Two, comprising three chapters, concerns negative accounts of reduction. In 
Chapter 6, explanatory reduction is critically analyzed. I argue that the contrastive 
nature of explanation prevents us defining reduction in terms of explanation. 
In Chapter 7, those accounts of reduction which define it in terms of supervenience 
are discussed. I argue that supervenience is not even a necessary condition of 
reduction. 
Chapter 8 is devoted to considering functional reduction, which defines the reduction 
of a property to a domain of more basic properties. Based on two possible ways of 
functionalization, the inadequacy of functional reduction is discussed. 
Finally, in Chapter 9 of Part Three, I return to the version of reduction that I defend. 
This has two important components: approximation and non-formal conditions. First, 
I sketch a portrait of this account, and then I consider some of its features, such as its 
aim and relata, its non-formal nature and its direction. 
University of Durham 
Department of Philosophy 
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Introduction 
It is a dominant belief that the basic idea behind the notions of 'reduction' and 
'reductionism' is captured by the clause 'nothing more than For example, i f we 
say that the chemical properties of a substance are reducible to that substance's 
atomic properties, this means that the former is nothing more than the latter, the 
former is entirely dispensable in favour of the latter, or the latter absorbs and wholly 
subsumes the former. In this framework, there is a distinction between 'reductionism' 
and 'reduction'. Reductionism is a philosophical belief that complex things (objects, 
properties, theories, meanings...) can always be reduced to simpler or more 
fundamental things. However, reduction is the process by which the reduced thing is 
shown to be dispensable in favour of the reducing thing. For example, to be a 
reductionist about scientific theories means two things. Firstly, it means believing 
that all high-level theories are always reducible to more basic theories (and 
ultimately to the most fundamental theory). In other words, it means believing that 
high-level theories are in principle dispensable in favour of more basic theories. 
Secondly, it means presenting a process by which high-level theories are reduced to 
theories that are more basic. 
Reductionism can be divided into different types according to the answer that it gives 
to the question, 'which aspects or features of the reduced thing are dispensable in 
favour of the reducing thing?' For example, in the case of reduction of scientific 
theories, we can ask 'which aspect of the reduced theory is dispensable in favour of 
the reducing theory?' Methodological reductionism says that explanations of high-
level theories are dispensable in favour of explanations of more basic theories. 
Theoretical reductionism holds that the theoretical assumptions, axioms and laws of 
the reduced theories are dispensable in favour of theoretical assumptions, axioms and 
laws of the reducing theories. And ontological reductionism says that ontological 
commitments of the reduced theory are dispensable in favour of their counterparts in 
the reducing theories. 
Answering the question above determines the relata of reduction. Accepting 
methodological reductionism determines that reduction is a relation between 
scientific explanations. Similarly, theoretical reductionism says that the relata are 
theoretical assumptions and laws, while ontological reductionism says that the relata 
are real-world items. This point shows that we can divide 'reduction' into two main 
categories: epistemological reduction and ontological reduction. I f the relata of 
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reduction are representational items (theories, concepts, models...), then we have 
epistemological reduction. In ontological reduction the relata are real world items 
(properties, events...) (Silberstein 2002, 82). Further classification is possible to sort 
out different accounts of reduction. As mentioned above, reduction is a process by 
which the reduced thing is shown to be dispensable in favour of the reducing thing. 
We can classify accounts of reduction on the basis of the strategies they take towards 
this process (Silberstein 2002, 82-89). In the case of ontological reduction, the 
following strategies have been suggested: elimination (reduced things eliminated 
from our ontology); identity (reduced things identical to reducing things); 
mereological supervenience (properties of a whole determined by the properties of its 
parts); and nomological supervenience (fundamental physical laws determine high-
level laws). In the case of epistemological reduction, the following strategies have 
been suggested: replacement (our prior conceptualizations replaced by new ways of 
describing and conceptualizing); theoretical-derivational (the reduced laws/theories 
derivable from the reducing laws/theories); semantic/model-theoretic/structuralist 
analysis (isomorphism between models of the reduced and reducing theories); and 
pragmatic (the reducing theory about a specific domain provides superior real-world 
explanatory and predictive value compared to the reduced theory representing the 
same domain). 
Now let me explain the conception of reduction which I will defend in this thesis, 
and then compare with the standard definitions above. I consider reduction to be a 
relation between scientific laws/theories. Therefore, my account is an account of 
epistemological reduction. Regarding the strategy of reduction, I follow Nagel's 
original suggestion including the derivation of laws and the satisfaction of certain 
non-formal conditions of reduction. Therefore, my account does not belong to the 
theoretical-derivational category, because, according to this category, derivation is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for reduction, while in my view, it is only a 
necessary condition. However, what makes my account radically different is the aim 
of reduction. As mentioned, the aim of reduction in the standard definitions is 
dispensability/absorption/subsumption of the reduced thing. However, this is not the 
case in my definition. I do not define reduction of scientific laws/theories as to 
involve eliminating their concepts/properties or making their explanations 
dispensable. 
In my view, genuine reduction of a scientific law/theory must have epistemic pay-
offs, including empirical and historical gains. A valuable reduction either brings 
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empirical achievements (i.e. increases our empirical knowledge, increases degrees of 
confirmation of laws, or gives clues to new scientific discoveries) or brings historical 
achievement (i.e. explains why scientists rationally believed in a false theory for a 
period of time, or why false theories seemed true before discoveries of more 
comprehensive true theories). On the other hand, as I will argue in detail, even when 
a law/theory is reduced, its concepts/properties and classifications are not 
dispensable. Reduced laws/theories can provide explanations that reducing 
laws/theories cannot. These reasons lead me to say that the aim of reduction is not 
dispensability, absorption or subsumption. Reduction is an intertheoretic relation that 
connects laws from different theories and provides epistemic pay-offs. By making 
local connections between laws/theories, we go in the direction of making the whole 
of science a connected and unified body. Reduction connects particular laws/theories 
together, brings epistemic gains and works in the direction of the unity of science. In 
what follows, we will see how changing the aim of reduction from the dispensability 
of the reduced items to achieving empirical gains and going toward the unity of 
science solves many traditional problems with reduction, especially problems with 
the nature of bridge principles. 
Another important difference between my account of reduction and the standard 
definitions is that I do not accept any kind of 'reductionism'. Reduction is a 
contingent matter, which is sensitive to many formal and non-formal factors, 
including the reduced and reducing laws/theories and the particular theories available 
at the time. Therefore, reducibility must be checked case-by-case, and there is no a 
priori reason to think that one kind of law/theory is always reducible to another kind. 
I wil l argue that relations such as ontological priority, supervenience, part-whole 
relation and causation cannot bring about reduction and do not determine the 
direction of reduction. 
*** 
The conclusion of this thesis is that Nagel's original account of reduction (presented 
in Chapter 1), and not later reconstructions of it, has the potentiality to become an 
adequate account of reduction, although it currently seems out of fashion. However, 
to remove huge arguments against this account (two of them are discussed in Chapter 
2) we have to strengthen it with two supplements. The first one is to introduce the 
notion of approximation (discussed in Chapter 3). Nagel recognized approximate 
reduction in his later account of reduction. The second supplement has a 
metaphysical flavour. We need a metaphysical analysis of the notion of realization 
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(discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). By having firm metaphysical grounds, we wil l see 
that the arguments against reduction which appealed to the notion of multiple 
realization are not catastrophic. 
After presenting a positive account of reduction, in the second part of this thesis I 
will consider some alternative accounts of reduction, and argue that they face serious 
problems, which do not apply to the version of reduction I defend. 
Finally, after giving a general outline of the version of reduction I defend, I will 
consider some of its characteristics and compare it with an alternative account of 
reduction. 
10 
Part One 
A Positive Account of Reduction 
11 
1 
Nagel's Account of Reduction 
Any analysis of the notion of reduction in the philosophy of science should start with 
Nagel's account. Not because it was the first account, nor because it does not need 
any amendment, but because it was so influential that most later accounts tried to 
support, modify, reformulate or reject it. Therefore, to understand the reduction 
literature, first we have to understand Nagel. Furthermore, I think there are still many 
important features to whom philosophers of science did not pay attention. Most 
philosophers simply supposed that Nagel had only one account. However, we wil l 
see that he did change some parts of the classic account after criticism. Therefore, it 
is not the Nagelian reduction; there are different Nagelian reductions, and each of 
them may have different problems. In addition, i f we restrict ourselves to his classic 
account of reduction, there are still many important points to which nobody paid 
enough attention. Some parts are simply ignored by philosophers and do not appear 
in any report. Critics did not pay attention to other parts and raised questions that 
Nagel had explicitly answered. Defenders, who wanted to add some elements and 
immunize it against criticisms, did not pay attention to its structure and so added 
elements that are in contrast with the original, and so on. In this chapter, I will start 
with Nagel's classic account and then in Chapter 3, after discussing some criticisms 
in Chapter 2, I will say more about his amended account. I think this amended 
account, supplemented by some metaphysical clarifications, can be the base of a 
modest account of reduction. 
1.1 Prelude 
Nagel presents his classic account of reduction between scientific theories in chapter 
11 of The Structure of Science (1961). As a general framework, he supposes that 
reduction is a kind of explanation: 'reduction, in the sense in which the word is here 
employed, is the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established in 
one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably formulated for some 
other domain.' (Nagel 1961, 338) This general framework says that the aim of 
reduction is an epistemic achievement (explanation) and not an ontological one (e.g. 
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economizing our scientific ontology). Therefore, i f an activity is directed towards 
achievements different from explanation of a scientific theory, it is not a reduction. 
Although, it is quite possible that in going towards explaining a scientific theory, 
some ontological results may be gained (e.g. identification of entities), but they are 
by-products of reduction not its central aim. 
Nagel divides reduction into two main kinds: homogeneous and heterogeneous. This 
is a 'language-relative' division (cf. Yoshida (1977, 174)), which is based on 
homogeneous and heterogeneous vocabularies. Two (descriptive) terms are 
homogeneous i f their meanings are (approximately) the same, and are heterogeneous 
i f their meanings are different (Nagel 1961, 339). The criterion is meaning here. 
Therefore, we need to consider Nagel's account of meaning. However, let us first 
explain his strategy for dividing reduction into two groups. Suppose that 77 is the 
primary theory (science) and that we want to reduce T2 as the secondary theory 
(science) to it. (Hereafter we call Tl the 'reducing theory' and T2 the 'reduced 
theory'.) Reduction of T2 to 77 is homogeneous i f the laws of T2 employ no 
descriptive terms that are not also used with approximately the same meaning in Tl. 
In other words, the reduction is homogeneous i f all descriptive terms of T2 are also 
used in Tl, and each of them has approximately the same meaning with its 
counterpart in Tl. Alternatively, the reduction is heterogeneous i f there are some 
descriptive terms in T2 that either are not used in Tl, or are used with (radically) 
different meanings (heterogeneous counterparts). As a result, homogeneous theories 
have homogeneous vocabularies and their reduction is homogeneous. Whereas, 
heterogeneous theories have heterogeneous vocabularies and therefore their 
reduction is heterogeneous. 
1.2 Theory of Meaning (I) 
As mentioned, Nagel's division of reduction into homogeneous and heterogeneous is 
based on the notion of meaning, and therefore his theory of meaning is at the heart of 
his reduction account. What is Nagel's account of meaning? Surprisingly, he does 
not present an explicit account of meaning in his classic work. However, he speaks 
about meaning and presents some examples that are clear enough to indicate his 
intuition. Here is one of them. 
Let us now assume that some person has come to understand what is 
meant by 'temperature' exclusively in terms of manipulating a mercury 
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thermometer. I f that individual were told that there is a substance which 
melts at a temperature of fifteen thousand degrees, he would probably be 
at a loss to make sense of this statement, and he might even claim that 
what has been told him is quite meaningless. In support of this claim he 
might maintain that, since a temperature can be assigned to bodies only 
on the basis of employing a mercury thermometer, and since such 
thermometers are vaporized when brought into the proximity of bodies 
whose temperature (as specified by a mercury thermometer) are a little 
above 350° C, the phrase "temperature of fifteen thousand degrees" has 
no defined sense and is therefore meaningless. (Nagel 1961, 340) 
According to this account, term 't' is associated with a procedure. We call this 
procedure the rule of usage for term 't'. This rule tells us that i f we want to use the 
term correctly, we have to follow the procedure. In this example, the rule of usage is 
the operational procedure of measuring temperature. According to Nagel, the 
meaning of 'temperature' is identical to (or at least determined by) this operational 
rule of usage. Now what is the place of the referent of 'temperature' in this picture? 
Naturally, we can say that if, and only if, a quantity satisfies the rule of usage, it is 
the referent of the term. What is temperature? Temperature is every state of a body 
that satisfies this operational rule of usage. 
Although this particular example concerns an operational definition for a scientific 
term, Nagel does not restrict rules of usage only to operational ones. Consider the 
situation of 'temperature' in elementary physics. Here this term has more than one 
rule of usage; it has a set of rules. One of them is still operational and expresses the 
relation between the behaviour of instruments such as thermocouples and the state of 
physical bodies that we call temperature. However, others are not operational. For 
example, there are some physical laws that express the relations between temperature 
and other physical states such as volume expansion or electrical resistance. Nagel 
considers all of them as rules of usage. Therefore, there is a set of rules of usage for 
the term (including operational, observational and theoretical). This set determines 
the meaning(s) of the term and every entity that satisfies this set is the referent of the 
term. (We shortly return to this point and consider its problems.) 
Let us consider this theory of meaning in more detail and see how it can affect an 
account of reduction. The first point is that meaning of a scientific term is fixed only 
by the theory that it has been appeared in. 
14 
It is, however, of utmost importance to note that expressions belonging to 
a science possess meanings that are fixed by its own procedures of 
explication. In particular, expressions distinctive of a given science (such 
as the word 'temperature' as employed in the science of heat) are 
intelligible in terms of the rules or habits of usage of that branch of 
inquiry; and when those expressions are used in that branch of study, they 
must be understood in the senses associated with them in that branch, 
whether or not the science has been reduced to some other discipline. 
(Nagel 1961,352) 
This point implies that every science determines the meaning of its terms by itself. 
From the fact that one term is used in two sciences, it cannot be concluded that these 
two usages have the same meaning and are synonymous. 
The second point is a question about the meaning of a term inside a single theory. 
Does a theory determine only one meaning for each term? For example, as we saw, 
'temperature' has different rules of usage in the science of heat and so has different 
meanings there. Are they synonymous? Nagel answers no. 
Accordingly, although 'temperature' is explicated in the science of heat 
both in terms of theoretical and of observational primitives, it does not 
follow that the word understood in the sense of the first explication is 
synonymous with 'temperature' construed in the sense of the second. 
(Nagel 1961,351) 
This consequence of Nagel's theory of meaning, however, is unclear and in one 
sense problematic. Suppose that in the science of heat we have two different 
meanings for 'temperature': 'temperature 1' determined by an observational rule of 
usage; and 'temperature 2' determined by a theoretical. These two terms, for which 
we use the same word, are heterogeneous, because according to Nagel their 
meanings are different. Given Nagel's theory of meaning that rules of usage 
determine reference of words, it is possible that these two terms refer to two different 
and distinct states of bodies. Now i f we want to use them interchangeably, for 
example using 'temperature 2' in premise of a deduction and deducing an 
observational sentence that contains 'temperature 1', we need some additional 
hypothesis that says the references of these two terms are the same, although each of 
them has a different meaning. It is because premises and results of a deduction must 
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refer to the same entity and not independent and distinct ones, although they might 
carry different meanings of it 1 . 
Now the question is, what elements of a theory play this role? For example, what 
parts of the science of heat tell us that the references of 'temperature l'and 
'temperature 2' are identical? One possible answer is that the theory embodies an 
empirical claim that, according to it, whenever we measure 'temperature 1' and 
'temperature 2' for any particular state of body, they have the same values. This 
means that i f we measure temperature by means of a thermocouple or i f we measure 
other parameters (like electrical resistance) and calculate temperature by means of 
them, we reach the same values. This solution, although it seems natural, has its own 
problems. One important problem is that the correlation between two parameters, or 
even having the same values, does not imply that they refer to the same thing. 
Temperature has a correlation with electrical resistance but they refer to two distinct 
physical states. Therefore, we need a stronger condition to ensure that there is only 
one state of body called temperature, although two terms with different meanings can 
both refer to it. What this stronger condition might be is a serious question that 
Nagel's account does not answer. 
Nagel's theory of reference has strong similarities with the 'description theories of 
reference'. The description theories can be divided into two groups: description 
theory of names and description theory of natural kind terms. Let us start with the 
former. According to the classical form of the theory, a descriptive content is 
associated with each proper name. This descriptive content determines the reference 
of the name: every particular object or individual that satisfies this description is the 
referent of the name. Consider for example 'Aristotle' as a proper name. When I use 
it, I associate a description with it like 'a Greek philosopher (384-322 B.C.)'. 
According to the description theory, this determines the reference of 'Aristotle': 
every person who has this description is Aristotle. In addition to this plain version of 
the description theory, there is an expanded version that tries to unify issues of 
reference and meaning (Reimer 2003). According to this expanded version, the 
meaning of a proper name is the mechanism by which the name refers to its referent, 
whereas according to the description theory, proper names refer to their referents via 
their associated descriptions, therefore the meaning of a proper name is the same 
' It is exactly the role of bridge principles, which Nagel requires them for deducing one theory from 
another with heterogeneous vocabularies. We will consider them later. 
16 
description that is associated with it. The meaning (cognitive content) of 'Aristotle' 
is the description associated with it: a Greek philosopher (384-322 B.C.). 
According to modern description theory, which is often called the 'cluster' theory, 
instead of tying a name tightly to one definite description, as the classical 
theory does, the modern theory ties it loosely to many. This cluster of 
descriptions expresses the sense of the name and determines its reference; 
the name refers to the object, i f any, that most, but not necessarily all, of 
those descriptions denote. The theory can be made more sophisticated still 
by allowing some descriptions to have greater weights in the vote than 
others. Thus, in the cluster associated with 'Aristotle', doubtless 'the 
systematizer of syllogistic logic' weights more heavily than 'the son of 
the court physician to Amyntas I I ' . (Devitt and Sterelny 1987, 43) 
Concerning natural kind terms, the description theory suggests the same strategy. 
Speakers of the language associate various descriptions with each natural kind term, 
like 'tiger', 'gold' or 'atom'. According to the classical version of the theory, one of 
these descriptions expresses the meaning of the term and determines its reference. 
However, according to the modern description theory, most of the cluster of these 
descriptions express the meaning and determine the reference (Devitt and Sterelny 
1987, 67). 
Similarly, in Nagel's implicit account of meaning which is mainly focused on natural 
kind terms, every term has some roles in its own theory. This means that, for every 
term, we have rules of usage which express relations between this term and other 
scientific terms, or its operational definitions. These rules of usage have similar 
function to descriptive contents in the description theory. Firstly, they determine the 
reference of the term, and secondly they express the meaning of it. Although some 
minor differences could be found between Nagel's implicit account of meaning and 
the description theory, their overall structures are similar. Especially i f we consider 
the alternative causal theory of reference, we wil l see that Nagel's account is more 
similar to the description theory rather than the causal theory. 
Nagel's account of meaning is an important component of his work on reduction but 
most philosophers did not pay attention to it. In the following chapters when we 
consider Feyerabend's objections to Nagel's account, we will see that he has a 
similar but more restricted account of meaning. We will also see that how some other 
philosophers (e.g. Yoshida) tried to adopt a causal theory of reference and present a 
17 
Nagelian account of reduction with different assumptions about meaning and 
reference2. 
1.3 Homogeneous Reduction 
Now let us return to Nagel's account of reduction. As mentioned, he distinguishes 
homogeneous from heterogeneous reduction. He thinks that because the former kind 
usually happens in the normal development of a science and is unproblematic, there 
is no need to discuss it in detail. According to Nagel, homogeneous reduction is 
nothing more than the deduction of one set of sentences from another, in which both 
use homogeneous vocabularies. For example, according to Nagel (1961, 339), 
Galileo's laws of free-falling terrestrial bodies reduce to Newtonian mechanics just 
by deduction. Because they use homogeneous vocabularies, we can easily obtain the 
latter from the former without any additional sentences. 
Sklar has presented an objection to this kind of reduction. 
I f one looks for examples of reduction from the history of science, strictly 
derivational reductions are few and far between. One can construe various 
relationships of a strictly derivational sort as reductions, but an 
examination of cases of reduction pre-analytically so-called, shows that 
even in the case of homogeneous theories reduction is very rarely 
derivation. (Sklar 1967, 110) 
Then he considers the relation between the Galilean laws of falling bodies or the 
Keplerian laws of planetary motion with Newtonian mechanics and concludes that 
here, the same and exact reduced theories cannot be derived from the reducing 
theory3. However, according to Sklar (1967, 111), 'what can be derived from the 
reducing theory is an approximation to the reduced, where this notion of 
approximation is suitably relativised to a degree of accuracy, a range of values of the 
independent parameters, etc' 
1 will consider approximate deduction and its relationship with the DN model of 
explanation in the following chapters, but let me consider the first part of Sklar's 
objection in more detail here: homogeneous reductions rarely happened in the history 
of science. It seems to me that we can strengthen this objection and change its nature 
2 For general problems with the description theory of reference, see Devitt and Sterelny (1987, Ch. 3). 
3 Duhem (1991, 193) also makes this point, 'the principles of universal gravity, very far from being 
derivable by generalization and induction from the observational laws of Kepler, formally contradicts 
these laws. If Newton's theory is correct, Kepler's laws are necessarily false.' 
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from historical to semantic. Can we have two homogeneous theories at all? Consider 
this simplified example: theory T2 contains descriptive term This term has only 
one rule of usage that determines its meaning. According to this rule ' t ' has a nomic 
relation with descriptive term 'k'. Term 'k' has two rules of usage, two nomic 
relations with terms 7' and 's' (Figure 1). 
t nomic relation k nomic relation s 
Figure 1: rules of usage in 72 
Now suppose that theory Tl contains terms 't\ 'k' and 's' too. I f these terms in 77 
want to have exactly the same meanings with their counterparts in T2, they must 
enter into exactly the same nomic relations in both theories. In other words, i f the 
meanings of terms are determined by their roles in a network of laws, having exactly 
similar roles means being in exactly similar networks. Therefore, 77 must have the 
same laws as 77. There are two possibilities here. According to the first, 77 has only 
the same laws that T2 has. In this case, terms in Tl and T2 are homogeneous and we 
can deduce T2 from Tl. However, this is a trivial reduction because T2 and Tl are 
the same. 
According to the second possibility, Tl might have some additional nomic relations, 
but they are such that they do not change the meanings of these three terms ('t', 'k' 
and 's'). This means that, they must be nomic relations among other terms, not 't\ 
'k' and 's'. As an example, let us suppose that Tl has the nomic relations as Figure 2. 
t nomic relation k .... .nomic relation s 
plus 
a .. ... nomic relation b nomic relation . .... c nomic relation .. d 
Figure 2: rules of usage in 77 
In this case, we can have homogeneous reduction between T2 and Tl, but the point is 
that Tl is not a unified scientific theory in the sense that we know in the history of 
science. Tl is in fact a conjunction of two separate and distinct set of laws, T2 plus 
T3. There is no connection between these two isolated parts. However, our concrete 
examples show that scientific theories are unified sets of laws, in the sense that each 
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two terms in a theory are somehow connected, directly or indirectly. Tl in our case is 
not a unified theory; it is simply a conjunction of two theories without any 
interconnection. 
As a result, a homogeneous reduction by means of the terms that have exactly the 
same meanings in both theories is possible only in two cases. Either the two theories 
must be the same or the reducing one must be an artificial conjunction of two 
separate theories. In both cases, reduction is trivial. 
However, there is another possibility here. As mentioned, Nagel (1961, 339) defines 
homogeneous terms as terms that might have approximately (not necessarily exactly) 
the same meaning. For example, we might say that terms 't', 'k' and 's' in Figure 1 
have approximately the same meanings with their counterparts in Figure 3. 
m nomic relation t nomic relation k nomic relation 5 
Figure 3: rules of usage in Tl 
This solution may solve the former problems, but brings about new ones. The notion 
of 'having approximately the same meaning' is vague, and Nagel has not explained 
whether two meanings are approximately similar or are radically different. Therefore, 
Nagel's criterion of homogeneous reduction is at best incomplete4. 
More importantly, the notion of similarity among meanings is elusive and vague such 
that articulating a satisfactory account of it is very difficult. For example, consider 
the fact that similarity is a relation that comes in degrees: a thing might be more 
similar to a second thing rather than a third one (regarding a particular aspect). This 
fact implies that apart from a satisfactory account of similarity, we need a limitation 
to indicate what extent of similarity is acceptable. For example, apart from 
articulating a theory about similarity among meanings, we need a criterion to indicate 
the minimum degree of acceptable similarity for homogeneous reduction. 
I wil l consider the issue of similarity in more detail in Chapter 5, but for our present 
purpose, it is enough to mention that having a satisfactory account of similarity 
among meanings and a justified threshold to indicate which amount of similarity is 
acceptable for homogeneous reduction is a philosophical project, as difficult as the 
4 Hempel (1965, Ch. 4) presents an exposition of empiricists' criteria of cognitive significance of 
sentences, including Carnap's account that was inherited by Nagel. In this exposition, there is no sign 
of combining the issue of meaning and the concept of approximation to make 'having approximately 
the same meaning' legitimate. 
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reduction project. Fortunately, we do not have to solve both problems at the same 
time. In Chapter 9, when I summarize my account of reduction, I will argue that the 
homogeneous/heterogeneous dichotomy does not solve any problem of reduction. 
We will see that by developing a satisfactory account of heterogeneous reduction we 
can cover the supposed homogeneous cases. In other words, by rejecting 
homogeneous reduction and considering any reduction as heterogeneous, and by 
having a strong account of heterogeneous reduction, we can bypass the difficulties of 
the notion of similarity among meanings. 
1.4 Heterogeneous Reduction: Formal Conditions 
Nagel thought that homogeneous reduction is unproblematic and so tried to provide 
an account of heterogeneous reduction. As mentioned, the aim of reduction is 
explanation of one theory by means of another. Of course, there are different models 
of explanation and there are different entities in each theory that can be explained. 
Nagel adopts the deductive-nomological account of explanation (DN), according to 
which both explanandum and explanans are sentences and the former should be a 
logical consequence of the latter. Regarding the entities, Nagel believes that laws of 
the reduced theory must be explained by the reducing theory: 
... [A] reduction is effected when the experimental laws of the secondary 
science (and i f it has an adequate theory, its theory as well) are shown to 
be the logical consequences of the theoretical assumptions (inclusive of 
the coordinating definitions) of the primary science. (Nagel 1961, 352) 
But for heterogeneous theories there is an obvious problem here. Some terms are 
used in T2 and not in 77, and deducing a synthetic sentence about a feature of the 
world containing terms that are not mentioned in the premises is impossible. I call 
this 'the standard problem' of heterogeneous reduction, the problem that Nagel tries 
to solve by suggesting some conditions for reduction. His conditions are divided into 
two groups: formal and non-formal. We start with the formal conditions. 
According to the first formal condition: 
It is an obvious requirement that the axioms, special hypotheses, and 
experimental laws of the sciences involved in a reduction must be 
available as explicitly formulated statements, whose various constituent 
terms have meanings unambiguously fixed by codified rules of usage or 
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by established procedures appropriate to each discipline. (Nagel 1961, 
345) 
The second formal condition is about meaning again: the elementary expressions 
used to construct sentences of a science S must be ' . . .employed unambiguously in S, 
with meanings fixed either by habitual usage or explicitly formulated rules' (Nagel 
1961, 349). The third formal condition is the core of Nagel's account, with which he 
wanted to solve the standard problem of reduction. Suppose that the reduced theory 
contains the term A that is not used in the reducing theory. According to the 
'condition of connectability', 'assumptions of some kind must be introduced which 
postulate suitable relations between whatever is signified by iA' and traits 
represented by theoretical terms already present in the primary science' (Nagel 1961, 
353-4). However, this condition is not sufficient for reduction and we need the 
'condition of derivability': 'With the help of these additional assumptions, all the 
laws of the secondary science, including those containing the term lA\ must be 
logically derivable from the primary discipline' (Nagel 1961, 354). 
Additional assumptions (bridge principles) are very important in Nagel's account, 
and many later objections and amendments were about their nature and role. Before 
we consider them in more detail, let us mention an important point about them. As 
mentioned, Nagel's distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous reduction 
is based on the notion of meaning. In heterogeneous reduction, we have some terms 
with different meanings. According to Nagel's account of meaning, because meaning 
determines reference, it is possible that these terms have distinct and separate 
referents. The role of additional assumptions is to provide some connections between 
the referents. It is important to notice that hereafter Nagel does not deal with 
meaning. He accepts that there are some terms with different meanings, and now he 
wants to find bridges to connect their referents. This point shows its importance 
when we see that some philosophers (e.g. Sklar 1967, 119) claimed that Nagel 
changes heterogeneous theories to homogeneous ones in the first place, and then uses 
the homogeneous account of reduction to reduce one of them to another. It is not true. 
Nagel accepts heterogeneous vocabularies, and does not want to make meanings of 
two heterogeneous terms similar by additional assumptions. He wants to connect 
their referents in some way. 
In his classic account, Nagel enumerates three possibilities for the states of bridge 
principles: they might provide logical, conventional or factual (material) connections. 
I f a bridge principle is a logical connection, it says there is a logical relation 
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(presumably synonymy or some form of one-way analytical entailment) between 
established meanings of two expressions (Nagel 1961, 354). On this alternative, 
because the meaning of an expression from the secondary science is explicable in 
terms of the established meanings of theoretical terms in the primary science, and 
because the meaning of a term fixes its reference, therefore there is a connection 
between the referents of the two expressions via the bridge principle. 
A bridge principle might be a conventional connection as well (Nagel 1961, 354). 
This case can be understood well i f we suppose that 'A' is an observational term in 
T2, and by a convention, we connect it to a theoretical expression in 77. By this 
connection, we assign an experimental significance to a certain theoretical term, and 
say it refers to a state of body that 'A ' as an observational term refers to as well. It is 
important to notice that it is not an arbitrary connection; it should be consistent with 
other such assignments that may have been previously made. We can see again that 
the meanings of two terms are still different here, whereas we have a connection 
between their referents. 
The third kind of bridge principle is factual (material). Here we have ' . . . physical 
hypotheses, asserting that the occurrence of the state of affairs signified by a certain 
theoretical expression '5 ' in the primary science is a sufficient (or necessary and 
sufficient) condition for the state of affairs designated by iA" (Nagel 1961, 354). 
Nagel (1961, 354-5) puts a restriction on this bridge principle, 'I t will be evident that 
in this case independent evidence must in principle be obtainable for the occurrence 
of each of two states of affairs, so that the expressions designating the two states 
must have identifiably different meanings.' In Chapter 3, we wil l see that Nagel, in 
his later account of reduction, restricts bridge principles to only the factual ones. 
Before we go on to consider the second group of conditions (non-formal), let us 
consider bridge principles in more detail, and see how some philosophers 
misunderstood their nature. 
1.5 Bridge Principles 
In this section, I am going to clarify the notion of bridge principles and mention 
some misinterpretations of them. The first point concerns the number of components 
in a bridge connection. The essential role of a bridge principle is to provide some 
connection between the referents of two heterogeneous terms. This role may be 
played by different kinds of connections. Therefore, as long as a connection (or a set 
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of connections) plays this role, it must be accepted as a bridge principle. However, 
Nagel restricts a bridge connection only to one bridge principle and ignores the 
possibility of a set of bridge principles instead of one. In other words, Nagel 
presupposes that, for connecting two terms, we always need only one bridge 
principle and not a set of them. For example, when he considers the factual 
connection, because he has only one bridge principle in mind, he says that the bridge 
connection must express either 'B' (from the secondary science) is sufficient for 'A ' 
(from the primary science) or 'B' is necessary and sufficient for 'A'. However, it is 
possible that instead of one connection, we have a set of bridge principles in one case, 
and accordingly it is possible that in one of them 'B' is a necessary condition for 'A '. 
Hempel (1969, 188) presents this example: suppose that the primary science includes 
this law, 
(x) (Blx^B2x) 
and the secondary science includes this one: 
(x) (Alx —»• A2 x) 
Now the set of bridge principles might have this form: 
(x) (Alx^Blx) 
(x) (B2x-^A2x) 
Here the secondary science can be derived from the primary science and the set of 
bridge principles and we have connections between referents of our terms in bridge 
principles. However, in one bridge connection the term of the primary science ( ' B l ' ) 
is a necessary (neither sufficient nor necessary and sufficient) condition for the term 
of the secondary science ( ' A l ' ) . Therefore, it seems that restricting the number of 
bridge principles to one and mentioning the logical form of factual connections is not 
necessary for Nagel's account, and the general requirement that they must provide 
some connections between referents of the terms is enough. 
Now let us turn to an obvious point that caused many philosophers to misunderstand 
Nagel's account. It is clear that because of the standard problem of heterogeneous 
reduction, we need some kind of bridge principles. This means that, the secondary 
theory can be deduced from the primary one plus bridge principles. Are these bridge 
principles parts of the primary theory? Nagel gives a negative answer to this question. 
In his case study of the reduction of the Boyle-Charles' law in thermodynamics to 
statistical mechanics, he says, 
... the Boyle-Charles' law cannot be deduced from the assumptions of 
statistical mechanics unless a postulate is added relating the term 
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'temperature' to the expression 'mean kinetic energy of molecules'. This 
postulate cannot itself be deduced from statistical mechanics in its classic 
form .... (Nagel 1961,372) 
In other words, according to Nagel, the laws of secondary science can be deduced 
from the laws of primary science plus some additional and independent assumptions, 
and the whole of this activity is called reduction. Therefore, it is an absurd attempt to 
discuss whether the reduced theory can be derived only from the reducing theory or 
not. Yoshida (1977, 1) has this point in mind when he says, T mention this now 
because some have thought it worthwhile to discuss the question of whether the less 
comprehensive is derivable from the more comprehensive theory alone. No one 
would or should be so foolish as to hold such a view.' 
However, some philosophers ignored Nagel's explicit answer and tried to criticize 
his account on this base. Sklar (1993, 8) says, 'But there is a serious objection to this 
account. I f the reduced theory follows only from the reducing theory and the bridge 
laws, why say that a reduction to the reducing theory has occurred at all?' In other 
words, Sklar thinks that T2 should be derived only from 77, and i f something else 
(bridge principles, BP) is added to 77, there is no reason to say that T2 is reducible to 
Tl. Therefore, Sklar thinks there is a dilemma here. I f we want to reduce T2 to Tl 
alone, all of the bridge principles must be derived from Tl. However, we know this 
is not possible and so Nagel's account is not feasible. On the other hand, Sklar says; 
let us accept that we can have some independent assumptions as bridge principles, 
now reduction is a trivial activity. 
Doesn't the postulation of bridge laws as usable in reduction in fact 
trivialize the search for reduction? Can't we always derive the reduced 
theory from the conjunction of the reducing theory and a new bridge 
theory that simply posits that i f the reducing theory holds, then so does 
the reduced? (Sklar 1993, 338) 
Regarding the second horn of the dilemma, I would like to say that Sklar, like most 
philosophers, did not pay attention to the non-formal conditions of reduction. Nagel 
puts some non-formal restrictions on the bridge principles that prevent such naive 
and trivial cases. We will consider these non-formal conditions later. 
Needham (1982, 196) has a similar objection, 
... they [factual bridge principles] are substantial claims extra to the 
reducing theory. This is the second major problem: i f the theory can't be 
construed as including them, why say that a derivation of the reduced 
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theory from the reducing theory together with bridge laws is a case of 
reduction? 
Then, Needham argues that the kind of bridge principles is not important here. Even 
i f we restrict them to only biconditionals, they are still something additional to the 
reducing theory and therefore 'extend' it. 
How can we reply to this objection? The situation here is similar to the prediction of 
an observational sentence from a theory. Newtonian mechanics can predict planetary 
motions, this means that the theory plus some additional information, like initial and 
boundary conditions, which are not part of the theory, logically imply some 
observational sentences about planetary motions. Does it mean, because these 
sentences are not deducible from only Newtonian mechanics, that we do not have a 
prediction? Alternatively, does it mean that the theory is extended by these additional 
sentences? Obviously not, because nobody says that premises of prediction must be 
restricted to the theory or adding initial conditions extends the theory. 
Similarly, in the case of reduction, as Nagel says, reducing T2 to 77 (by definition) 
means obtaining the former from the latter plus some additional bridge principles. 
Nagel does not restrict the premises to the reducing theory, and as he explicitly says, 
we need something more. 
The next point concerns identity statements. We will see in Chapter 3 that many 
philosophers after Nagel suggested that bridge principles must be identity statements, 
asserting an identity relation between things or properties. However, Nagel does not 
require bridge principles to be identities. In his concrete example to reduce a law 
from thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, we see a bridge principle that makes a 
connection between the referent of 'temperature' in the former and the referent of 
'mean kinetic energy of the molecules' in the latter, both in the ideal gases. However, 
this is not an identity statement. 
Let us consider this particular example in more detail. Nagel (1961, 344-5) says, 
Let us therefore introduce the postulation that 2E/3 = kT, that is, that the 
absolute temperature of an ideal gas is proportional to the mean kinetic 
energy of the molecules assumed to constitute it. 
Unlike some other philosophers such as Kripke (1980, 129), Nagel does not say that 
temperature is identical with the mean kinetic energy of molecules. Kripke's claim 
has some serious empirical problems that Needham (1982, 206-10) has considered in 
detail. For example, the notion of negative absolute temperature makes many 
physicists dubious about the identity of temperature and mean kinetic energy of 
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molecules. Nevertheless, whatever objections threaten the identity between these two 
entities, they are irrelevant to Nagel's claim about a proportional relation between 
temperature and the mean kinetic energy of molecules only in the ideal gases. 
Needham (1982, 209), however, extended his objection and tried to cover Nagel's 
claim as well. 
There remains a problem even in the special case of the ideal gas for 
which a proportionality between temperature and energy is derived from 
the kinetic gas theory. Considering the average kinetic energy of the 
constituent molecules accommodates the fact that the molecules don't all 
have the same energy, and gives us a property which, like temperature, is 
a property of the entire gas but not of the individual molecules. But this 
leads to the problem that the average kinetic energy might be defined 
when the gas doesn't have a temperature at all. Such situations obtain 
when the distribution of energy isn't that of an equilibrium distribution-
i.e. a distribution corresponding to an equilibrium state, when all parts are 
at equilibrium with one another. (The notion of temperature is introduced 
in thermodynamics by providing a basis for maintaining that bodies at 
equilibrium with one another have the same temperature.) Accordingly, 
even where temperature does correspond to a definite value for the 
average kinetic energy of the constituent particles, mere possession of this 
microfeature is at best only a necessary condition for an ideal gas having 
a particular temperature. The question is whether this necessary condition 
can be converted into a sufficient condition by a suitable further 
qualification without circularity- without presupposing the very notion of 
temperature which was to be reduced. 
In reply to this objection, I would like to emphasise that Needham might have some 
reasons for converting the necessary condition into a sufficient one. However, 
whatever these reasons are, they are irrelevant to Nagel's model. According to my 
interpretation of Nagel (see above), logical forms of bridge principles are not 
important; the main aim is to provide some connections between the referents, by 
means of which the secondary science can be deduced from the primary science. 
This connection, as Hempel showed, may contain a necessary condition. Therefore, 
the mere fact that we have a necessary condition is not an objection against Nagel's 
model. I f we can deduce T2 from 77 by using this necessary condition, it is enough 
for the purpose of reduction. As a result, Nagel's example is not an identity relation 
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and as he explains, it is either a physical (factual) or a conventional connection5. 
Furthermore, even i f we show that having a particular microfeature is only a 
necessary condition for having a particular temperature in the ideal gases, this does 
not prevent us in principle from reduction. This necessary condition might appear in 
a set of bridge principles and might facilitate reduction. 
The last point about bridge principles is that they are not necessarily bridge laws, i f 
we understand laws as empirical claims. As mentioned, Nagel presents three 
possibilities for a bridge principle. Under two of them, they are clearly not laws, but 
logical and conventional connections. Many philosophers, including Nagel in his 
later works, restricted bridge principles to 'bridge laws'. However, in his classic 
account Nagel does not insist on laws. In Chapter 3, we wil l see that even i f logical 
and conventional connections are rejected as bridge principles, there are other kinds 
of bridge principles (e.g. initial conditions) that are not laws. In Chapter 5, I will 
argue that the essential requirement for a factual bridge principle is to have nomic 
necessity, not being a law. 
1.6 Heterogeneous Reduction: Non-formal Conditions 
Apart from formal conditions, Nagel presents some non-formal conditions for 
reduction. As far as I know, almost all philosophers who wanted to summarize, 
criticize, amend, apply or reformulate this account, simply ignored the non-formal 
conditions6. It is a dominant belief that Nagel's account of reduction is purely formal 
and that the formal (logical) structure of theories is sufficient to decide whether the 
theories are reducible or not. However, this is not true at all. Nagel's account is a 
non-formal one, which, in addition to logical restrictions, puts non-formal conditions 
on reduction. Nagel (1961, 358) sees reduction as a genuine scientific activity and 
thinks that formal conditions cannot separate trivial reduction from noteworthy 
scientific achievements. I will consider non-formal aspects of reduction in the last 
5 It is interesting to note that according to Nagel (1961, 356-7), a bridge principle can have more than 
one cognitive status and these statuses are not necessarily inconsistent. In one context, we can assume 
the relation of temperature and the mean kinetic energy of molecules as a physical hypothesis, and in 
another context, we can assume it as a conventional one. In the former case, we calculate the value of 
the mean kinetic energy of molecules in some indirect fashion from experimental data other than that 
obtained by measuring the temperature. This measurement shows that the temperature is proportional 
to the value of the mean kinetic energy. In the latter case, according to a coordinating definition we 
connect the experimental concept of temperature to the theoretical concept of the mean kinetic energy. 
6 See for example, Feyerabend (1962), Schaffner (1967), Sklar (1967, 1993), Nickles (1973), Yoshida 
(1977), Hooker (1981), Needham (1982), Kim (1990) and Smith (1992). 
28 
chapter. Here I only mention Nagel's non-formal conditions and show how these 
conditions cast light on the notion of reduction. 
Nagel has three non-formal conditions. According to the first, the primary science 
must not be ad hoc. 
I f the sole requirement for reduction were that the secondary science is 
logically deducible from arbitrary chosen premises, the requirement could 
be satisfied with relatively little difficulty. In the history of scientific 
reductions, however, the premises of the primary science are not ad hoc 
assumptions. Accordingly, although it would be a far too strong condition 
that the premises must be known to be true, it does seem reasonable to 
impose as a nonformal requirement that the theoretical assumptions of the 
primary science be supported by empirical evidence possessing some 
degree of probative force. (Nagel 1961, 358) 
Nagel mentions two kinds of empirical support for the primary science. Obviously, 
the first kind is those supports that 77 had them before we consider reducibility of 
any other theory to it. This means that before we went to discover reduction relation, 
77 was an established theory with different empirical supports, including both direct 
and indirect. The second kind of support for 77 is provided after reduction of T2 to it. 
For 77 implies the established, and even new laws of T2, supportive evidence of T2 
is now supportive for Tl as well. In other words, by reduction, we go towards a kind 
of unity between different parts of science. In the case of reducing thermodynamics 
to the kinetic theory of gases Nagel (1961, 359) says, 
But the point having greatest weight in this connection is that the 
combined assumptions of the primary science to which the science of heat 
was reduced have made it possible to incorporate into a unified system 
many apparently unrelated laws of the science of heat as well as of other 
parts of physics. A number of gas laws had of course been established 
before the reduction. However, some of these laws were only 
approximately valid for gases not satisfying certain narrowly restrictive 
conditions; and most of the laws, moreover, could be affirmed only as so 
many independent facts about gases. The reduction of thermodynamics to 
mechanics altered this state of affairs in significant ways. It paved the 
way for a reformulation of gas laws so as to bring them into accord with 
the behaviour of gases satisfying less restrictive conditions; it provided 
leads to the discovery of new laws; and it supplied a basis for exhibiting 
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relations of systematic dependence among gas laws themselves, as well as 
between gas laws and laws about bodies in other states of aggregation. 
Therefore, we can summarize that reduction is a genuine scientific activity in Nagel's 
account, which goes towards the unity of science. This unity makes the primary 
science more supported, gathers and connects laws of the secondary science 
(especially approximately valid laws) together, gives more support to the secondary 
laws, gives opportunities to discover new laws, and finally shows a systematic 
dependence between the two theories. By having this non-formal condition, we can 
consider one of the objections that some philosophers raised against Nagel. In the 
case of reduction of the Boyle-Charles law to the kinetic theory, Nagel suggests this 
factual bridge principle: 
(*) 2E/3 = kT 
(Which in it E is mean kinetic energy of molecules, T is absolute temperature and A is a constant) 
Now this factual claim must be testable. How can we test it? Ager, et al. (1974) 
raised their objection on the basis that it was impossible to test (*). According to 
them, we can only deduce the Boyle-Charles law or some other well-confirmed laws 
from (*) plus kinetic theory, and because these laws are well-established empirical 
ones, their derivation cannot be regarded as testing (*). 
But because the Boyle-Charles law is highly confirmed independently of 
kinetic theory, the fact that it is deducible from kinetic theory and (*) 
gives no entrance for testing (*). Indeed, even i f other well established 
empirical laws are deducible from other parts of kinetic theory and (*), 
the structure of these derivations would similarly insulate (*) from 
falsification. So long as bridge laws like (*) are conceived of as 
statements which enable the derivation of well confirmed macroscopic 
laws from a micro-theory, their adequacy is decided on logical rather than 
experimental grounds. The reason that [2/3E2 = kT] is an inadequate 
bridge law is not that it is falsified by experimental work, but that it does 
not lead to the Boyle-Charles law. (Ager, et al. 1974, 120-1) 
These authors did not recognize that Nagel had accepted this point and explicitly 
mentioned it. 
I f the Boyle-Charles' law were the sole experimental law deducible from 
the kinetic theory of gases, it is unlikely that this result would be counted 
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by most physicists as weighty evidence for the theory. They would 
probably take the view that nothing of significance is achieved by the 
deduction of only this one law. ... Moreover, physicists would doubtless 
call attention to the telling point that even the deduction of this law can be 
effected only with the help of a special postulate connecting temperature 
with the energy of gas molecules- a postulate that, under the 
circumstances envisaged, has the status of an ad hoc assumption, 
supported by no evidence other than the evidence warranting the Boyle-
Charles' law itself. (Nagel 1961, 359) 
However, in the actual and significant scientific reductions we have two sets of 
supportive evidence that change this situation. 'One set consists of experimental laws, 
deduced from the theory, which have not been previously established or which are in 
better agreement with a wider range of facts than are laws previously accepted' 
(Nagel 1961, 360). For example, in the case of thermodynamics, Nagel says that, by 
adjusting our bridge principles, apart from the Boyle-Charles law, we can deduce the 
van der Waals law, which is applicable to both ideal and non-ideal gases. Therefore, 
these two laws are now connected to each other by means of a single theory. This 
scientific achievement of reduction provides some supportive evidence for both the 
primary science and the bridge principles. 
In general, therefore, for a reduction to mark a significant intellectual 
advance, it is not enough that previously established laws of the 
secondary science be represented within the theory of the primary 
discipline. The theory must also be fertile in usable suggestions for 
developing the secondary science, and must yield theorems referring to 
the latter's subject matter which augment or correct its currently accepted 
body of laws. (Nagel 1961, 360) 
The second kind of supportive evidence is the intimate and frequently surprising 
relations of dependence that obtain between various experimental laws of two 
theories by means of reduction. For example, we can show that the different 
experimental laws of 77, which before reduction had been regarded as independent 
and separate with independent evidential grounds, are now deducible from an 
integrated theory. Another example concerns the numerical constants that are 
appeared in different experimental laws of 77. By means of reduction, we can show 
that they are definite functions of theoretical parameters in the primary science. 
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In summary, those philosophers who criticized Nagel for the impossibility of testing 
factual bridge principles did not pay attention to the first non-formal condition of 
reduction, according to which reduction must be a significant scientific achievement, 
which goes beyond mere deduction of the established laws of the secondary science. 
Reduction should provide some suggestions for development of the secondary 
science, and this development provides the possibility of testing both the primary 
science and the bridge principles. 
The second non-formal condition is about the stage of development of theories. The 
question of reducibility cannot be answered without considering this parameter. The 
general idea is that scientific theories do not remain unaltered during the 
development of scientific disciplines and '[accordingly, the question whether a 
given science is reducible to another cannot in the abstract be usefully raised without 
reference to some particular stage of development of the two disciplines' (Nagel 
1961, 361). For example, Nagel says, thermodynamics is reducible to mechanics 
only i f the latter has postulates about molecules and their modes of actions. This 
means that thermodynamics is only reducible to mechanics after 1866, the year that 
Boltzmann gave a statistical interpretation for the second law of thermodynamics 
with the help of some statistical hypotheses, and it was not reducible to the 
mechanics of 1700. This point says that the question 'whether thermodynamics is 
reducible to mechanics or not?' does not have an absolute answer. Reduction needs 
some logical apparatus, and, i f it exists, reduction is possible. According to Nagel, 
reducibility or irreducibility of one theory to another is not a sign for their 
ontological connection or separation; it is a mere logical fact and does not relate to 
the immutable structure of the universe (Nagel 1961, 363-4). 
Nagel presents another point in connection with the second non-formal condition. 
Because reduction must be a significant scientific achievement, it is possible that 
despite the fact that formal conditions are satisfiable in a particular case, we do not 
try to reduce one science to another at a certain period of their development. 
Attempts to reduce the discipline to another (perhaps theoretically more 
advanced) science, even i f successful, may then divert needed energies 
from what are the crucial problems at this period of the discipline's 
expansion, without being compensated by effective guidance from the 
primary science in the conduct of further research. For example, at a time 
when the prime need of botany is to establish a systematic typology of 
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existing plant life, the discipline may reap little advantage from adopting 
a physicochemical theory of living organisms. (Nagel 1961, 362) 
The moral of the story is that, according to the current stage of development of 77 
and T2, we can make a strategic decision to reduce T2 to 77 or not. Whatever this 
decision is, it has a temporal character and the reducibility or irreducibility is 
temporally qualified, and so does not say anything about the ultimate structure of the 
world. 
The second non-formal condition helps us to see the non-formal nature of Nagel's 
account more clearly. According to this account, apart from two theories and their 
logical relations, some external factors are relevant in reducibility. This means that 
even i f formal conditions are satisfied, some non-formal considerations such as the 
time of reduction or the empirical significance of it, must be taken into account. We 
might have no reduction between two theories in a particular period, but have 
reduction between them some time later. This point leads us to distinguish two 
categories of reduction that I call 'reduction with necessity' and 'reduction without 
necessity'. According to the former, formal considerations (in particular formal 
relations between two theories or between their elements) imply a necessity for 
reduction. We consider two theories formally, and i f some formal conditions are 
satisfied, one of them is necessarily reducible to another. I f the reduction is not 
achievable now, it is available in principle, and we will obtain it in the future when 
we discover more about the field of study. As an example, consider those accounts of 
microreduction; according to them, i f a theory deals with macro-behaviours, macro-
states and macro-properties of a system, it is necessarily reducible to theories that are 
dealing with micro-behaviours, micro-states and micro-properties of that system. I f 
such a necessary reduction is not achievable now, it is achievable in principle. As 
this example shows, here some formal considerations (the micro/macro relation) 
imply that reduction is necessary . 
However, in 'reduction without necessity', no formal consideration can imply the 
necessity of reduction. Nagel's account belongs to this category. According to him, 
even i f all the formal conditions of reduction are satisfied, some non-formal 
conditions might prevent us from reduction. Believing in reduction with necessity is 
to believe in a kind of reductionism, which I defined in the introduction. In Chapter 9, 
7 Another example is reduction by means of supervenience, which I will consider in Chapter 7. Here 
the formal consideration of supervenience between two sets of properties implies that the theory deals 
with the supervenient set of properties is necessarily reducible to the theory that deals with the 
subvenient set. 
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I wil l explain the version of reduction that I defend. This is a reduction without 
necessity. I do not commit to reductionism. 
Nagel's third non-formal condition is a general remark about the nature of reduction, 
more of a real condition. Nagel emphasises that reduction is the deduction of one set 
of sentences from another. In reduction, we derive sentences of one theory from 
another and not properties of one subject matter from properties of another. This 
point is important when we find out that some emergentists (e.g. Broad 1925, 59) 
rejected reduction, because according to them we cannot even in principle, obtain or 
deduce novel properties of systems from the most complete knowledge of the 
behaviour of the components. In reply, Nagel presents two answers. First, we do not 
have direct access to properties and nature of things, unless we have certain 
explicitly formulated theories that embody those properties. 
... the "nature" of things, and in particular of the "elementary 
constituents" of things, are not accessible to direct inspection and that we 
cannot read off by simple inspection what it is they do or do not imply. 
Such "natures" must be stated as a theory and are not the objects of 
observation... (Nagel 1961, 364) 
Therefore, the emergentists claim changes to a new claim that we cannot reduce 
theories which embody novel properties of systems to theories that embody 
properties of the components. Nagel's second point says that i f we cannot reduce one 
theory to another, this has only a formal reason and not a metaphysical one. Two 
theories are irreducible simply because there are no suitable bridge principles to 
connect them. However, this does not mean that the properties of these two theories 
are ontologically irreducible. We might find new theories embodying these 
properties, while they are reducible. 
Accordingly, whether a given set of "properties" or "behavioral traits" of 
macroscopic objects can be explained by, or reduced to, the "properties" 
or "behavioral traits" of atoms and molecules is a function of whatever 
theory is adopted for specifying the "natures" of these elements. (Nagel 
1961, 365) 
Irreducibility of two theories does not show anything about the nature of the world 
and its hierarchy. We might have reduction i f theories dealing with properties are 
changed (as thermodynamics became reducible to mechanics only after 1866). 
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1.7 Nature of Nagel's Account 
I finish this chapter by two general remarks about Nagel's account. First, Nagel's 
original model is suitable only to reduce true theories, (those we currently use), or 
approximately true theories (those that are strictly speaking false, but are 
approximately true in a narrow domain of application). It cannot be used to reduce 
false theories to more comprehensive theories that replaced them (e.g. phlogiston 
and Lavoisier's theory). There are two reasons for this claim. First, because the 
primary science is true and bridge principles either are true or are approximately true 
(true in a narrow domain), therefore the secondary science that is derived from them 
is either true or approximately true. Second, because a significant reduction must 
provide usable suggestions for developing the secondary science (the first non-
formal condition), the secondary science must be in use. This means that the 
secondary science is either true or approximately true. Yoshida (1977) tried to extend 
Nagelian reduction to cover false theories. I will discuss this possibility in Chapters 3 
and 9. 
The second remark concerns the point that reduction of T2 to 77 does not mean that 
72's classifications and kinds are illusory, and we can eliminate them by means of 
77's classifications and kinds. Nagel is not an ontological eliminativist. The reason is 
that by reducing T2 to 77, we find some explanation for the occurrence of the states 
and behaviours that T2 deals with. However, this is an explanation, neither a 
logically necessary connection nor a synonymy relation between two states (Nagel 
1961, 366). By this explanation, we assert some conditions, formulated by means of 
the primitives of the primary science, under which a state from the secondary science 
contingently takes place. The key point is that Nagel takes the relation between 
properties of the secondary and primary sciences to be a contingent relation . His 
bridge principles are at most coextension relations, rather than property identities. 
Therefore, he concludes that, although the primary science can imply the secondary 
one, we still recognize properties of the secondary science as real. Hempel 
recognizes the point that satisfying Nagel's conditions of reduction does not 
conclude that we reduce concepts of the secondary to concepts of the primary science 
and eliminate them from our ontology. 
8 As far as I can see, there is an inconsistency in Nagel's account here. As we saw earlier, he accepts 
that a bridge principle might be a logical relation, i.e. a synonymy or an analytic relation. However, 
here he insists that bridge principles are contingent relations. I have not found any attempt to reconcile 
these two claims. Perhaps this is the reason that Nagel in his later account of reduction restricted 
bridge principles only to factual connections and ignored logical and conventional connections. 
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Even a set of connective principles powerful enough to permit a reduction 
of all the principles of a biological theory B to those of a physicochemical 
theory P need not permit a corresponding reduction of concepts; i.e., it 
need not provide a characterization of every concept of B by means of 
concepts of P. (Hempel 1969, 189) 
This point is worthy of further clarification. One possible kind of bridge principles is 
identity statements. Here we assert an identity between two types (kinds), concepts 
or properties of the primary and the secondary science. For example, we say concept 
c2 from the secondary science is identical to (is nothing more than) concept cl from 
the primary science. An identity relation is necessary, although it might be known a 
priori or a posteriori. Some philosophers believe that reduction must be achieved by 
means of identity statements that identify each kind of T2 that is not used in 77 with 
a kind of 77. We can call this 'type-type' identity, by means of which we eliminate 
T2,s ontology and replace it with TPs. However, it is important to notice that 
Nagel's reduction is not so. Even i f we restrict bridge principles only to factual 
(material) connections, they are not identity relations. Identity relations are necessary, 
whereas Nagel says that factual relations are contingent. Factual connections assert 
that an occurrence of what is referred to by a term of the primary science is sufficient 
or necessary and sufficient (or according to my interpretation only necessary) for 
occurrence of what is referred to by a term of the secondary science. Moreover, this 
relation might hold only in a narrow domain. For example, Nagel says 'temperature' 
and 'the mean kinetic energy of molecules' are coextensive only in the ideal gases 
and not in other states like phase changing, and this is enough for the purpose of 
reduction as long as we want to reduce a law about the ideal gases (the Boyle-
Charles law) to the basic theory. Consequently, Nagel's bridge principles, even i f we 
restrict them to factual hypotheses, are not type-type identities. We still commit to 
the ontology of the secondary science after reduction9. 
9 In Chapter 6,1 will show that some reduced theories can provide explanations that are not obtainable 
by reducing. This is another reason why we need reduced theories as well as reducing ones. 
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2 
The First Wave of Objections 
Nearly one year after Nagel published his classic account of reduction; P. K. 
Feyerabend (1962) raised some objections on it. These (and others presented by other 
philosophers with the same nature) made the first wave of objections on Nagel's 
account. In reply, reductionists made two kinds of response. One group tried to 
criticise Feyerabend's presuppositions and arguments and show their inadequacy. 
The other group, although they did not accept Feyerabend's arguments, found 
important points in them, and so modified their accounts of reduction. In this chapter, 
I will start with Feyerabend's basic presupposition about the nature of meaning and 
an exposition of his holistic account of meaning, which has a central role in his 
criticisms. Then I will consider some problems with it and show that, aside from the 
debate over reduction, it is not an adequate account of meaning for scientific terms. 
After that, I wil l examine Feyerabend's two main objections to reduction: the 
problem of inconsistency, and the problem of meaning variance. Regarding the latter, 
I will show that Feyerabend's argument is not clear and has flaws. Moreover, i f we 
ignore the flaws, it is not a serious objection to Nagel's model. The former objection, 
however, is more powerful and leads us to the next chapter, in which I consider the 
reductionists' attempts to remove it. 
2.1 Theory of Meaning (II) 
Feyerabend's account of meaning for scientific terms is similar to Nagel's in one 
aspect. Both of them believe that every descriptive term used in a scientific theory, 
has rules of usage that determine its meaning and reference. Therefore, Feyerabend's 
account, like Nagel's, is in the campus of the description theory of reference. 
However, an important difference is that Feyerabend's account is radically 'holistic' 
or 'contextual'. According to Nagel, a descriptive term (especially an observational 
descriptive term) might have a rule of usage that is not connected to the theory which 
the term is used in. In other words, the meaning of an observational term might be 
determined independently from the theory in hand, for example by an operational 
rule of usage in a different theory. Meanings of this sort of terms are independent of 
the theoretical principles of the theory, and therefore can appear in two different 
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theories with two different sets of theoretical principles with the same meaning. 
(Remember the example of 'temperature' in Chapter 1: its meaning could be 
determined by an operational definition independently from the theoretical principles 
of the kinetic theory.) 
However, according to Feyerabend, the meaning of each scientific term is completely 
determined by theoretical principles of the theory in which the term appears. As 
Achinstein summarizes Feyerabend's view, 
1. A scientific term S that occurs in a theory T cannot be understood 
unless at the least the basic principles of T are known and understood. 
(Achinstein 1964, 497) 
One logical consequence of this account is that i f an old theory is replaced or 
modified by a new theory, and by doing so, some of its theoretical principles are 
changed, then common terms in these two theories are not synonymous. Because the 
rules of usage that determine their meanings include different theoretical principles, 
they do not have a common meaning. For example, although we use the term 'mass' 
in both classical and relativistic theories, it has a different meanings in each one, and 
in fact we speak about two different things by one name. (It might be said that the 
term 'mass' is ambiguous.) Achinstein puts this logical consequence as follows, 
2. The meaning of a scientific term S which occurs in a theory T wil l 
change i f T is modified or i f T is replaced by another theory in which S 
also occurs. (Achinstein 1964, 497) 
Here is a long quotation from Feyerabend to support these two ideas10. 
What happens here when transition is made from a theory T' to a wider 
theory T (which, we shall assume, is capable of covering all the 
phenomena that have been covered by T1) is something much more 
radical than incorporation of unchanged theory T' (unchanged, that is, 
with respect to the meanings of its main descriptive terms as well as to the 
meanings of the terms of its observation language) into the context of T. 
What does happen is, rather, a complete replacement of the ontology (and 
perhaps even of the formalism) of T' by the ontology (and the formalism) 
of T and a corresponding change of the meanings of the descriptive 
elements of the formalism of T' (provided these elements and this 
formalism are still used). This replacement affects not only the theoretical 
1 0 Feyerabend presented these two ideas in almost all of his works. Kuhn (1970, 100-102) also has a 
similar view about the meaning of scientific terms. 
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terms of T' but also at least some of the observational terms which 
occurred in its test statements. That is, not only will description of things 
and processes in the domain in which so far T' had been applied be 
infiltrated, either with the formalism and the terms of T, or i f the terms T' 
are still in use, with the meanings of the terms of T, but the sentences 
expressing what is accessible to direct observation inside this domain will 
now mean something different. In short: introducing a new theory 
involves changes of outlook both with respect to the observable and with 
respect to the unobservable features of the world, and corresponding 
changes in the meanings of even the most "fundamental" terms of the 
language employed. (Feyerabend 1962, 28-9) 
2.2 Problems with the Holistic Theory of Meaning 
In this section, I will consider some problems with this theory of meaning. First, I 
wi l l start with a general problem with any description theory that could be applied to 
Feyerabend's proposal as well. Kripke (1980) enumerates three main problems with 
the description theories of meaning: the problem of unwanted necessity (sometimes 
called the epistemic problem), the problem of rigidity (sometimes called the modal 
problem), and the problem of ignorance and error (sometimes called the semantic 
problem). According to some people, the second and third problems have more 
narrow domains of application, while the first problem is more general11. In what 
follows, I will consider only the first problem in detail. 
Consider the sentence: 'Aristotle was a philosopher'. Now suppose that for a speaker 
the associated description with 'Aristotle', which determines its meaning, is 'the last 
great philosopher of antiquity'. For this speaker, the above sentence says nothing 
more than 'the last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher'. It is clear that 
1 1 For example, according to Reimer (2003), 
The first and second problems apply only to expanded description theories of reference: 
theories that claim that meaning of a proper name is its reference-fixing description. The 
third problem applies to the 'basic' versions of the description theory as well: to those 
versions that claim only that the reference of a proper name is determined by the 
associated descriptive content, a content which needn't be construed as the name's 
'meaning'. 
Now the question is whether Feyerabend's account is a basic or an expanded version. There is a 
reason to consider Feyerabend's proposal as an expanded version: he believes that by changing 
scientific theories and therefore changing the meanings of their terms, we have a new ontology. 
Therefore, according to him, there is a connection between meaning and reference. If so, the first two 
objections may apply to it as well. 
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such an expression is trivial, analytic, and necessary. However, by saying such a 
sentence our speaker does not utter a trivial, necessary and analytic truth. For 
example, he would admit that it was metaphysically possible that Aristotle had not 
gone to philosophy, and therefore the sentence does not have metaphysical necessity 
(Reimer 2003). 
Now let us change the context of the example and consider the situation of scientific 
terms. Yoshida has a nice example in this regard. Consider special relativity and a 
basic equation like 'E= mc 2 '. This is one of our theoretical principles in this theory 
and therefore, according to Feyerabend, partly determines the meaning of the terms 
that appear in it: mass, velocity of light and energy. This means that 'mass' in special 
relativity would mean: the measure of the inertial property of a body which 
satisfies the basic equations of special relativity like E= mc 2' (Yoshida 1977, 9). In 
addition to mass, this situation also holds for energy and velocity of light. Therefore, 
the equation ' E - mc 2' would say something like this in special relativity, 
The product of the measure of that inertial property of a body which 
satisfies E= mc2 amongst other things, and the square of the velocity of 
light (which velocity satisfies E= mc2, amongst other things) is equal to 
the energy (which energy satisfies E= mc2 amongst other things). In short, 
and to put it crudely, E= mc2 would say "those properties that satisfy me 
satisfy me". (Yoshida 1977, 9-10) 
Yoshida says that such an expression is self-referring, necessary, analytic and a 
priori. Whereas, according to him this equation in fact does not refer to itself even 
indirectly. Yoshida concludes that this false result is a consequence of Feyerabend's 
false theory of meaning. 
Other philosophers have pointed out the same problem. Hempel says, 
Feyerabend's puzzling thesis that successive theories are incompatible 
and that their key terms differ in meaning may have its root in an overly 
narrow construal of the idea that terms "obtain their meanings by being 
part of a theoretical system." I f one construes this idea as implying that 
the meanings of the key terms of a theory must be such as to make the 
theory true, then the terms are, as it were, "implicitly defined" by the 
theoretical principles, and the latter are true simply in virtue of the 
meanings thus assigned to the terms - they are analytic. And a formal 
incompatibility between two theories with the same key terms must then 
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be taken to indicate simply that those terms have different meanings in 
the two systems. (Hempel 1969, 191) 
Apart from general problems with the description theory 1 2 , there are specific 
problems with Feyerabend's holistic theory of meaning13. According to Achinstein 
(1964, 498), Feyerabend's assumptions lead to a paradox. Suppose that I want to 
understand the meaning of a scientific term. According to Feyerabend, first I have to 
learn and understand the basic theoretical principles of the theory that the term 
appears in. It is because they fix the meaning of the term. However, I cannot learn 
and understand a theory and its theoretical principles before I know meanings of the 
terms that appear in it. Therefore, we have a circular situation. 
This paradox is in fact a disguised version of a 'hermeneutic circle': it is not possible 
to understand any part of a work until you understand the whole, but it is not possible 
to understand the whole without understanding all of the parts. In other words, 
neither the whole (say a text or a theory) nor any individual part (say a phrase or a 
scientific term) can be understood without reference to one another, and hence, it is a 
circle. However, it is suspicious to call this a real 'paradox'. In contrast to a vicious 
circle, the concept of hermeneutic circle refers to the dynamic process of 
understanding, by acquiring more information about the parts, we have a deeper 
understanding about the whole, and by knowing the whole deeper we understand the 
parts better. Therefore, what Achinstein's objection can show at most is that we have 
a spiral situation: understanding parts and wholes are mutually dependent. However, 
this does not imply that the whole process of understanding is impossible. 
The second problem (Achinstein 1964, 499) is more interesting. There are cases in 
the history of science where a new theory exactly denies the assumption of the old 
one. (Achinstein's example is Bohr's theory, which says that the angular momentum 
and radiant energy of electrons cannot have continuous values, whereas classical 
electrodynamics says they can have continuous values.) In such cases, meanings of 
common terms between two theories must be the same. In other words, for one 
theory to say that a particular entity has one property and the other to deny it, both of 
them must use the same terms with the same meanings. However, this is not possible 
1 2 Probably the most powerful argument against description theories of natural kind terms is Putnam's 
Twin-Earth fantasy (Putnam 1975, 223-7), according to it 'no association of descriptions or mental 
images will express a sense that is sufficient to determine reference' (Devitt and Sterelny 1987, 70). 
l j Devitt and Sterelny (1987, Sec. 4.2) argue that an alternative causal theory of reference has some 
virtues over description theories; one of them is that the former avoids the problem of unwanted 
trivialities, necessities, analyticities and a priorities. 
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according to Feyerabend: here each theory has different theoretical principles and 
therefore determines the meanings of its terms in a different manner. Consequently, 
such theories do not speak about similar things and cannot be incompatible. In 
summary, according to Feyerabend, because meanings of terms are determined by 
theories, we cannot have two incompatible theories. Incompatibility between two 
theories means they speak about the same things, but attribute to them different 
properties. Any change in a theory, according to Feyerabend, changes its ontology 
and the meanings of its terms. However, we have incompatible theories, and it shows 
Feyerabend's theory of meaning is not correct14. Achinstein formulates this problem 
under the name of rule B, 
B. It must be possible for two theories employing many of the same terms 
to be incompatible, i.e., for the principles of one to contain denials of 
principles of the other. And this presupposes that at least some of the 
common terms have the same meaning in both theories. (Achinstein 1964, 
499) 
Feyerabend has replied to this objection. He (1965, 272) presented his own 
interpretation of Achinstein's rule B, I would formulate [rule B] as saying that 
competing theories must have common meanings'. Let us put aside the fact that it is 
not an accurate interpretation of rule B, and follow the argument. On the basis of this 
interpretation, Feyerabend tried to show that in deciding between two competing 
theories, meanings are not important. We do not consider his method in detail here 
and simply accept that his method (which is based on making some isomorphism 
between certain selected semantical properties of some descriptive statements of the 
two competing theories) works well. However, accepting this method is in 
contradiction with Feyerabend's key conception of semantic incommensurability. 
To see this point let us explore the concept of incommensurability. Two versions of 
the incommensurability thesis are distinguishable: the semantic incommensurability 
thesis and the methodological incommensurability thesis. Sankey (1999, 5) 
formulates the former, which is a consequence of Feyerabend's contextual and 
holistic theory of meaning and is accepted by him, as follows, 
1 4 Sklar (1993, 336-7) raises a similar objection, 'Taken to its limit, the doctrine that every change of 
theoretical assertion generates a change of meaning of the theoretical terms involved leads to paradox, 
if not absurdity. If one person asserts "S" and someone else assert "not S," they cannot be 
contradicting one another, for the terms in "S" and "not S" have, by the doctrine, different meanings, 
and the two assertions are not the negations of one another.' 
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Because the meaning of the terms employed by scientific theories varies 
with theoretical context, the vocabulary of such theories may fail to share 
common meaning. But i f theories are unable to be expressed by means of 
a common vocabulary, the content of such theories cannot be directly 
compared. For in the absence of a shared, semantically neutral vocabulary, 
it is impossible for statements about the world asserted by one theory to 
either assert or deny the same thing as any statement made by the other 
theory. Theories which are unable in this way either to agree or disagree 
with respect to any claim about the world are incommensurable in the 
sense that their content is unable to be directly compared due to semantic 
variance. 
According to the methodological version of the incommensurability thesis, mainly 
developed by Kuhn, 
... there are no shared, objective methodological standards of scientific 
theory appraisal. Hence, alternative scientific theories may be 
incommensurable due to absence of common methodological standards 
capable of adjudicating the choice between them. (Sankey 1999, 10) 
Now let us return to Feyerabend's reply. The point is that i f his suggested method 
exists, i.e. i f it is possible to compare the contents of two competing theories, then in 
the cases where two competing theories are semantically incommensurable, there are 
ways to compare their contents15. However, as mentioned, when two theories are 
semantically incommensurable their contents cannot be compared. Therefore, i f 
Feyerabend's argument for the possibility of deciding between two theories with no 
common meanings (including incommensurable theories) is true, then these theories 
are commensurable. Therefore, Feyerabend can insist on his suggestion only i f he 
gives up the possibility of semantic incommensurability. 
The third problem with Feyerabend's account of meaning is that he ignores many 
different ways that the meaning of a scientific term can be determined, and only 
mentions determination by means of the role that a term plays in a theory. Achinstein 
(1964, 500-502) enumerates five possible ways to understand a scientific term. This 
is possible by (i) knowing an explicit definition for the term, (ii) knowing the 
derivation of a formula containing an expression denoted by the term, (iii) knowing 
various characteristics or properties of the item designated by the term, (iv) knowing 
1 51 will explain Feyerabend's definition of (semantic) incommensurability in Section 2.4. 
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the range of application of the term (i.e. the sorts of situations in which it can be 
employed), or (v) knowing the role the term plays in a theory. 
By presenting concrete examples for each case, Achinstein shows that in the first 
four options there are two alternatives. Sometimes the meaning of a term can be 
determined without considering principles of the theory that it appears in, and 
sometimes the only way to understand the meaning is to refer to the theory itself. 
However, it is only in the last option that we must refer to the theory to understand 
the meanings of a term. 
As an example, according to Achinstein (1964, 502), we understand both the terms 
'absolute temperature' and 'pressure' in thermodynamics according to their explicit 
definitions, i.e. both of them belong to the first category above. However, in the 
explicit definition of 'absolute temperature' we have to refer to principles of the 
theory, whereas the definition of 'pressure' is independent from these principles. 
Achinstein's examples show that Feyerabend ignores these vast possibilities and only 
mentions the last option. However, i f we consider the real process of scientific 
enquiry, we wil l see that some terms can be understood in a theory without referring 
to principles of that theory, but perhaps by referring to others. This means that, two 
different theories may have some terms with common meanings. 
To sum up, the arguments of this section show that Feyerabend's holistic theory of 
meaning, apart from reduction debate, is not an adequate theory. It suffers from a 
general problem (the problem of unwanted necessity), which is avoidable by 
adopting other alternatives (e.g. the causal theory of reference). More importantly, 
this theory does not fit well with actual scientific inquires: it cannot account having 
two incompatible theories, and ignores some possible ways that meanings of 
scientific terms are determined without referring to the principles of the theories they 
appear in. 
2.3 The Problem of Inconsistency (I) 
In this section, I will consider one of Feyerabend's objections to Nagel's account of 
reduction. Although he only uses one label here, it is worthwhile to note that in fact 
Feyerabend presents two separate objections under this label. According to the first 
version, Feyerabend considers particular and paradigmatic examples of reduction in 
the history of science and shows that the secondary science is inconsistent with the 
primary and therefore the former is not deducible from the latter. In other words, 
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because the heart of reduction is deduction, and no consistent set of premises can 
imply an inconsistent set of results, therefore in the alleged concrete examples of 
reduction we do not actually have reduction. 
Consider for example Galilean science and the physics of Newton. A basic 
assumption in the former is that the vertical acceleration is constant. By some 
appropriate assumptions, like neglecting the height of a falling body compared with 
the radius of the earth, we can obtain something similar to Galilean laws from 
Newtonian laws, but what obtained are not the Galilean laws themselves. Although 
the height of an ordinary falling body in comparison with the radius of the earth is 
small, their proportion still has some finite value and is not zero. This means that, in 
what is deduced, we still have inconstant acceleration, and so it is not a Galilean law. 
This is the most powerful argument of Feyerabend against reduction, which is 
independent of his theory of meaning, and caused many philosophers to revise their 
accounts of reduction. In the next chapter, we will see how philosophers have 
responded to it. There are two main ways of response here. One group accepted that 
we cannot deduce the same secondary science, but we can deduce a good 
approximation to it (approximate reduction). The other group discussed bridge 
principles and auxiliary assumptions, and showed that we have no reason to suppose 
them to be true. Therefore, by allowing them to be false we can imply the exact 
secondary science. Let us leave these solutions to the next chapter and consider the 
second version of the problem of inconsistency here. 
The second version of the problem of inconsistency has two parts. First, Feyerabend 
(1962, 43) says 'according to Nagel reduction or explanation is (or should be) by 
derivation'. Then he concludes that 'only such theories are admissible (for 
explanation and prediction) in a given domain which either contain the theories 
already used in this domain, or are at least consistent with them' (Feyerabend 1962, 
44). After that, Feyerabend presents long arguments to show that the second claim 
according to the concrete examples, empirical grounds and methodological 
considerations, is not defendable. By rejecting the second claim, Feyerabend 
concludes that the first one is false as well, and therefore reduction cannot be done 
by deduction. 
In reply to Feyerabend, it should be noticed that the first claim could not imply the 
second one alone. It needs some additional premise such as, 'More general theories 
are always introduced with the purpose of explaining [reducing] the existent 
successful theories' (Coffa 1967, 505). Feyerabend's formulation (1962, 43) of this 
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additional premise is as follows; 'the task of science, so it is assumed by those who 
hold the theory about to be criticized, is the explanation, and the prediction, of 
known singular facts and regularities with the help of more general theories.' 
However, this additional premise is not true (at least according to reductionists like 
Nagel), and therefore the falsity of the conclusion is not due to the falsity of the main 
premise, it is due to the falsity of this additional condition. 
There are two reasons to suppose that reductionists like Nagel do not accept and 
support this additional claim. First, Nagel did not assert such a condition anywhere, 
and Feyerabend did not refer to any passage as evidence. The second reason is more 
persuasive, this additional condition is in contrast with Nagel's account of reduction. 
To see this, reconsider the argument again which can be summarized as below: 
Main premise: explanation and reduction are done by deduction. 
Additional premise: every general theory should explain the less 
comprehensive ones {all the less comprehensive theories must reduce to 
the general theory). 
Conclusion: any general theory must contain or be consistent with the less 
comprehensive ones. 
As we explained in Chapter 1, Nagel's account of reduction does not have necessity. 
He does not say that every general theory necessarily reduces the less comprehensive 
ones. According to him, conditions of reduction are not satisfiable in all particular 
cases, and for a particular case, it depends on the development stage of the theories; 
we do not have reduction between all general and less comprehensive theories. 
Although this is a virtue for a general theory to explain all possible less 
comprehensive theories, not all general theories have this virtue. Nagel only 
describes the conditions of reduction, and says that in any case where these 
conditions are satisfied, we have reduction. In other words, he does not say that all 
less comprehensive theories are necessarily reducible at all times. Therefore, by 
taking non-formal conditions of reduction into account, and by realizing the nature of 
Nagel's account which does not have any necessity, we see that the additional 
premise and the conclusion are false, whereas the main premise is true 1 6. 
1 6 Another piece of evidence showing the additional premise to be false is 'Kuhn-loss.' According to 
Kuhn (1970, 169), in some cases in the history of science the new theory could not explain some 
phenomena that the old theory had explained. Therefore, the task of science is not to provide such 
theories that explain all already explained phenomena. See also Coffa (1967, 506). 
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2.4 The Problem of Meaning Variance 
Feyerabend's second objection to Nagel's model is the problem of meaning variance. 
According to Feyerabend, what we deduce from the primary science must have terms 
with the same meanings as the original secondary science. In other words, the 
process of reduction should not affect the meanings of terms of the secondary science 
and they must be deduced with their original meanings, not with different (although 
similar) meanings. Whereas reduction is done by means of deduction, and according 
to Feyerabend deduction does not influence meanings, this demand is an immediate 
consequence of Nagel's model that 'meanings are invariant with respect to the 
process of [deduction and] reduction' (Feyerabend 1962, 33). However, it is not a 
satisfiable demand. According to Feyerabend, the primary science determines the 
meanings of its terms by its theoretical principles, and because these principles are 
different from the principles of the secondary science, the meanings of terms are 
different in both theories. Therefore, in what are deduced from the primary science 
terms have meanings assigned to them by the science, and because these meanings 
are different from the original meanings in the secondary science, what is deduced 
from the primary science is something different from the original secondary science17. 
We may generalize this result in the following fashion: consider two 
theories, T' and T, which are both empirically adequate inside D', but 
which differ widely outside D'. In this case the demand may arise to 
explain T' on the basis of T, i.e., to derive T' from T and suitable initial 
conditions (for D'). Assuming T and T' to be in quantitative agreement 
inside D', such derivation will still be impossible i f T' is part of a 
theoretical context whose "rules of usage" involve laws inconsistent with 
T. (Feyerabend 1962, 75) 
Two types of reply have been suggested for this objection. In the first, the starting 
point is theory of meaning. By rejecting Feyerabend's theory of meaning, his 
objection loses its legitimacy as well. However, in the second, the description theory 
of reference is still valid, but there are some ways to avoid Feyerabend's objection. 
Yoshida has a reply with a different theory of meaning, and Nagel provides a reply 
accepting the same theory of meaning. Let us start with the first. 
1 7 Cf. Kuhn(1970, 100-102). 
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Yoshida (1977, 13) believes that there is one principle that both proponents and 
opponents o f meaning variance accepted: common meaning is a necessary condition 
for deducibility. We can explain this principle like this. Suppose that theory T 
deduces the sentence '/?*', and suppose tha tp is a proposition and '/?' is the sentence 
which says that p. Now i f meanings of ' /?* ' and '/?' are different, then the proposition 
p is not deducible f rom T. 
According to Yoshida (1977, 14-15), this principle is false for two reasons. First, it 
presupposes a theory about propositions that Yoshida does not accept. According to 
this theory, propositions are the meanings o f sentences. Consequently, i f two 
sentences have different meanings, then they correspond to two different 
propositions. However, we have pairs of sentences that make the same statement 
(correspond to the same proposition), while having different meanings. I f a person 
asserts that 'John is ta l l ' , this sentence refers to the same proposition that the 
sentence that John asserts ' I am tal l ' . These two sentences, in their given contexts, 
assert the same proposition, however, no one would say that they have the same 
meaning. 
Second, according to Yoshida, the identity o f the referents, not the identity o f 
meaning, is a necessary condition for deducibility,. In other words, even i f '/?*' and 
'/?' have different meanings, they might express the same proposition, and i f we 
show that they express the same proposition, we can conclude that theory T deduces 
'/?' in addition to deducing '/?*'. 
N o w how can we show that two sentences '/?*' and '/?', express the same proposition? 
Yoshida says, i f ' / ?* ' and '/?' 
.. . are used to claim that the same relations hold between the same 
referents, regardless o f how those referents or indeed the relations 
themselves are designated and i f the terms which do not refer like "is" 
and "the" ("syncategorematic" terms) have the same meanings. (Yoshida 
1977, 15) 
Let us consider what Yoshida says in a concrete example. Suppose that the equation 
"F= md 2r/dt 2", with the help o f some assumptions such as (v/c) 2 being negligible, can 
be deduced f rom the special theory o f relativity. Here, 
"F" refers to a vectorial quantity which is a measure o f that which causes 
a change in motion and which acts in the direction o f motion (this latter is 
not generally true for the relativistic force, except under the assumption 
that (v/c) 2 is negligible), " m " refers to the measure o f that property o f a 
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body in virtue o f which it resists a change in motion, and "d 2 r/dt 2 " refers 
to the acceleration of the body. (Yoshida 1977, 16) 
Now Yoshida says that the proposition which this equation expresses is, 
.. . the magnitude and direction of the measure o f that which causes a 
change in motion and which acts in the direction o f the acceleration is 
equal to the product o f the magnitude o f that property in virtue o f which it 
resists a change in motion and the acceleration o f the body. (Yoshida 
1977, 16) 
This is exactly the same proposition that the second law of Newtonian physics 
expresses. Now because these two sentences express the same proposition and one o f 
them is deducible f rom the special relativity, the other one (the second law) is 
deducible too, although they might have different meanings or their terms might have 
different meanings. These two sentences assert the same thing, and the identity o f the 
referents is a necessary condition o f deducibility, not the identity o f meanings. To 
sum up, by rejecting a presupposition about meaning, Yoshida concludes that 
reduction is acceptable as long as what is deduced f rom the primary science refers to 
the same proposition that the secondary science refers to, although they might have 
different meanings, or their terms have different meanings determined by two 
different sets o f principles. 
There are two points about this solution. First, it is clear that for reducing T2 to 77, 
Yoshida allows deduction o f some sentences f rom Tl with different meanings f rom 
72. His main demand is that what is deduced from 77 should express and refer to the 
same propositions that T2 refers and expresses. However, Nagel does not accept this 
interpretation. What is important for him is that i f we want to reduce T2, what we 
deduce f rom Tl must have the same meaning with the original T2. Otherwise, we 
reduce something else, not T2. 
. . . [ I ] f thermodynamics is to be reduced to mechanics, it is temperature in 
the sense of the term in the classical science o f heat which must be 
asserted to be proportional to the mean kinetic energy o f gas molecules. 
(Nagel 1961,357) 
The second point concerns Yoshida's theory o f reference. It seems that he is much 
closer to the causal theory o f reference than the descriptive. According to the causal 
theory o f reference, we f i x the reference o f a name by dubbing it , either by 
perception or by description. It means that either we perceive an object and dub it by 
name 'TV, or we stipulate a description and say 'whatever the unique such-and-such 
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is, w i l l be called ' i V . After f ix ing the reference, the name is passed on f rom one 
speaker to another, but what makes them successful in referring to something by 
means o f its name is that a causal chain, which stretches back to the initial dubbing 
o f the object with that name, links all uses o f the name together 1 8. Yoshida has 
something similar to this in mind when he says that ' .F in the derived equation f rom 
the special relativity refers to the same thing as 'force' in Newtonian physics, 
although they might have different meanings. Consequently, we can say that Yoshida 
saves the apparent surface o f Nagel's model; however, he changes one o f the hidden 
and central ideas inside it , its theory of reference 1 9. 
Now let us consider the second reply to the problem of meaning variance, presented 
by Nagel (1970) who did not change his theory of reference. As mentioned, Nagel 
does not accept that meanings o f scientific terms are exclusively determined by 
theories. Some terms have common meanings in different theories. 
Accordingly, although both "theoretical" and "observational" terms may 
be "theory laden", it does not fo l low that there can be no term in a theory 
which retains its meaning when it is transplanted into some other theory. 
(Nagel 1970, 131) 
However, it also does not fo l low that all common terms between the primary and 
secondary science have the same meaning. As we explained in the last chapter, Nagel 
is aware that some common terms might have different meanings in two theories. 
Now Nagel's new point is that f rom the fact that two terms have different meanings 
in two theories we cannot conclude that they are incommensurable. In other terms, 
the fact that two terms have different meanings is not equal to the fact that their 
meanings are radically different, and they are incommensurable. 
To see this point and its relevance to our discussion let us start wi th Feyerabend's 
definition o f incommensurability 2 0. According to him, in two cases we have radical 
meaning change, and therefore incommensurability. 
[We have incommensurability]... either i f a new theory entails that all 
concepts o f the preceding theory have extension zero or i f it introduces 
rules which cannot be interpreted as attributing specific properties to 
See Reimer (2003, 2.2) and Devitt and Sterelny (1987, Ch. 4 and Sec. 5.2). 
In the next chapter, I will say more about other aspects of Yoshida's account. 
For criticisms of this definition, see Fine (1967, 234-5). 
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objects within already existing classes, but which change the system of 
classes itself. (Feyerabend 1965, 268) 
As a concrete example, consider 'entropy' in thermodynamics that has a different 
meaning f rom 'entropy' in statistical mechanics. Now the question is, 'are these two 
meanings radically different, and therefore the two terms incommensurable?' Nagel 
directs our attention to the fact that, according to Feyerabend's definition, 'entropy' 
in thermodynamics and its counterpart in statistical mechanics are not 
incommensurable. 
In thermodynamics, 'entropy' is defined so that it can be applied legitimately to 
physical systems satisfying certain conditions. As an example, Nagel (1970, 132) 
says, '[the term 'entropy' in thermodynamics is applicable] .. . to systems such as 
gases, whose internal motions are not too "tumultuous" — the word is Planck's —, a 
condition which is not satisfied in the case o f Brownian motions.' However, in 
defining 'entropy' in statistical mechanics we do not need these conditions, and 
therefore, the extension o f the notion o f 'entropy' in statistical mechanics (the 
Boltzmann notion o f entropy) includes the extension o f its counterpart in 
thermodynamics (the Clausius notion). 
This shows that statistical mechanics does not say that the concept o f 'entropy' in 
thermodynamics has extension zero. This only shows that the class o f systems for 
which laws o f thermodynamics are valid is more restricted than the class for which 
the laws o f statistical mechanics are valid. Therefore, even according to 
Feyerabend's definition, although these two terms have different meanings, they are 
not incommensurable. 
The second step in Nagel's solution is straightforward. We have two terms which 
have meanings that are not radically different; there are common extensions between 
them. Therefore, there might be bridge principles asserting connections between their 
common extensions. These bridge principles are accessible because two terms have a 
domain o f application in common. Therefore, by means o f this common domain o f 
application, i f other conditions are satisfied, we can deduce the narrower theory from 
the wider one. To sum up, according to Nagel, what can block the possibility o f 
reduction is a radical change in meaning (incommensurability), not any change. 
Feyerabend presents examples o f meaning change and concludes that because we 
have meaning change in all theory change, we cannot have reduction at all. Nagel 
points out that not all meaning changes are radical (according to Feyerabend's 
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definition of radical change). Therefore, we can still save the possibility o f reduction 
in many cases, although the phenomenon of meaning change is dominant. 
*** 
We can conclude this chapter by stating the fol lowing claims, (i) Feyerabend's 
holistic theory o f meaning is not adequate. It has some internal problems, and cannot 
cover what we intuitively have in mind when we speak about scientific terms and 
their meanings, ( i i) As for the problem of inconsistency, the second version that we 
discussed in this chapter does not threaten Nagel's account o f reduction. It is based 
on a premise that is false according to Nagel's non-formal conditions, ( i i i ) As for the 
problem of meaning variance, there are two possible solutions. By rejecting a 
common presupposition about meaning and taking a causal account o f reference 
(Yoshida), or by accepting the description theory but distinguishing between 
different and radically different meanings (Nagel), we can save the possibility o f 
reduction. 
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3 
Reductionists Make a Response: Modifications 
In Chapter 2, we examined the first wave o f objections to Nagel's classic account. It 
contained two main objections: the problem of inconsistency and the problem of 
meaning variance. Regarding the latter which directly depends on the theory o f 
meaning and semantics, I explained that Feyerabend's contextual theory o f meaning 
and his argument for meaning variance are not strong enough to reject Nagel's 
account. Thus, Nagel does not need any change in his theory to protect it against the 
problem of meaning variance, and it is enough to clarify the notion o f meaning to 
show that Feyerabend's schema is very radical. However, the problem of 
inconsistency makes problems that should be solved by modifications to the original 
account. In the first half o f this chapter, I w i l l consider the nature o f this objection in 
more detail and then compare two close but different alternatives to remove it. 
The second half o f this chapter is devoted to another modification proposed by 
reductionists: using identity statements as bridge principles. To look at this proposal, 
first I w i l l distinguish two kinds o f identity: identity between things, and identity 
between properties. While I accept the former, I consider two motivations for 
proposing the latter: the explanation o f bridge principles, and ontological simplicity. 
It w i l l be argued that there is no need to admit any kind o f property identity in 
reduction. The non-formal conditions o f reduction are enough to remove 
philosophical worries about the explanation o f bridge principles. Therefore, Nagel's 
account does not need new elements for this purpose. Regarding the second 
motivation, I w i l l argue that by rejecting the semantical analysis o f properties and by 
accepting a plausible account o f properties, philosophical worries about ontological 
simplicity w i l l be removed. By a plausible account o f properties, I mean either 
analysing properties in terms of causal powers or flat ontology, based on the notion 
of similarity. Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to these two accounts respectively. 
Therefore, I w i l l only mention the outline o f my argument in this chapter, and leave 
details to the fol lowing chapters. Finally, I w i l l conclude the chapter by reviewing 
some proposals for the relation between property identity and correlation. This 
review shows that even i f we accept identity as a necessary component o f reduction, 
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the controversial question about the way we distinguish identities f rom correlations is 
still present. 
3.1 The Problem of Inconsistency (II) 
It is clear that i f we treat reduction as a strict derivation of the exact secondary theory 
f rom the exact primary theory plus some true bridge principles (let us put the non-
formal conditions aside for a moment), then there are few, i f any, examples o f 
reduction in the history o f science. As Sklar (1967, 110) says, examples o f this kind 
of reduction are few and far between in the history o f science, and more importantly 
this kind o f reduction cannot cover those examples that we pre-analytically 
considered as reduction. Therefore, to apply our philosophical model to real 
scientific activities we need revisions in the model. 
Moreover, there are cases in the history o f science where the secondary theory is 
inconsistent wi th the primary one, but we still regard pre-analytically as reduction. 
Hence, whatever is deduced from the primary theory, even i f its observational results 
are numerically close to the results o f the secondary science, is different f rom (and 
even inconsistent with) the secondary science. For example, according to the special 
relativity, the mass of an object is a function o f its velocity. This means that in 
whatever is derived f rom this theory, mass is a function o f velocity as well . However, 
in classical mechanics, mass is independent f rom velocity. Therefore, two formulas 
f rom these two theories might have very close (or even indiscernible) experimental 
consequences, but they are two different and inconsistent things. The problem o f 
inconsistency says that we cannot derive a result (the secondary theory) inconsistent 
wi th the premises f rom any true and consistent set o f premises (the primary theory) 
plus true bridge principles. Therefore, i f we want to cover such examples in the 
history o f science as reduction, we have to revise in our theoretical model o f 
reduction. 
Finally, there are examples o f theories that we know are false, but for some practical 
reasons (like simplicity) we still use them in narrow contexts (e.g. Newtonian 
mechanics is strictly speaking false but we still use it in many branches o f 
engineering). The problem in such cases is that we intuitively want to reduce them to 
some more general and true current theories, but according to the standard notion o f 
reduction, it is not possible. It is obvious that we cannot validly derive a false 
conclusion f rom any set o f true premises. 
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This point can be extended more. There are some theories (like the caloric theory o f 
heat, or the early phlogiston theories o f reduction, calcinations and respiration) that 
we know are false; however, contrary to the previous cases we do not use them in 
any field o f science. But we might still want to reduce them, in one sense or another, 
to more general and true theories. Motivations for this kind o f reduction might be 
different, but one o f them is the claim of continuity in the history o f science. We 
might want to show that although we have many theory changes in the history o f 
science, all (or at least most) o f them fol low a common pattern o f reduction, and 
therefore we have a kind of continuity in the history o f science. A l l o f these points 
force us to modify Nagel's account, and i f we could cover all o f them by only one 
common pattern o f modification, it would be perfect. 
3.2 The Role of Approximation 
It is commonly accepted by reductionists that the key notion to solve the problem of 
inconsistency is approximation. Nagel in his revised version o f reduction speaks 
about approximate reduction (1970, 120-1). Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956), Sklar 
(1967, 112), Schaffner (1967, 144-6), Hempel (1969, 194), Causey (1972 b, 213-7), 
Yoshida (1977, 2-7), Spector (1978, Ch. 5), Hooker (1981, 46 and 49), Friedman 
(1982, 27) and Needham (1982, 194-5) appealed to this notion as well . O f course, 
there are many disagreements among these philosophers about the definition, limits 
and extension o f approximation. For example, Sklar and Friedman believe that we 
can use approximation only in homogeneous reduction, whereas Yoshida and Hooker 
extend it to both homogeneous and heterogeneous reductions. Nevertheless, the 
notion o f approximation became a component o f every reasonable account o f 
reduction. 
Let us first examine what the idea behind this notion is. Apart f rom Yoshida, who 
has a systematically different account of approximation, the other philosophers have 
such a schema in mind: instead o f the original secondary theory (T2), we derive a 
different theory (T2*) f rom the primary theory (77). T2* has two important features; 
firstly, it is logically consistent with 77 and so strictly derivable f rom it; secondly, it 
has a strong similarity (analogy) with T2, i.e. it is a close approximation to it. 
How can this model solve some o f the problems mentioned in the previous section? 
It is clear that inconsistency between 77 and T2, and so impossibility o f derivation o f 
T2 f rom 77, is not present in this picture. T2* is consistent wi th Tl and so there is no 
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problem in applying the D N model of explanation (77 explains T2*). Therefore, i f 
we define reduction in terms o f the D N model, 72* might be reducible to 77, while 
72 is not. This is true even in the cases where 72 is false. We derive a true theory 
(72*) f rom our current true theory (77) which has strong similarities wi th a false 
theory (T2), and there is no logical problem here. 
This schema has one additional virtue. In the cases where T2 is incorrect and we do 
not currently use it, the strong similarity between T2* and T2 provides an indirect 
explanation for why we thought that T2 was correct at a certain time. In other words, 
although T2 is incorrect, because it is very similar (for example in observable 
predictions wi th certain amounts o f accuracy that our equipments had in the past) to 
a correct theory (72*), we can explain why scientists believed in T2. This point can 
help us to f ind a model o f continuity in the history o f science. For example, we can 
say that although we had theory changes in the history o f science and although the 
whole process o f science is not strictly cumulative, we have a kind o f connection 
between theories such that a new and true theory explains why scientists (rationally) 
believed in some false theories. 
However, the proposed schema has its own diff iculty, which needs further 
21 
philosophical work. The main point concerns the nature o f similarity . How can we 
define similarity in general, and similarity between two theories in particular? We 
have to define similarity between two things in one or another respect. Similarity is 
not a two-place relation held between two things; it is at least a three-place relation, 
which aside f rom two things needs a respect for comparing them. The general 
question 'are these two things similar?' cannot be answered unless we determine the 
respect in which we want to compare them: 'Are these two objects similar in respect 
of their colours?' Now the question is, in what respect do we want to consider 
similarity between two theories (T2 and 72*)? Formal structures, observable 
predictions, numerical results, conceptual apparatus, simplicity, applicability, and 
relations wi th other theories are just a few examples o f respects in which we can 
compare two theories. 
Therefore, the claim that two theories must be similar (good approximation/having 
analogy) is not sufficient. To have an adequate account, first we have to know 
different respects that two theories can be similar regarding them, and then in each 
case we need a philosophical account to explain when two particular theories are 
2 1 I have mentioned this point in Chapter 1, and I will consider it in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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similar. In some cases, we already have philosophical accounts o f similarity , while 
other cases need more work 2 3 . 
However, there is still a deeper problem using the proposed schema in concrete cases. 
In the above schema, it was simply assumed that the bridge principles are exact and 
true and we derive a true theory (T2*) f rom them (plus the primary theory) which is 
strongly similar to the original secondary theory. In other words, there is no room for 
approximation in the bridge principles and we need the notion of approximation only 
in comparing the two theories (T2 and T2*). However, bridge principles are false or 
approximately true in most concrete examples of reduction. Consider for example the 
reduction o f Kepler's laws to Newtonian mechanics. To derive the mathematical 
formula o f a planet's orbit f rom Newtonian mechanics, in addition to the general 
laws, we need some information about the initial conditions o f the system (position 
and momenta o f all objects that can affect the planet). However, we do not know all 
the bodies in the universe, and even i f we do know them, we do not know their 
positions and momenta with exact precision. Therefore, we have to omit some 
theoretically relevant information and use approximately true bridge principles. Now 
let us assume that we know all theoretical bridge principles that are necessary for 
derivation o f the planet's orbit. In such case, we w i l l be faced with the n-body 
problem, for which we do not have a general and exact solution. In other words, not 
only true and exact bridge principles are not sometimes available, but sometimes we 
do not want to have such things. 
Furthermore, allowing approximation in the bridge principles has an additional virtue. 
By allowing them to be false, we have the conditions under which the secondary 
theory would be false. In other words, when we know that the bridge principles are 
false and we know why they are false, we can explain why the secondary theory is 
strictly speaking false but was as successful as it was. When we know the margin o f 
accuracy o f the bridge principles, this margin transmits to the secondary theory and 
makes the margin that this theory is approximately true. In our example, because we 
know the margin of accuracy o f the bridge principles, we know that the orbit o f 
planet is not a perfect ellipse, but something similar to an ellipse, and it provides an 
For example, structuralist philosophers of science have developed a version of intertheoretical 
approximation (Balzer et al. 1987, 364-383). Moreover, in line with the semantic conception of 
scientific theories, Gorham (1996) has developed an account of the intertheory relation of comparative 
structural similarity. His account allows to measure structural dissimilarity between two models. 
2 3 Schaffher (1967, 146) points out that we have not done much works on the logic of analogy and 
Sklar (1993, 336) points out some difficulties and complexities in taking a limit in approximations. 
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explanation o f why Kepler's laws seemed correct in the past. This explanation 
corresponds exactly wi th what we mentioned earlier, that in historical cases we need 
a kind of reduction to explain why the false theories seemed true 2 4 . 
These points lead Yoshida (1977, 2-7) to propose an alternative view on 
approximation in reduction. According to him, instead o f approximate relation 
between two theories (72 and 72*), we allow the bridge principles to be 
approximately true. From the conjunction of the primary theory with these 
approximately (and in few cases absolutely) true bridge principles, we can deduce 
the exact and original secondary theory, and not an approximation to it. (From 
conjunction o f Newtonian Laws with approximately true bridge principles about the 
initial conditions, we can derive the exact and original Kepler's laws.) 
I would like to consider some aspects o f Yoshida's schema here. First, let us discuss 
different kinds o f acceptable bridge principles. Yoshida (1977, 21-28) enumerates 
three different cases. In the first, we use the mathematical l imit ing process. By using 
the l imiting operation on the laws o f the primary science, we can derive the laws o f 
the secondary one. For example, by allowing N (the number of degrees o f freedom) 
—• oo we can show that classical thermodynamics is a l imiting case o f statistical 
thermodynamics 2 5. In the second case, the bridge principles are contrary to fact, or 
contrary to the assumptions o f the primary theory. For example, by allowing h 
(Planck's constant) = 0, we can reduce classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. 
Finally, the third kind of bridge principle is those in which we neglect a l imit ing 
variable in comparison with the other magnitudes involved. For example in Lorentz 
transform, (x' = x- v.t / Vl - (v 2 / c 2 ) ) , by the assumption that v/c is negligible, we can 
deduce the Galilean transform, (x' = x- v.t). 
Yoshida's schema has a further benefit over the standard account o f approximate 
reduction. As mentioned, for different respects where two theories might be similar, 
we need different philosophical accounts to explain conditions o f similarity. 
However, in Yoshida's schema, approximation in the bridge principles has a 
mathematical nature and so is much clearer. The limiting operation, neglecting a 
Allowing the bridge principles to be false has another virtue over the standard view. It clearly shows 
that reduction does not entail the elimination of concepts of the secondary science (ontological 
simplicity), i.e. even if we reduce T2 to Tl, we still need predicates and concepts of 72. For more 
detail, see Chapter 9. 
2 5 A controversial point about this alternative is that according to some philosophers (e.g. Nickles 
(1973, 199)) letting numerical constants change value is mathematically illegitimate. Yoshida (1977, 
22-3) considered the issue and presented arguments to show that it is mathematically and 
philosophically legitimate. 
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variable in comparison with some others and allowing variables to be infinite are 
familiar mathematical notions that we have strong theoretical foundations for. 
Therefore, it seems that this model is much simpler than the traditional model and 
wi th stronger foundations. It should be pointed out that Yoshida does not claim that 
there is no other possible way to make approximation in the bridge principles. He 
(1977, 74) does not claim that his list is exhaustive. However, the point is that he 
uses only these three methods and succeeds in covering a vast range o f reductions. 
This can be supposed as being a good confirmation o f his proposal 2 6. 
However, Yoshida's proposal faces a logical problem. It is possible that in all three 
cases (especially in the second one) one o f the bridge principles contradicts one 
assumption or axiom o f the primary theory. For example, the assumption that h = 0 
contradicts quantum theory. Now it could be argued that according to a theorem of 
classical logic, we can derive anything (not only the secondary theory) f rom a 
contradiction. In other words, we can reduce all theories (true or false, with a 
relevant universe o f discourse or irrelevant, scientific or non-scientific) to the 
conjunction o f quantum mechanics and this auxiliary assumption, and this is clearly 
absurd. Alternatively, by having contrary to the primary theories auxiliary 
assumptions we can reduce any arbitrary theory to any other arbitrary one. 
Yoshida (1977, 73-74) was aware o f this point and tried to provide an answer for it. 
According to him, we must not use contradictions in the premises o f a deduction. To 
avoid contradiction we have to omit those parts o f the primary theory that are 
inconsistent wi th the necessary bridge principles for reduction. In other words, first 
we change 77 to Tl*, whereby Tl* does not contain those parts o f Tl that are 
inconsistent wi th the bridge principles, then we derive T2 f rom the conjunction o f 
Tl * and the bridge principles. However, can we omit any part o f a theory arbitrarily 
and without any criterion? For example, i t does not make sense to omit the principle 
of restricted relativity 2 7 f rom the special theory o f relativity and still insist that the 
He covers reductions of impetus theory, Kepler's laws and Galileo's laws to Newtonian mechanics 
as well as physical optics to electromagnetic theory, thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, 
classical mechanics to special relativity, classical celestial mechanics to the general theory of relativity, 
classical mechanics to quantum theory, geometrical optics to wave optics and the special theory of 
relativity to the general theory. In the case of false theories, his account covers reductions of early 
phlogiston theories of reduction, calcinations and respiration to Lavoisier's theory as well as the 
caloric theory of heat to kinetic theory of heat. 
2 7 This principle says, 'If, relative to K, K' is a uniformly moving co-ordinate system devoid of 
rotation, then natural phenomena run their course with respect to K' according to exactly the same 
general laws as with respect to K.' (Yoshida 1977, 74) 
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remaining body of theory can be called special relativity, and that every theory which 
is derived f rom that, is reducible to the relativity theory. 
To remove this objection Yoshida divides statements o f a theory into two parts: 
essential and nonessential. A bridge principle can contradict wi th nonessential 
statements o f the primary theory; however, it must not contradict any essential 
statement. Hence, we can omit nonessential parts of a theory without changing its 
essence, and use the rest of the theory as a reducing base. Now we face a question 
about the definition o f 'essential parts' and the way that we can separate them from 
nonessential parts. Yoshida responds with, 
By "essential statement" I mean a statement which is essential to the 
theory, one without which the theory would not be the theory it is. For 
example, the principle of restricted relativity [ . . . ] is essential to the 
special theory o f relativity. Without that principle one could hardly call 
the remaining body of statements the special theory o f relativity. By 
contrast, Newton's laws o f motion are not essential to statistical 
mechanics; one can use the quantum laws and still have statistical 
mechanics. (Yoshida 1977, 74) 
Clearly, this definition is not strong enough to carry the burden o f reduction, 
although two particular examples mentioned in it are not so controversial. The 
definition is circular ' . . .by "essential statement" I mean a statement which is 
essential to the theory... ' , and the remaining words do not remove the circularity. 
Apart f rom circularity, the definition is vague. It says that without an essential 
statement, the theory would not be the theory it is. Every statement, essential or non-
essential, can satisfy this condition because when we remove it , the remaining body 
o f statements is not the same theory, as it lacks one statement. In its present form this 
condition is too weak. We need more restrictions to find which two bodies o f 
statements are essentially the same, or alternatively what amount o f difference is 
acceptable to suppose two theories being essentially similar. 
Surprisingly, these issues are exactly the same that we faced when we considered the 
alternative view o f approximation, according to which T2* must be similar to T2 and 
derivable f rom Tl. In other words, after bypassing the issue o f similarity between 
theories and changing the location o f approximation f rom T2 to bridge principles, 
Yoshida faces the same problem concerns similarity between theories. He wants to 
make Tl * wi th the same essence with Tl. This means that these two theories must be 
similar in respect o f their essence. Now Yoshida has to answer these questions: 
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'What is the essence of a theory?' and 'What is the acceptable margin o f difference 
to suppose two theories essentially similar?' 
This point leads me to conclude that the two alternative accounts of approximation 
have the same nature, and face the same problems. Both are completely tied to the 
notion o f similarity between theories, and so need further philosophical work. 
Therefore, we can summarize the issue like this: to solve the problem of 
inconsistency between 77 and 72, and reducing the latter to the former by means o f a 
set o f bridge principles (BP), there are three places for approximation. Either we 
might have a new but similar primary theory (77 *), or we might have a new but 
similar secondary theory (T2*) or we might have a set o f approximately true bridge 
principles (BP*). In the case o f the first two options, we still need more works on 
similarity between theories, but the third case has clearer nature. 
Therefore, i f according to Nagel's classic account, the only acceptable formal 
structure is 77 +BP f- 72; according to my account, seven fol lowing derivations are 
acceptable too. (The operator * represents good approximation) 
(v i i ) T1*+BP* \-T2* 
3.3 Identity between Things 
The second half o f this chapter is devoted to the issue o f identity statements and the 
huge debates over them. Two kinds o f identity statements have been proposed to 
serve as bridge principles. Let me start with the first, identity between things, and 
leave the second, identity between properties, to the next section. 
Sklar (1967) was one the first philosophers who proposed thing-identities as bridge 
principles. First, I w i l l present his account briefly and then examine it critically. He 
divides heterogeneous reduction into two parts: weak and strong. In a strong 
reduction, the reduced theory remains well established even after the reduction, and 
its degree o f confirmation would increase because o f the process o f reduction. 
However, in a weak reduction, the reduced theory is not a true and current theory and 
its degree o f confirmation is not increased. By its reduction we only want to provide 
a kind o f explanation to show that why it seemed true in the past. 
(i) T1*+BP \T2 
( iv) T1*+BP* \T2 
(i i) 77 +BP* \- T2 
(v) T1*+BP \-T2* 
( i i i ) 77 +BP \-T2* 
(vi) Tl +BP* \T2* 
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Sklar (1967, 118-121) believes that in the case o f strong reduction, the mere 
correlation between two predicates via a (bi-) conditional statement is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for reduction. In other words, he thinks that Nagel's bridge 
principles that state (bi-) conditional relations between referents o f two attribute-
predicates are not strong enough to make reduction. According to him, in some cases, 
like the Wiedemann-Franz law, we have a correlation between two attribute-
predicates (electrical and thermal conductivity o f metals) and therefore we can derive 
laws o f one theory f rom another, but we still do not have reduction. (Both thermal 
and electrical regularities are determined by a common cause, microphysical 
arrangements, and therefore both must be reduced to this third theory). Hence, mere 
correlation is not sufficient for reduction. On the other hand, in some cases we have 
reduction without any set o f correlatory laws. For example, according to Sklar, there 
is no correlatory law that states a nomological relation between light and 
electromagnetic radiation, but physical optics is reducible to electromagnetic theory. 
This example, according to him, shows that in strong heterogeneous reduction, we 
need a stronger relation between entities than mere correlation, like that which holds 
between light and electromagnetic radiation: identity. 
Sklar (1967, 120) insists that the only acceptable bridge principle in strong 
heterogeneous reduction is identity between things. This identity relation says that 
we have only one set o f things whose members (or some of its members) may be 
referred to by two different labels: light and electromagnetic radiation, or as a macro-
micro relation a piece o f salt and an array o f particular atoms in a particular 
configuration. Therefore, the logical form of identification may have two forms: 
universally quantified conditional statements that say every thing that is A is also B, 
or alternatively universally quantified biconditional statements that say every thing 
that is A is also B and vice versa. The crucial point is that in both cases the quantifier 
only ranges over physical objects, and not properties. 
There are some points in Sklar's account which I do not agree with. For example, I 
see no reason to commit myself to the distinctions of weak/strong and 
homogeneous/heterogeneous reduction. Moreover, I do not accept Sklar's point that 
because two macrophysical theories are determined by a common microphysical 
theory, we cannot reduce them to each other. However, let us leave these points to 
Chapter 9, and consider Sklar's main point here. 
Two questions about Sklar's proposal can be raised. (1) Can identity statements 
between things be used as bridge principles? (2) Is identity statement between things 
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the only acceptable form of a bridge principle? M y answer to the first question is 
affirmative and to the second one is negative. Like Nagel (1970, 126-8) in his revised 
version o f reduction, I think that in addition to other kinds o f bridge principles we 
may use identity statements between things. These statements are another kind o f 
bridge principle and not the unique kind. Here I present an argument to show that 
restricting bridge principles to identity statements between things contradicts Sklar's 
presupposition about reduction. 
According to Sklar, a philosophical model o f reduction and the history o f science 
must be in accordance with each other in significant cases. There are concrete 
examples in the history o f science that we regard intuitively and pre-analytically as 
reduction. A philosophical account o f reduction must recognize most o f them as 
successful reductions, or at least the model must not treat them as irreducible cases in 
principle. I f a philosophical model o f reduction says that many of pre-analytically 
cases o f reduction are irreducible in principle, the model does not fit wi th the history 
o f science and is not an acceptable account o f reduction. Sklar uses this strategy to 
reject Nagel's classic model. As mentioned earlier, when Sklar discusses Nagel's 
account o f reduction, he believes that when we consider historical and concrete 
examples o f reduction, we recognize that few ( i f any) o f them fo l low a strictly 
derivational account. Then Sklar (1967, 110) adds that somebody can construe 
strictly derivational relations as reduction, but i f we do so, we have to exclude those 
cases that we pre-analytically called reduction f rom our successful cases. However, 
this is not acceptable according to Sklar, because it contradicts his discussed 
presupposition. Therefore, he concludes that Nagel's account cannot cover concrete 
examples, and so is not acceptable. 
The same strategy can be used against Sklar. We can imagine two kinds o f theories 
and therefore two kinds o f reduction. In the first group, the reduced and reducing 
theories are just different in some thing-predicates (or equally sortal or substantival 
predicates). However, in the second group, the reduced and reducing theories are 
different in some attribute-predicates. What is the difference between these two 
predicates? According to Causey (1972 a, 408), ' A thing-predicate is a name for a 
kind o f elements of the domain of the theory. A n attribute-predicate is a name for an 
attribute, which, in general, some elements of the domain w i l l possess and others 
w i l l not possess.' In other words, a particular thing belongs to a particular kind, and 
therefore satisfies the corresponding thing-predicate. (For example, this particular 
creature belongs to the horse kind and so is a horse.) However, a particular thing 
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possesses (instead of belongs to) an attribute, and therefore satisfies the 
corresponding attribute-predicate. (For example, this particular cup possesses blue 
colour and so has blue colour.) 
According to some philosophers, identity between two kinds is extensional, whereas 
identity between two attributes is not. I f anything that belongs to kind A belongs to 
kind B and vice versa, then kind A and B are identical. (For example, roughly 
speaking because every thing that is water is H20 and vice versa, these two kinds are 
identical.) However, it is possible that two attributes have the same extension, but 
they are still different attributes. (For example, every creature, which has a heart, has 
two kidneys as well, but having a heart is something different from having two 
kidneys.) 
Now where does this story leave us? Sklar's proposal for identity statements has 
obviously an extensional nature. He suggests conditional (or bi-conditional) 
quantified statements, their quantifiers ranging only over things. This kind of identity 
statement might be applicable to the first group of reduction, in which the reduced 
and reducing theories are only different in some thing-predicates. However, i f two 
theories are different in some attribute-predicates (one uses 'temperature' and the 
other 'the mean kinetic energy of molecules') we cannot identify their attribute-
predicates by extensional criteria. Therefore, Sklar's proposal does not work for them. 
(It is not a new point, Sklar (1967, 123) himself says that we have to avoid using this 
kind of identity in the case of properties, attributes, events, state of affairs and 
processes.) 
As a result, according to Sklar two theories with different attribute-predicates are in 
principle irreducible. Therefore, his account excludes many pre-analytically cases of 
reduction as in principle irreducible, and this contradicts with his presupposition 
about reduction. Restricting bridge principles to identity statements between things 
prevents us covering many cases of reductions. 
Identity relations between things have two advantages over mere correlatory bridge 
principles. Firstly, they bring ontological simplicity. By this relation, we merge two 
classes of things that we thought were separate into a single class, and therefore 
reduce our ontological commitments and simplify our ontology. For example, by 
identifying light with a sub-class of electromagnetic radiation, we simplify our 
scientific ontology. 
Secondly, identity between things exempts us from making some substantive 
changes in our theories. In other words, to save our theories and avoid changes in 
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them, we are forced to consider some relation between two classes of things as 
identity and not mere correlation. In these cases, i f we consider a class of things over 
and above the other class, and merely assume a correlatory relation between them, 
then we have to make unwanted important changes in our theories. Sklar presents an 
example, 
In many cases, identity, as opposed to correlation, is forced upon us, 
unless we are willing to make substantive changes elsewhere in our 
theories. Once we attribute mass-energy to light waves and to 
electromagnetic waves, the conservation rules for that mass-energy won't 
leave room for distinct light waves and electromagnetic waves to be 
present. So i f we are going to take light waves as something over and 
above the electromagnetic waves and merely correlated to them, we will 
have to so modify our theory to deprive the light waves of mass-energy, 
of other features (momentum, for example) as well. Once we say that the 
light waves are just the appropriate electromagnetic waves, the problem is 
gone. (Sklar 1993, 340) 
It is because of this advantage that Sklar (1993, 341) suggests a general 
methodological principle, according to which we have to identify things whenever 
we can, unless the assertion of such an identification is blocked by some other 
features of the situation. For example, our identification is blocked i f the reduced 
entity has some features that are not attributable to the reducing one. 
It might be said (Sklar 1967, 121), (Causey 1972 a, b), (Hooker 1981, 204) that 
another advantage of identity statements between things is that, opposed to mere 
correlations, these statements need no explanation, although they do need 
justification. We examine this point in the next section when we discuss identity 
between properties, and see that it is completely irrelevant to the debate of reduction 
and must not enumerate as an advantage of identity statements. 
Another alleged advantage of identity over correlatory statement (Hooker 1981, 202-
3) is that reduction via identities, contrary to reduction via correlatory statements, 
preserves the pattern of explanation of the reduced theory. This means that i f we 
have only identities, then the reducing theory can explain all phenomena that the 
reduced theory has explained, and so can preserve its explanatory pattern. I will 
discuss this point in Chapter 6 and show that in some cases of reduction, even i f we 
have identities, the reduced theory could provide explanations that the reducing 
theory could not. 
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Apart from Sklar, other philosophers like Kim (1966), Nagel (1970), Causey (1972 a, 
b), En? (1976) and Hooker (1981) accepted identities between things as bridge 
principles. 
3.4 Identity between Properties 
The second kind of identity statements that were widely proposed to play the role of 
bridge principles are identities between properties28. I will start by considering two 
main motivations for proposing such identities and then show that one of them is 
irrelevant to reduction and the other cannot be satisfied by identities. The first 
motivation is explanation. It was widely accepted that identities, contrary to mere 
correlations, need no explanation, although they still need justification. We do not 
need to explain 'why' water is H20, we only need to provide some theories to show 
'how' we recognised that they were identical, and provide some evidence to confirm 
that they are identical. Therefore, according to the proponents of identities, because 
in reduction the only things that need further explanations must be the fundamental 
laws of the reducing theory, we have to use identities (including thing and property 
identities), and not mere correlations that need explanations29. 
Before I examine this point in more detail, it should be pointed out that it is not an 
uncontroversial and accepted point that identities need no explanation. En? (1976, 
291), for example, has claimed that identity statements are also explainable and it is 
possible that they demand explanation in some epistemological frameworks. En? has 
gone further and argued that, 
...unless a specific type of explanatory relation holds between the fact 
that an individual a is 0 and the fact that a is y/, the theory in which the 
attribute predicate ' 0 ' occurs cannot be said to be reduced to a theory in 
which the attribute predicate 'y/' occurs. After the reduction is achieved, 
the identity criteria that we decide upon for properties may lead us to 
claim that ' 0 ' and 'y/' designate one and the same property. But this is a 
claim that has to follow a successful reduction, and not, as Causey has 
suggested, a claim that makes the reduction successful. (En? 1976, 291) 
2 8 See for example (Schaffner 1967), (Hempel 1969), (Causey 1972 a, b), (Ager, el al. 1974) and 
(Hooker 1981). 
2 9 See for example Sklar (1967, 121 and 1993, 338), Causey (1972 a, 417 and 1972 b, 208) and 
Hooker (1981, 204). 
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Here I do not want to support En9's proposal that identities are results of successful 
reductions and need explanations, or support his critics (Hooker 1891, 210-2). My 
point is that this issue is not as obvious as its earlier supporters assumed. 
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that identities need no explanation. I shall 
argue that this point is completely irrelevant to the reduction debate. Firstly, notice 
that, apart from mere correlation, we have other kinds of bridge principles which, 
because of their natures, do not demand explanation. Consider the reduction of 
Kepler's laws to Newtonian mechanics. As explained earlier, we need some strictly 
speaking false initial and boundary conditions to play the role of bridge principles 
here. We do not seek explanation for a particular initial condition. This point shows 
that, although mere correlations (as physical hypothesis) may need explanation in 
other contexts, they do not need explanation when take the role of bridge principles. 
In the context of reduction, they need something else, something that initial 
conditions, which take the role of bridge principles, need as well. This is not 
explanation. 
Secondly, we do not demand explanation for all kinds of physical hypothesis. There 
are fundamental and basic laws, which are axioms of theories, and we cannot explain 
them by laws that are more fundamental. We explain other laws by means of them 
and not vice versa. In addition, there are experimental laws, which have a high 
degree of confirmation but are not explainable in terms of other laws. There is no 
problem using such unexplainable laws as bridge principles in reduction. This point 
again shows that what an acceptable bridge principle needs is not explanation. 
What is needed for bridge principles is justification rather than explanation. We have 
to justify their selection by showing that they have a high degree of confirmation. 
Therefore, the main question is 'How can we provide experimental evidence to 
confirm bridge principles?' In the case of initial conditions, it seems impossible to 
provide experimental evidence to support an initial condition directly. In the case of 
mere correlations, which state testable scientific claims, we do not have a better 
situation. Consider Nagel's famous bridge principle. 
(*) 2E/3 = kT 
(E is mean kinetic energy of molecules, T is absolute temperature and k is a constant) 
Here, there is no way to test this statement directly. The only available way is to add 
this principle to an equation from kinetic theory, and then to conclude the Boyle-
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Charles law. However, the problem is that because the Boyle-Charles law has high 
degree of confirmation independent of kinetic theory, the fact that this law is 
deducible from kinetic theory plus (*) gives no entrance for testing and confirming (*) 
(Ager, etal. 1974, 120-1). 
This is exactly the same problem that we discussed in the first chapter, and it arises 
only for those proponents of reduction which restrict conditions of reduction to 
formal ones. As I showed, Nagel mentioned this problem explicitly and accepted it. 
However, he had a solution for it. There are non-formal conditions of reduction. One 
of them is that reduction must be a significant scientific achievement and goes 
beyond mere deduction of the former established laws of the secondary science. 
Reduction must have empirical gain and provide '...usable suggestions for 
developing the secondary science, and must yield theorems referring to the latter's 
subject matter which augment or correct its currently accepted body of laws' (Nagel 
1961, 360). These new scientific achievements provide (direct and indirect) 
confirmation for the bridge principles. Therefore, i f a deduction can satisfy all of the 
formal and non-formal conditions of reduction, it provides justification for its bridge 
principles as well, and therefore their selection is rational. 
In summary, we need no explanation for bridge principles, neither for explainable 
nor for unexplainable ones. We need justification for them. This justification can be 
provided by satisfying the non-formal conditions of reduction, and it is irrelevant to 
the point that whether bridge principles are identities or not. 
The second motivation for proposing identities between properties as bridge 
principles is ontological simplicity 3 0. In the case of identities between things (via 
coextensionality of two thing-predicates), it is reasonable to accept that identities can 
simplify our ontology. In the case of properties, even we do not have such an 
advantage. To see this point, some metaphysical considerations are required. 
A crucial presupposition of those philosophers who suggested identity between 
properties is that we have a layered picture of properties. At the lower levels, there 
are properties of more basic sciences like physics, and at the higher levels, there are 
functional (or multiply realizable) properties of special sciences like psychology. 
Then reduction must identify high-level properties with basic ones, and simplify this 
multi-level picture. There are different ways to conclude that the scientific ontology 
is multi-level. The most dominant one is 'the semantical analysis of properties'. 
3 0 See for example Schaffher (1967, 143), Hempel (1969, 189) and Hooker (1981, 202). 
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According to this approach, corresponding to any scientific predicate there is a 
property, and because we have levels of predicates, we have levels of properties as 
well. 
The best way to show that it is not a task of reduction to simplify the scientific 
ontology, and therefore we do not need property identities as bridge principles, is to 
reject the layered picture of reality. (See Section 5.2 for more detail.) In addition, i f 
an alternative metaphysical approach can show that the scientific ontology is simple 
and flat per se, then the second motivation for proposing property identities as bridge 
principles is irrelevant. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will present two metaphysical 
frameworks according to which reality is not multi-level. In Chapter 4, I will 
consider an account that analyzes properties in terms of causal powers. According to 
this picture, we have a flat level of conditional causal powers (as building blocks of 
our ontology), and putting these powers together makes properties (See Section 
4.2.2). In Chapter 5,1 will consider an alternative view according to which we have a 
flat level of basic properties, and other entities that we thought were high-level and 
functional properties but are not really properties; they are predicates designating sets 
of similar basic properties. Both of these approaches, despite their differences, show 
that the scientific ontology is not multilevel, and therefore there is no need to 
simplify it by means of reduction. 
3.5 Distinguishing Property Identities from Correlations 
Although I have argued that two main motivations for proposing property identities 
as bridge principles are not strong enough, the question about the possibility and 
criteria of property identity is still attractive. Is identity between properties possible? 
What conditions should be satisfied to claim that there is identity in a particular case? 
It is obvious that we cannot answer these questions unless we adopt a metaphysical 
framework about properties and their natures. Are properties real things or linguistic 
entities? Are they universals or particulars? Is a property a bundle of conditional 
causal powers that bestows to its possessor? Different answers to these questions 
bring different answers to the question of possibility and criteria of property identity. 
Discussing these metaphysical questions is beyond the scope of this chapter. Putting 
these questions aside, another interesting topic is the relation between identity 
statements and their corresponding correlations. Can we distinguish them by means 
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of empirical evidence? In this section, I wil l review some proposals suggested by 
philosophers in the context of reduction. 
Perhaps Hempel (1969) has the most naive view about the relation between identity 
and coextensionality. He does not discuss property identity explicitly, but has a 
similar idea in mind. He believes that in a ful l reduction, in addition to deducing laws 
of the secondary science from laws of the primary, we need the reduction of concepts. 
This means that for every term B in the secondary science, we need a connective 
empirical law of biconditional form, which specifies a necessary and sufficient 
condition for its applicability in terms of a single concept P from the primary science 
(Hempel 1969, 189). This connection, which can be treated as the definition of B, 
enables us to avoid B theoretically. Hempel calls this an 'ontological' feature of 
reduction. 
It can be seen that although Hempel does not mention property identity, his 
motivation is similar to what we mentioned earlier: ontological simplicity. However, 
it is obvious that mere empirical coextensionality between two attribute-predicates 
does not bring about ontological simplicity, and we cannot avoid one concept just 
because we have a coextension concept with it. Having one heart and having two 
kidneys are coextension; however, we cannot avoid one of them by having another. 
In summary, contingent and empirical coextensionality is not equal to identity and 
does not simplify our ontology. 
Kim (1966) was fully aware that there is an essential difference between identity and 
coextensionality of two properties. 
It is clear that a psycho-physical correlation statement does not entail the 
corresponding identity statement - at least, the identity must be 
understood in such a way that it is not entailed by a mere correlation. [...] 
It is perhaps clearer that the identity entails the corresponding correlation, 
and at least to this extent, the identity statement has a factual component. 
(Kim 1966, 227) 
In addition to the point that any identity entails a correlation, Kim believes that the 
corresponding correlation is the only factual component of an identity. According to 
him (1966, 227), an ' . . .identity statement is not confirmable or refutable qua identity 
statement; it is confirmable or refutable insofar as, and only insofar as, the 
corresponding correlation statement entailed by it is confirmable or refutable by 
observation and experiment.' We will shortly see some problems with this view, but 
before that let us continue with Kim and see what he says about reduction. 
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Generally, Kim believes that reduction does not necessarily need identities as bridge 
principles. According to Kim (1966, 228-230), two points might be presented as 
advantages of using identities as bridge principles over using correlations. Firstly, 
reduction by means of identity enables us to simplify our scientific theories. In reply 
to this point, Kim says we have simplicity only i f we reduce the number of primitive 
concepts or independent primitive assumptions. However, even i f we have identities 
between properties, the number of primitive concepts are not reduced, because two 
identified properties are still nonsynonymous and so they are still two primitive 
concepts (Kim 1966, 230). In addition, reduction by means of identity does not 
reduce the number of independent primitive assumptions more than reduction by 
means of correlations. 
The second alleged advantage of identity over correlation, according to Kim, is that 
identity statements need no explanation, while correlations need explanation. In reply 
to this point, Kim asserts, 
Thus, it turns out that by moving from correlation statements to identity 
statements we do not explain facts that were previously unexplained; 
rather, we make them "non-explainable." Now the question is this: In 
what sense does this achieve scientific or theoretical simplicity of the sort 
desired in science? [...] I think that the simplicity thus achieved is rather 
trivial and minimal significance from a scientific point of view. (Kim 
1966, 230) 
Therefore, according to Kim, reduction by means of property identity does not bring 
about any special kind of simplicity over reduction by means of correlation. 
After considering Kim's arguments, let us return to his point that identities and 
corresponding correlations are not distinguishable by means of any empirical 
evidence. This controversial claim motivated many philosophical discussions. Let us 
review some of them. Causey (1972 a) criticized Kim's view and tried to show that 
we can separate identities from correlations by means of explanation. He says, 
Suppose that we have empirically justified "A i f f B," where A and B are 
attributes. Thus, "A i f f 5" is at least a correlation. I claim that it will then 
be a contingent identity i f f it does not require explanation. (Causey 1972 a, 
417) 
However, how can we recognize that "A i f f 5" needs explanation or not? Causey's 
main tool is the substitution principle, which says, 
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Let lA\ ' 5 ' be attribute-predicates, and let D\, D2 be derivations such 
that D2 is obtainable from Z)l by uniform substitution of ' 5 ' for lA\ and 
such that D\ is obtainable from D2 by uniform substitution of 'A' for '5 ' . 
Then: I f A and B are identical, then D\ and D2 are explanatorily 
equivalent. (Causey 1972 a, 419) 
According to Causey (1972 a, 420), this is a necessary condition for identity, and 
although it is possible that some correlations vacuously or fortuitously satisfy it, but 
correlations in general will not satisfy i t 3 1 . 
Ager (Ager, et al. 1974, 129-131) criticized the idea that A and B are identical i f f "A 
i f f B" does not require explanation. Causey (1976) replied to this objection. Enc 
(1976, 288-92) criticized Causey's substitution principle as well. He argues that we 
do not have explanatory symmetry between all of identical properties. His example is, 
...there are certain facts about the weight of an object which can be 
explained by an appeal to its being the gravitational force exerted on the 
object by the earth, and yet there are no corresponding facts about the 
gravitational force exerted on an object which are explainable by an 
appeal to its being the weight of the object. (Enc 1976, 289) 
Hooker (1981, 210-2) criticized Enc's view and presented a criterion for property 
identity, which is very similar to Causey's. According to him (1981, 219) 
'Isomorphism of theoretical role, in clarified science, is a necessary and sufficient 
condition of property identity.' The idea behind this criterion is simple and plausible. 
I f two attribute-predicates are coextensive, there is no guarantee that i f we substitute 
one of them with another in a theoretical context, we still have true statements. 
Having a heart and having two kidneys are coextensive, however by substituting 
'two kidneys' with 'heart' in the sentence 'Heart makes blood circulation', we will 
not have a true sentence any more. 
Considering these arguments in detail is beyond the scope of this section. 
Nevertheless, intuitively it seems to me that Causey and Hooker's ideas that 
identities are distinguishable from correlations, in one way or another, are more 
plausible than their rivals. However, this does not mean that we must have property 
identity in any reduction. For example, in Section 5.11 will show that even i f we 
accept Hooker's criterion to distinguish identities from correlations, his main point 
3 1 It should be pointed out that in some contexts, like modal, we could not substitute one property with 
its identical counterpart and save explanatory equivalency. However, in the causal and scientific 
contexts there is no problem with the substitution. 
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that reduction must be done by means of identity statements is not true. In particular, 
I wil l argue that his proposal to make identity statements does not work in a very 
important case when we have multiple realization32. 
*** 
The arguments of this chapter can be summarized by the following claims: (i) 
Approximation is a necessary component for any plausible account of reduction, at 
least to remove the problem of inconsistency. We can have approximation in three 
places: making an approximate theory close to the primary theory, making an 
approximate theory close to the secondary theory, and using approximately true 
bridge principles. In the first two cases, first we need to know in which respects two 
theories might be similar and then we need philosophical accounts of similarity for 
each case. Using the notion of approximation in the third case is easier, (ii) Identity 
statements between things might be used as bridge principles. They simplify our 
scientific ontology. However, restricting bridge principles to identities between 
things makes a gap between our philosophical model and concrete examples of 
reduction, (iii) There is no need for property identity as a bridge principle. Bridge 
principles do not need explanation, and having firm metaphysical frameworks about 
properties shows that reduction does not need to simplify the scientific ontology. 
Nickles (1973, 192-3) presents three objections to those accounts of reduction that want to save 
Nagel's structure but use identities instead of correlations. Firstly, introducing identities does not 
completely solve Nagel's problem. According to Nickles, Nagel's problem is that the DN model of 
explanation does not have a causal direction and we can explain a cause by its effect as well as explain 
an effect by its cause. Therefore, using the DN model in reduction also has this problem, i.e. we can 
reduce the primary theory to the secondary one as well as reduce the secondary theory to the primary 
one, and introducing identities does not solve it. (I will examine this point in Chapter 9.) Secondly, 
identifications raise new problems. For example, in reduction of a non-statistical theory to a statistical 
one we have different alternatives in the statistical theory to identify with a concept of non-statistical 
theory. Finally, some strong intertheoretic relations, like relation between classical mechanics and 
quantum theory, do not involve theoretical identifications. 
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4 
Multiple Realization (I): A Causal Analysis of Properties 
Realization is one of the most central issues in contemporary analytic metaphysics. 
Many debates in different areas of philosophy like physicalism, the mind-body 
problem, consciousness, and the nature of properties connect to it. In the philosophy 
of science, realization is central as well. After the first wave of objections to the 
classical model of reduction (the problems of inconsistency and meaning variance 
that we discussed in Chapters 2 and 3), the second wave of objections were based on 
the notion of multiple realization. These objections are more discussed and powerful 
than the first wave of objections such that for many philosophers the standard 
problem with the classical model is multiple realization. It is a dominant belief, and 
in many arguments taken for granted, that the possibility of reduction and the unity 
of science is blocked by multiple realization. 
Because the realization relation is mainly conceived as a relation between properties, 
metaphysical discussions about nature of properties are inevitable. In this chapter, I 
wil l focus on the nature of multiple realization according to a causal analysis of 
properties. After that, I will show that in this metaphysical framework we can save a 
version of the unity of science. In Chapter 5, after mentioning some problems with 
the causal account, I will consider an alternative analysis of properties and show that 
this framework can also save a version of the unity of science. After that, I will 
present an exposition of the second wave of objections to the classical model of 
reduction, using the notion of multiple realization, and then consider the situation of 
the classical model of reduction according to the discussed metaphysical frameworks. 
Here is a more detailed map of what I am going to do in this chapter: First, I wil l 
start with the causal analysis of realization. In the next section, Gillett's reflections 
on this view and his new account of realization wil l be presented. I wi l l argue that his 
new account suffers from problems and so I take the standard causal view as my 
framework in the rest of the chapter. In the third section, Shapiro's considerations 
about the possibility of multiple realization wil l be discussed. It will be argued that 
his worries are only valid when we consider the possibility of multiple realization of 
artificial kinds and not properties or natural kinds. 
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After these metaphysical points, I will move on to the philosophy of science and 
examine some points about special sciences. First, I will try to show that given the 
causal framework of realization a version of the unity of science is still defendable. 
After that, Kim's considerations about the impossibility of general special sciences 
will be discussed. In reply, I will try to defend the possibility of general special 
sciences given the causal account of realization. 
4.1 Multiple Realization 
4.1.1 The Causal Account of Realization 
Although philosophers have been using the notion of realization for a long time, few 
of them have discussed its metaphysics in detail. Normally they consider the intuition 
that some properties, states or kinds can be realized in different ways and by different 
physical bases enough to clarify the realization relation. As Gillett (2002, 316-17) 
says, among early accounts of realization, however, we can find some metaphysical 
features which would help us to formulate early accounts of realization more 
precisely. The first demand was that realization must be a non-causal determination 
relation. This means that the realizing property e determines and fixes the realized 
property E, i.e. we have E in virtue of having e, but e does not cause E. The second 
demand was that there should be a connection between the causal roles of the 
realized and realizer properties. The dominant idea was that when E is realized by e, 
e's instantiation should play the same causal roles that E's instantiation plays and not 
vice versa. In other words, although e and E are not identical, when E is realized by e 
any causal power of £ ' s instantiation is in fact a causal power of e's instantiation. 
However, some causal powers of e's instantiation might not be causal powers of £ ' s 
instantiation. 
To give an example, Papineau's (1993, 25) definition is a good candidate. His main 
motivation in appealing to this notion is avoiding the problem of overdetermination. 
He wants to define the realization relation between a physical property P and a 
mental property M such that their common effects, say e, are not overdetermined. For 
this purpose he says, 
I propose that we adopt the following account of realization. In order for a 
mental or other special type M to be realized by an instance of some 
physical type P, M needs to be a second-order property, the property of 
having some property which satisfies certain requirements R. And then M 
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will be realized by P in some individual X i f and only i f this instance of P 
satisfies requirements R. In such a case we can say X satisfies M in virtue 
of satisfying P. (Papineau 1993, 25) 
However, in recent years some philosophers, without rejecting the earlier accounts, 
tried to clarify the realization relation more. Here I will focus on Shoemaker's 
attempt and then mention some others who reached nearly the same results. 
Shoemaker's formulation of realization is completely dependent on his view of 
properties, which therefore we start by describing. In 'Causality and Properties' 
(1980), Shoemaker tries to analyze the notion of property in terms of the notion of 
causality. First, he defines the notion of a power: power is a function from 
circumstances to effects. Therefore, for a thing to have a power is for it to be such 
that its presence in a particular kind of circumstances has certain effects. Similarly, it 
can be said that for a thing to have a property is for it to be such that its presence in a 
particular kind of circumstances (i.e. in combination with some other properties) has 
certain effects. Therefore, a property could be defined as a function from sets of 
properties to sets of powers. Being 'knife-shaped', for example, is a property, which 
combined with some other properties like being made of steel, wil l produce a set of 
powers like the power of cutting butter. On this basis, Shoemaker defines a 
conditional power: an object has power P conditionally upon the possession of the 
properties in set Q, i f it has a property r such that i f r combines with Q, they produce 
P (and obviously having Q should not be sufficient for P alone). For example, an 
object O which has the property of being knife-shaped (r), has the power of cutting 
wood (P) conditionally upon the set of properties like being knife-sized and made of 
steel (0. From these definitions, Shoemaker concludes his theory of properties: a 
property is a cluster of conditional powers. This means that a property, say being 
knife-shaped, is nothing more than a cluster of conditional powers: i f it combines 
with the properties of being knife-sized and made of steel it will manifest the power 
to cut wood, alternatively i f it combines with the set of being knife-sized and made 
of wood it will manifest power of cutting butter and so on. 
Three points in this account are worth to be mentioned. Firstly, Shoemaker identifies 
a property with a cluster of conditional powers, i.e. the former is nothing over and 
above the latter. This means that conditional powers are constituents of properties. 
Secondly, he takes the relation between a property and its conditional powers to be a 
necessary relation. A property has a particular and fixed set of conditional powers in 
all possible worlds. In any other possible world that the property exists, it has the 
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same conditional powers. Finally, every property is a set of conditional powers; 
however, not every set of conditional powers makes a property. For a set of 
conditional powers to constitute a property, any pair of them should be causally 
unified. Two conditional powers X and Y are causally unified if, and only if, it is a 
consequence of causal laws that either (1) whatever has either of them has the other, 
or (2) there is some third conditional power such that whatever has it has both X and 
Y (Shoemaker 1980, 246). 
Nearly twenty years later, Shoemaker presented his account of realization based on 
the same assumptions. In 'Realization and Mental Causation' (2001), he analyzes the 
realization relation in terms of conditional powers. However, there are some 
modifications in the assumptions about properties. Firstly, he no longer identifies a 
property with a cluster of conditional powers (Shoemaker 2001, 94, n. 10). He 
simply says that instantiation of any property bestows a set of conditional powers on 
its subject. Secondly, he does not use the 'controversial' part of his former account 
that a property bestows a particular set of conditional powers, those it does in the 
actual world, in any other possible world (Shoemaker 2001, 77-8). He simply 
assumes that in the actual world the same property always bestows the same 
conditional powers. Finally, concerning causally unified conditional powers in a set, 
Shoemaker believes that it is not a sufficient condition to constitute a property. He 
(2001, 87) adds a new condition according to which the set must be closed under 
nomic and metaphysical entailment: 'for every conditional power contained in the set, 
the set contains every conditional power nomically or metaphysically entailed by that 
conditional power'. 
Now let us see how Shoemaker analyzes the realization relation by means of causal 
powers. He starts with the determinate/determinable relation, which many 
philosophers have agreed has a close relation to the realization relation. He (2001, 78) 
says that the conditional powers bestowed by a determinable property, like being red, 
are a proper subset of the conditional powers bestowed by each of its determinate 
properties, like being scarlet. In other words, although each of the different 
determinates bestows a different set of conditional powers, all of them have the 
conditional powers bestowed by the determinable in common. Therefore, the 
determinate property realizes the determinable property by virtue of the fact that the 
conditional powers conferred by the latter are a proper subset of the former. The 
second case that Shoemaker considers is functional properties, on which some 
philosophers (e.g. Papineau) based their accounts of realization. Here again 
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Shoemaker thinks that the conditional powers bestowed by a functional property, like 
being in pain, are a proper subset of the conditional powers conferred by each of its 
realizers. 
Shoemaker (2001, 78) generalizes this requirement to define the realization relation: 
' In general, property X realizes property Y just in case the conditional powers 
bestowed by Y are a subset of the conditional powers bestowed by X (and X is not a 
conjunctive property having Y as a conjunct).' Naturally, when Y is a multiply 
realizable property the conditional powers bestowed by it are proper subsets of the 
sets of conditional powers bestowed by each of its realizers. 
Accepting this definition, we could have two different interpretations. I f we accept 
Shoemaker's first view that a property is nothing more than a cluster of conditional 
powers, i.e. i f we identify a property with a cluster of conditional powers, we could 
easily say that the realized property is a part of each of its realizers. By accepting 
Shoemaker's framework of properties and independent from his second paper, Clapp 
(2001) takes such a position. He first defines realization relation as follows, 
A property P of an object (or event) o realizes a property F of o i f and 
only i f (i) it is necessary that, i f o instantiates P, then o instantiates F, and 
(ii) o's instantiating P in some metaphysical sense explains o's 
instantiating F - being P is one way in which a thing can be F. (Clapp 
2001,112-3) 
Then he (2001, 127) adds that, 'properties are simply identified with sets of causal 
powers'. By putting these two ideas together, he moves on to the definition of 
realization in terms of powers, 
P realizes Q i f and only i f (def), where p and q are the sets of powers 
constituting P and g, ^ <= />. (Clapp 2001, 129) 
A logical consequence of these premises is that a realized property is a part of its 
realizers. Clapp (2001, 133), for example, says, '...multiply realized mental 
properties, though real and causally efficacious, are better thought of as parts of their 
physical realizers.' It is a very interesting conclusion that according to this view, not 
only are mental properties not high-level properties, but also in one sense, they are 
more basic such that physical properties are made of them. 
The second interpretation is obtained when we, with the later Shoemaker, do not 
identify a property with a set of conditional powers. In this case, we cannot say that 
the realized property is a part of its realizers. However, according to Shoemaker 
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(2001, 94. n. 11) we still can say that instances of the realized property are parts of 
instances of its realizers . 
Apart from Shoemaker and Clapp, Kim expresses nearly the same result about the 
nature of the realization relation. With a general claim about the nature of properties 
like Alexander's dictum according to which '7b be real is to have causal powers'1 
(Kim 1993a, 202), it is not surprising to see that Kim analyzes the relation between 
realization and causal powers as follows, 
[The Causal Inheritance Principle] I f mental property M is realized in a 
system at t in virtue of physical realization base P, the causal powers of 
this instance of M are identical with the causal powers of P. (Kim 1992, 
326) 
However, this definition ignores the point that P might have some additional causal 
powers that we would not like to attribute to M. On the other hand, i f P is a realizer 
of Many stronger property P* (say, P & Q, for a nontrivial Q consistent with P) is 
also a realizer of M. In this case P* has some causal powers that are not included in P 
and therefore we do not want to attribute to M (Kim 1998, 129, n. 45). For these 
reasons, Kim has modified his definition. Instead of requiring identity between 
causal powers of instantiations of M and P, he allows the subset relation as well: 
I f a second-order property F is realized on a given occasion by a first-
order property H (that is, i f F is instantiated on a given occasion in virtue 
of the fact that one of its realizers, H, is instantiated on that occasion), 
then the causal powers of this particular instance of F are identical with 
(or are a subset of) the causal powers of H (or of this instance of H). (Kim 
1998, 54) 
We can summarise the 'causal' ('received' or 'standard') analysis of realization like 
Gillett (2002, 317-8) as follows: 
(I) A property instance X realizes a property instance Y only if X and Y are 
instantiated in the same individual. 
(II) A property instance X realizes a property instance Y only if the causal 
powers individuative of the instance of Y match causal powers 
contributed by the instance of X (and where X may contribute powers not 
individuative of Y). 
For a critical analysis of this interpretation and Shoemaker's possible motivations for suggesting it, 
see Section 5.3. 
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4.1.2 The Dimensioned Account of Realization 
Gillett (2002) tried to criticise the causal analysis of realization and propose a new 
account. Let us start with his concrete example. Suppose that we have a piece of 
diamond, S, which has the property H of being extremely hard. In addition, let us 
suppose that Sl-Sn are the constituent carbon atoms of S, and Fl-Fn are properties of 
the atoms or relations between them. It is an obvious point that according to the 
causal view none of Fis is a realizer of H alone. Fi and H are not instantiated in the 
same individual (violating requirement I), and their causal powers are quite distinct 
and independent (violating requirement II). According to Gillett (2002, 320) a 
plausible candidate for realizer of H, in the causal framework, is a structural property 
(say COMBO), which is a highly complex structure of carbon atoms, their properties 
and relations. Now Gillett raises the question, what is the relation between COMBO 
and the fundamental microphysical properties/relations that basic components of 
carbon atoms like quarks have? Here again it is an obvious point that none of these 
properties/relations is a realizer of COMBO alone. Gillett inclines to say that here we 
have a realization relation, 
Although not identical, the sciences again provide evidence that makes it 
plausible that COMBO is not wholly distinct from such fundamental 
microphysical properties/relations either. Instead, it appears that such 
ontologically fundamental properties/relations realize structural properties 
such as COMBO. (Gillett 2002, 320) 
However, from the mere fact that according to the causal view none of these 
fundamental properties/relations is a realizer of COMBO alone, Gillett (2002, 320) 
surprisingly concludes that the causal view again cannot class these cases as 
involving realization'. I cannot understand Gillett's main intention behind this 
argument. It seems to me that such as in the first case, the causal view prevents us 
from identifying any single basic property/relation as a realizer of COMBO, but the 
same strategy could work here. We need another structural property of the diamond, 
say COMBOBO, which is a highly complex structure of fundamental particles, their 
properties and relations. This property satisfies both requirements of the causal view 
and is a possible realizer of COMBO; similarly, COMBO satisfies those two 
requirements and is a possible realizer of hardness. 
It is possible that Gillett's example and his argument for the inadequacy of the causal 
view do not work well. However, he presents a new account that he thinks adds 
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dimensions to the realization relation. Let us consider this account and the alleged 
dimensions. His (2002, 322) definition of realization is, 
Property/relation instance(s) Fl -F« realize an instance of a property G, in 
an individual S, if and only i/S has powers that are individuative of an 
instance of G in virtue of the powers contributed by F l -F« to S or S's 
constituent(s), but not vice versa. 
Gillett thinks that the new definition adds two dimensions to the flat causal view. The 
first dimension concerns the first feature of the causal view; according to it, the 
realized and realizer properties are co-instantiated. In the above definition, in 
addition to the identity of substance, Gillett opens the possibility that instead of one 
substance (S), the realizer properties have a number of substances (SI-Sri), which are 
constituents of the substance of the realized property. The second dimension 
concerns the second feature of the causal view, according to which conditional 
powers of the realized property are identical with, or a subset of, the conditional 
powers of the realizer property. Apart from identity, Gillett opens the possibility that 
in virtue of powers contributed by Fl-Fn, S has contributed powers of G. 
Both of these dimensions seem awkward to me. Regarding the first one, I think there 
is no difference between the causal and dimensioned views. What is the realizer 
property in Gillett's account? Here we have a set of properties, Fl-Fn, which plays 
this role. Now, what is the substance of this set? There are two possibilities here. 
According to the first, Fl-Fn contribute their powers directly to S. Here we have a 
situation similar to the causal view and both of the realizer and realized properties 
have the same substance. Secondly, Fl-Fn contribute their powers not to S, but to 5"s 
constituents. In this case, Fl-Fn are properties and relations of 5"s constituents. In 
other words, Fl-Fn is exactly a structural property at a given level, atomic or sub-
atomic. Now, it is obvious that when we want to determine the substance of a set of 
properties that contribute powers to a set of constituents, we cannot mention one or 
another constituent. Here the substance of the set of properties is the set of all 
constituents, i.e. Sl-Sn. However, Sl-Sn is nothing more than S. Therefore, the 
substance of the realized property G is S, and the substance of the realizing property 
Fl-Fn, is Sl-Sn that is identical with S. Consequently, there is no difference between 
the two accounts of realization in this regard. 
Regarding the second alleged dimension, I think there is an ambiguity in Gillett's 
account. The heart of his definition is substituting the notion of 'identity between 
conditional powers' with the notion of 'in virtue o f . Instead of identity between 
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conditional powers of G and a subset of conditional powers of Fl-Fn, he says that in 
virtue of the former we have the latter. However, ' in virtue o f is a vague relation that 
might be used in different ways in different contexts. Even i f we take the point that in 
all cases, ' in virtue o f is a non-causal relation, there are still different usages of it 
that cannot be unified by one metaphysical account. The whole-part relation and the 
constitution relation are two examples of usage of this relation: this table has contact 
with the floor in virtue of the fact that some of its parts (its legs) have contact, and 
this pen is red in virtue of the fact that one of its constituents is the property of 
redness. Now, the question is, in which sense does Gillett uses this notion? I f he says 
that powers of the realized property are parts of powers of the realizing property 
(which would be similar to Clapp's view), this is something quite different from the 
position that the former is a constituent of the latter. These positions must be first 
distinguished from each other, and then their plausibility according to more general 
theories of properties (like the causal model) discussed, a task that Gillett has not 
done. As a result, there is an ambiguity in Gillett's definition of realization, which 
might be interpreted in radically different ways. The consistency of these 
interpretations with more general theories of properties has not been discussed. 
Finally, let us close this section with one of the cases that Gillett (2002, 322, n. 9) 
thinks his account can cover, but the causal account cannot. Suppose S has X and Y, 
but X contributes none of the powers individuative of Y. However, the powers 
contributed by X to S are sufficient for S to have powers individuative of Y. 
According to Gillett, because there is no identity between powers here, the causal 
account could not cover this case as a realization. However, sufficiency is an 
example of the 'in virtue o f relation, and therefore Gillett's account covers this case 
as realization. 
To assess this claim let us examine the possible ways that a set of powers might be 
sufficient for another set. The weakest case (factual sufficiency) is obtained when we 
have mere factual coextensionality between two sets of powers; in a possible world 
that all water-soluble things are white, being water-soluble is sufficient for being 
white. I think Gillett must reject such cases as real realizations; otherwise, he has to 
accept that having one heart is a realizer of having two kidneys, which seems absurd. 
Two other possible kinds of sufficiency are available, nomological and metaphysical. 
In the former, it is a causal law that anything that has X, has Y as well. And in the 
latter it is a necessary truth that anything that has X, has Y as well. Now remember 
Shoemaker's new additional condition for a set of causal powers to constitute a 
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property. According to this condition, i f a conditional power is (nomically or 
metaphysically) entailed by another conditional power, then any property that has the 
latter has the former as well. According to this condition, i f conditional powers of Y 
are entailed by conditional powers of X, then X should confer these powers as well. 
Hence, the conditional powers of 7 are a subset of the conditional powers of X. 
Therefore, the second feature of the causal account is satisfied and we have 
realization according to this account. There is no advantage for Gillett's account over 
the causal account because of this case. 
4.1.3 The Possibility of Multiple Realization 
The multiple realization thesis is normally regarded as an argument against reduction. 
Therefore, apart from the notion of realization we have to consider multiple 
readability as well. In this section, I wil l discuss Shapiro's (2000) considerations 
about the possibility of multiple realizability. His main concerns (Shapiro 2000, 636) 
are that no one has seriously questioned the truth of multiple realizability thesis and 
no one has tried to answer the question about when two realizations are different and 
distinct from each other. After considering three arguments for possibility of the 
empirical thesis of multiple realizability, he concludes that none of them can prove it. 
Here I do not examine these arguments, and start from where Shapiro begins to 
present his own arguments. 
The first crucial point is that, following Lycan, Shapiro thinks that the only things for 
which the multiple realizability thesis has a chance of being true are kinds. What sort 
of kinds? 
[The multiple realizability thesis], to the extent that it is true, is true of 
kinds that are defined by reference to their purpose or capacity or 
contribution to some end. Purpose, capacities, contributions— these 
specify roles to be played and, accordingly, it may be possible that any of 
a variety of occupants can fill the role (Shapiro 2000, 643). 
The second crucial point is that Shapiro thinks realizers are objects, which have some 
properties. An object is a realizer of a kind, i f the object, in virtue of its properties, 
can fulf i l the purpose, capacities, or contributions by reference to which the kind is 
defined3 4. Now according to Shapiro (2000, 643), 'Some of the properties of realizers 
This point seems very unusual. Intuitively, we expect that the realized and realizer entities belong to 
the same ontological category and have the same nature. For example, we expect that any account of 
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of multiply realizable kinds are relevant to the purpose, activity, or capacity that 
define the kind and some are not'. As an example, 'corkscrew' is a kind that can be 
defined in terms of a capacity; a corkscrew has the capacity to remove corks. 
Therefore, a piece of steel with a particular shape that could remove normal corks 
under normal circumstances is a realizer of this kind. The colour of this tool is one of 
those properties which are not relevant to the capacity. However, the rigidity of the 
steel is a relevant property. 
On the basis of these assumptions, Shapiro (2000, 644) says that two realizers of a 
kind are distinct only i f they differ in the relevant causal properties, properties that 
are relevant to the purpose and function of the kind. In other words, two realizers are 
distinct only when they bring about the function that defines the kind in different 
ways. As a result, a given kind is multiply realizable only i f it has some distinct 
realizers. 
As an uncontroversial example, it is clear that according to this framework two 
similar corkscrews that only differ in their colours are not two distinct realizers of the 
kind corkscrew, because they differ only in colour, which is irrelevant to the function 
of corkscrew. However, the case will be more complicated i f we consider two 
waiter's corkscrews, one is composed of steel and the other of aluminium. Shapiro 
(2000, 644) still thinks that they are not two distinct realizers. Both of them fulf i l the 
purpose of the corkscrew with the same causally relevant properties: e.g. rigidity. 
However, there is a point here that might help understand Shapiro's account. Steel 
and aluminium might consider as two distinct realizers of some other kinds. Consider 
'rigidity' as a disposition. According to Shapiro (2000, 643), because we can define a 
disposition in terms of some capacities, dispositions (like kinds) are candidates for 
multiple realizability. Therefore, we might consider rigid objects as members of a 
kind. Now regarding this kind steel and aluminium are two distinct realizers, because 
they differ in the mechanisms and the ways that they bring about rigidity. 
The oint of this example, as far as I understand, is that any kind has a proper level of 
abstraction. This level determines which pairs of objects are heterogeneous and 
therefore make distinct realizers for the kind, and which are homogeneous and so 
cannot make distinct realizers. A given pair of objects (like steel and aluminium) 
might be homogeneous according to one level of abstraction, and heterogeneous 
according to another one. What determines this level of abstraction is the purpose 
realization takes for granted that realizers of properties are properties themselves. However, Shapiro 
says that concrete objects are realizers of abstract entities like kinds. 
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and function of the kind. Regarding the purpose of a corkscrew, i.e. removing normal 
corks under normal circumstances, any two normal rigid objects, like steel and 
aluminium, are homogeneous. This purpose screens off their differences, because 
both of them bring about the same effect by the same mechanism. However, 
regarding the purpose and function of rigidity (if any), they bring about it in different 
ways and so are heterogeneous. 
On the basis of such assumptions, Shapiro (2000, 646-50) presents a dilemma for 
multiple realizability. There are two possible cases. I f two realizers of a kind are not 
distinct from each other, then we do not have multiple realizability. We have two 
instantiations of the same realization. On the other horn, i f they are distinct this 
means they are different in their causally relevant properties and so belong to two 
different kinds. Therefore, i f they are distinct realizers, there is no single kind with 
multiple realizations; there are two different kinds here. 
Different points in Shapiro's account might be criticized. However, I wil l consider 
only one point, which is directly relevant to our discussion of reduction. The formal 
conditions of the classical model of reduction concerns the deduction of laws of the 
secondary science from laws of the primary science. Normally, laws deal with 
properties and natural kinds. Consequently, we have to consider the situation of 
properties and natural kinds according to Shapiro's account. Therefore, the question 
is, 'can properties and natural kinds be multiply realized?' In other words, can we 
always characterize a property or a natural kind in the format that Shapiro suggested, 
i.e. by reference to its purpose, capacity or contribution to some end? 
As to properties, Shapiro accepts that dispositional properties can be defined by 
referring to their purpose and capacity. Extending this claim to all properties needs 
the additional assumptions that all properties are dispositional. As to natural kinds, 
claiming that they can be defined by referring to their purpose and capacity needs the 
additional assumption that a natural kind is a cluster of dispositions. Both of these 
additional assumptions might be disputed, but for the sake of argument let us accept 
them. 
However, even i f we accept that dispositional properties and natural kinds might be 
realized, considering two particular realizers as distinct or non-distinct is not an 
objective feature of them, it depends on our point of view and the respects in which 
we consider them. To see this point, let us return to Shapiro's two concrete examples. 
This moral makes sense of why the waiter's corkscrew and the winged 
corkscrew do seem to count as multiple realization of a corkscrew. The 
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waiter's corkscrew relies on a lever to prise the cork out of the bottle 
whereas the winged corkscrew uses a rack and two pinions to do the same 
job. Levers and rack and pinions are different mechanisms that require 
different manipulations, they are described by different laws, and so on. 
The causally relevant properties of these two devices differ; a fortiori they 
qualify as different realizations of a corkscrew. [.. .] 
For all I know, rigidity is a disposition that is multiply realizable. I f 
rigidity is a disposition that can be brought about in various ways, and i f 
steel and aluminum differ in respect to how they produce rigidity, then 
steel and aluminum are alternative realizations of rigidity. (Shapiro 2000, 
644-5) 
In the first example, it is quite possible that we take the two corkscrews as non-
distinct, i f we compare them with an imaginary corkscrew that works by laser beams 
instead of mechanical forces. This imaginary machine first destroys corks by laser 
beams and then removes them by vacuuming. Here we could say that the first two 
corkscrews are homogeneous, because both of them work by means of mechanical 
forces. This means that they are not distinct, because both of them use the same 
mechanism (using mechanical forces) to bring about the purpose. However, the 
imaginary machine is a distinct realizer, because it brings about the purpose by a 
quite different mechanism. Therefore, considering two realizers distinct or similar is 
a matter of our point of view, and depends to other possible and available cases. It is 
not an intrinsic feature of realizers. 
Similarly, in the second example, we could say that steel and aluminum are not 
distinct realizers of rigidity. Each brings about rigidity in virtue of having 
fundamental physical particles (e.g. quarks) and the same laws that govern them 
(fundamental microphysical laws). In this respect, they are homogeneous. However, 
in another context, when we focus on the type of chemical bonds between atoms of 
steel and aluminum, they are different and distinct. 
Therefore, there is no fixed level of abstraction for a given kind or property. In 
different contexts and by different points of view, we could have different judgments 
about two realizers. Shapiro's account is a context-dependent rather than an objective 
account of realization, according to which homogeneity and heterogeneity of two 
realizers, apart from them, depend on the context of consideration. A context-
dependent analysis of realization might be useful for considering artificial kinds (like 
corkscrews), but I think is not good for analyzing natural kinds and properties. In my 
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view, a proper metaphysical account of realization for properties and natural kinds 
must be objective and independent of the context. It must determine exact conditions 
which under them we have realization, independent of any cognitive, epistemic, or 
contextual aspects. Shapiro's account is not a proper model for this purpose . 
Finally, let us close this part by considering a question: 'Given the causal account of 
realization, are realizers of a multiply realizable property distinct?' My answer is yes 
and no. In one sense, they are not distinct. Al l of them realize the realized property 
by a given, common and fixed set of causal powers. Therefore, all contain a 
particular set of causal powers, and by virtue of it realize the realized property. 
However, in another sense they are distinct. Apart from the shared set of causal 
powers, each of them has some different and un-shared causal powers, which might 
be unique to that realizer. In this sense, the causal powers of one realizer are different 
from any other realizer, and so they are distinct. In other words, realizers of a 
property are different, but are not radically different properties. We will return to this 
important point shortly and see how it helps to answer some questions. 
4.2 Multiple Realization and Special Sciences 
Now it is time to return to the philosophy of science and consider the situation of 
special sciences according to the causal account of realization. In the following 
section, I wil l show how we could still defend a version of the unity of science. The 
next section is devoted to Kim's arguments against general special sciences. In reply, 
I wi l l try to show that given the causal account of realization we can have general 
special sciences. 
4.2.1 The Possibility of the Unity of Science (I) 
The idea of the unity of science is one of the old attractive themes for both 
philosophers and scientists. For some philosophers, the unity of science is more 
important than particular accounts of reduction. This means that even i f Nagelian 
account cannot be defended against objections, as long as we have a defendable 
account of the unity of science, that is enough. Therefore, presenting an account of 
For a completely different critique of Shapiro's approach, see Rosenberg (2001). 
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the unity of science, which is immune against objections to the classical model of 
reduction, is a promising philosophical task. 
At least three components can be distinguished in any model of the unity of science. 
The first element concerns the aspect in which, according to the model, scientific 
theories are unified. For example, according to Carnap (1938) in his 'Logical 
Foundations of the Unity of Science', scientific theories can be unified in respect of 
their languages. He claims that all physical terms are reducible to the 'thing-
language', and i f any other science wants to be legitimate, it must only use terms that 
are reducible to the 'thing-language'. 
The second element concerns the strategy that by following it the unity of science in 
the alleged respect can be shown. Normally philosophers have used an intertheoretic 
account of reduction as this part. They have suggested ways to reduce more 
comprehensive to less comprehensive theories in the alleged respect. For example, i f 
somebody believes that scientific theories are unified in respect of their laws, then 
she might use Nagelian classic account as the second part of her model. However, it 
is not the case that any model of the unity of science needs a reduction account. We 
wil l see shortly that in my favourite model there is no particular reduction account. 
The third element concerns the generality of the model. This element asserts that the 
model covers some theories, and is silent about others. For example, Carnap thinks 
that his model is applicable to any scientific theory. Alternatively, some other models 
claim that they only cover macro-theories, i.e. they provide accounts for the unity of 
macro-theories with their counterpart micro-theories. 
In the model I will defend, the first element is content of laws: content of a special-
science law is a coarse-grained (more abstract) version of contents of a set of basic 
laws. Regarding the second element, I do not need a particular account of reduction. 
Metaphysical considerations about the nature of properties are sufficient to show the 
unity. Finally, the scope of my account only covers special sciences, or more 
precisely those sciences that use multiply realizable properties. This means that my 
model at most can show a unity between special and basic sciences. Therefore, this 
model is silent about the relationship between theories that do not use multiply 
realizable properties. 
To present my version of the unity of science, let us consider a special-science law 
and its basic (physical) counterparts. Suppose P and Q are two properties belonging 
to a special science, with two sets of physical realizers respectively: pJ,p2 ... and ql, 
q2.... Moreover, suppose that P and Q enter into a law of the special science like P 
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—> Q, and any pair of pi and qi enter into a law of physics like pi —> qi. Whenever P 
is realized by pi and Q by qi, we have two laws in two different levels, at the high 
level we have P —* Q and at the physical level we have pi —* qi (Figure 1). 
pl,p2,p3... ql,q2, q3 
Figure 1: Realization of a special-science law at the physical level 
Now, let us consider the conditional causal powers of these properties. Suppose that 
P and Q's sets of conditional causal powers are a and /? respectively. According to 
the causal account of realization, because pis are realizers of P, a is a subset of their 
conditional causal powers. Therefore, we can represent their conditional causal 
powers as table 1. Similarly, for Q and qis we have table 2. 
Property Conditional causal powers 
P a 
pl a + al 
p2 a + a.2 
Table 1: Conditional causal powers of P and its realizers 
Property Conditional causal powers 
Q P 
ql P + Pl 
q2 P + P2 
Table 2: Conditional causal powers of Q and its realizers 
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Now we can re-write the laws of Figure 1 according to the conditional causal powers 
of properties (table 3). 
In terms of properties In terms of conditional 
causal powers 
A special-
science law (Law 0) P^Q 
Physical laws 
(Law 1) pi —» ql a + a! ^ p + fil 
(Law 2) P2 -* q2 a + a2 - > p+ P2 
Table 3: re-writing a special-science law and its physical realizers in terms of their conditional causal 
powers 
My claim is that the content of law (0) is a coarse-grained version of contents of a set 
of laws (law 1, 2...). To see this point let me review Batterman's (2000) argument 
and examples, and then borrow from him the concept of an irrelevant causal power. 
He (2000, 120) introduces the concept of 'a universal behaviour/property': saying 
that a property/behaviour is a universal feature of a range of systems means that all 
of the systems, despite their micro-level differences, manifest the same 
property/behaviour. For example, for a container of fluid, we define the 'order 
parameter' as the difference in densities of the vapour and liquid. Near critical 
temperatures, the order parameters of all fluids follow the same mathematical 
equation. This means that the curve of density vs. temperature for all fluids is the 
same (a universal behaviour); however, each fluid has a unique microstructure 
(chemical constitution) and a different critical temperature. 
Now with regard to a universal behaviour, some details of the microstructure of a 
given system are 'irrelevant'. The criterion of irrelevancy is this: i f by changing a 
microfeature we still have the universal behaviour, then that microfeature is 
irrelevant to the universal behaviour, whereas i f by changing the microfeature we 
will lose the universal behaviour, the micro-feature is relevant. For example, 
chemical constitutions of fluids are irrelevant to the discussed universal behaviour, 
while the spatial dimension of the system is relevant. When we have systems with 
one spatial dimension or quasi-one dimensional systems (e.g. polymers), or when we 
have systems with (quasi)-two dimensional systems (e.g. films), their curves of 
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density vs. temperature are different from the curve of three dimensional systems like 
fluids (Batterman 2000, 127-8). Relevant microfeatures are present in all the systems 
that manifest a universal behaviour, while the systems might be different in their 
irrelevant microfeatures. 
Batterman (2000, 130-134) extends his argument to special sciences as well. 
According to him, we can explain multiple realization in special sciences with the 
same strategy. Here we have a universal property at the high-level (say, being in 
pain), which can be realized by different low-level configurations. Al l of these 
different low-level configurations share a set of relevant physical parameters, while 
they might be different in some irrelevant physical parameters. Although Batterman 
did not mention the causal analysis of properties, his proposal is very similar to 
Shoemaker's proposal. What Batterman calls the relevant physical parameters, which 
are common in all the systems that manifest a universal behaviour, corresponds to 
the set of causal powers of a multiply realizable property (in our example a). And 
what he calls the irrelevant factors corresponds to the additional causal powers of the 
realizers (in our example al, a.2 . . . ) . Now by having these assumptions, we need one 
further step to obtain the unity of science, the step that Batterman and Shoemaker did 
not explain and I will explain here. 
By using Batterman's terminology, in our previous example the antecedents of laws 
1, 2...include irrelevant sets of causal powers, ou's are irrelevant because when we 
substitute one of them with another, we still have the common (universal) causal 
powers {fi). Although at the fine-grained physical level, a cannot appear alone and 
should be with one of ais, which ai is present does not matter. In fact, a is sufficient 
to bring about fi. In other words, a/s are irrelevant in the sense that it does not matter 
which one is present. The key factor is the presence of a with one its supplements; 
the supplements which in any case one of them (no matter which one) is required to 
be with a in the actual world, but all are nomologically irrelevant to bring about /?. 
On the other hand, when a combines with one of these supplements, apart from /? 
they bring about some byproducts like fil or fi2 .... Similarly, (lis are irrelevant as 
long as our concern is the presence of fi. In other words, although fi cannot appear 
without them, it does not matter which one is present. They are irrelevant to our main 
concern here, which is the presence of a universal behaviour (Ji). 
Now my main claim is that the content of law (0) is a coarse-grained version of a set 
of nomological contents expressed by laws 1, 2.... Each of laws 1, 2... expresses a 
nomological content at a fine-grained physical level, however law (0) puts all these 
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contents together and eliminates irrelevant factors from their antecedents and 
consequents and then present their common content in a coarse-grained version. In 
other words, at a more abstract level, law (0) only mentions the relevant factors to 
bring about a universal behaviour. As long as our concern is a universal behaviour 
(/?), law (0) mentions what is nomologically essential for it. However, laws 1, 2..., in 
addition to the essential information, give more detail about particular configurations 
and byproducts that we have in particular instances. 
The relationship between law (0) and laws 1, 2... can be explained more. According 
to the discussed interpretation, law (0) says that the only relevant set of causal 
powers to ft is a. Therefore, this law asserts two things: firstly, a is sufficient for /?; 
secondly, the only sufficient and relevant factor for /? is a. Now it seems that this law 
has a distinguished situation from the ordinary laws like law 1, 2.... Each of these 
laws only mentions that a set of causal powers (e.g. a + al) is sufficient for another 
set (e.g. P + pi). However, they do not have the second component of law (0), i.e. 
they do not claim that the only relevant factors to their consequents are those that are 
mentioned in the antecedents. Based on this distinction, it seems that the method of 
confirmation for law (0) is different from the ordinary method of confirmation. To 
confirm ordinary laws, like law (1), we only need positive instances that have both 
the antecedent and consequent sets of causal powers. Any object that has a + al and 
P + pi is a positive instance for law (1). However, this cannot be a positive instance 
for law (0). To confirm law (0) we must confirm its second component, i.e. we must 
show that the only relevant set of causal powers is a. Now the question is how we 
can confirm law (0). 
One way to do this task seems to be this: we need a vast range of highly confirmed 
laws as laws 1, 2 .... These laws (probably with the help of some mathematical 
methods) show that by keeping a unchanged and by changing other factors, we still 
have p. Therefore, they give us evidence that the only relevant factor is probably a. 
In other words, it seems that we infer law (0) from a set of basic laws. Now let us 
suppose that in a particular case we have only law 1. In this case the inference from 
the law 'a + al is sufficient for P + PV to the law 'a is the only relevant factor to /?', 
is not always valid. It is possible that instead of a, al is relevant here and brings 
about p. However, i f we have law 1 and law 2, then the inference is more plausible, 
although it cannot still prove that law (0) is true. As a result, obtaining law (0) from 
the set of basic laws 1,2... (probably with the help of some mathematical methods) 
has an inductive nature, which at most can give a high degree of confirmation to law 
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(0), but cannot prove it. Having more laws, saying that the combination of a with 
different ais is sufficient to bring about /?, gives more confirmation to law (0). 
Therefore, the claim that real multiply realizable properties have infinite possible 
realizers does not only make a problem for this account of the unity of science, but 
also increases the degree of confirmation of special-science laws. On the other hand, 
the degree of confirmation of a generalization that uses multiply realizable properties 
with few realizers is probably low. 
Let us consider a concrete example to understand the proposed unity of science better. 
As a typical law of psychology, consider this one36. ' I f a person wants something (w), 
and believes she can get w by doing some action (a), then she will do it . ' Let us 
suppose that properties that are used in this law (e.g. 'wanting something' or 
'believing she can get w by doing some action') are multiply realizable (or 
determinable). This means that anybody who has one of these properties has a certain 
set of causal powers . Imagine that according to neuroscientific discoveries, the 
brain of anybody who wants something (w) has the set of causal powers a, and by 
believing she can get w by doing some action (a) her brain has the set of causal 
powers /?, and by doing the action a her brain has the set y. To illuminate these sets 
let me give an example. Doing the action a needs some electrical pulses from the 
brain to the appropriate limbs. Therefore, the set of causal powers corresponding to 
this property (y) has a conditional causal power like c, which says i f an appropriate 
voltage-detector connects to the neurons that carry electrical pulses from the brain to 
the limbs, then the detector will detect a particular electrical pulse when the property 
is instantiated. 
Now let us consider one realization of this law. I f Mary wants a glass of water (her 
corresponding brain state is si), and believes she can get it by opening the fridge (her 
corresponding brain state is s2), then she will open the fridge (her corresponding 
brain state is s3). Being in these brain states has something more than the mentioned 
sets of conditional causal powers (a, ft, y). For example, when Mary wants a glass of 
water, in addition to set a, her brain has some additional features, the features that are 
In fact, this law needs a ceteris paribus clause. For the sake of simplicity, this clause is eliminated. I 
will examine the issue of exceptions in special-science laws shortly. 
3 7 A perspicacious reader might say that this claim is in fact the claim of a type-identity physicalist: 
mental properties are identical with some physical properties. Therefore, at the end of the day the 
causal analysis of realization rejects the main point of'multiple realization'' and takes type-identity. I 
will consider this objection in Section 5.3. 
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special to wanting a glass of water and not wanting something else, like a piece of 
chocolate. 
In the real world, a cannot be instantiated alone. 'Wanting' is always 'wanting a 
particular thing by a particular creature'. Therefore, at the fine-grained neurological 
level we have to include all the additional and irrelevant causal powers, while at the 
more abstract psychological level we can eliminate these powers and only mention 
the relevant causal powers. Therefore, the discussed psychological law, saying that 
the only relevant powers to y are a and /?, is a coarse-grained version of a set of 
infinite neurological laws, laws like Mary's case that says si and s2 are sufficient for 
s3. 
The last point about the proposed analysis of the unity of science is its ability to 
account ceteris paribus clauses in special-science laws. It is a familiar point that 
special-science laws have exceptions and so are not universally true. In our last 
example, it is possible that Mary wants a glass of water and believes she can get it by 
opening the fridge, but she will not do it simply because a doctor prohibited her from 
drinking water. In such cases, a and /? are present, but they cannot bring about y. 
Therefore, it seems that these cases falsify the special-science law, which claims the 
only relevant powers are a and /?. 
In reply, it might be said that the causal powers of some interfering psychological 
states (e.g. believing in doctor's advice) can block manifestations of some causal 
powers belong to a or /?. I f so, then a and P no longer bring about y. In other words, it 
is possible that some irrelevant causal powers block manifestations of some relevant 
causal powers, and therefore block the manifestation of the universal behaviour. In 
these cases, the coarse-grained laws have exceptions. A familiar example of this 
phenomenon is antidote. By covering a sugar cube in a plastic cover, its water 
solubility will not manifest, although the cube still has the relevant causal powers 
(e.g. a particular molecular structure). 
In summary, given that what a law says about the properties it links is just what it 
says about the causal powers they confer, and given the causal analysis of realization 
we can save a version of the unity of science. The content of a special-science law 
that uses multiply realizable properties is a coarse-grained version of the contents of 
a set of basic realizer laws. These basic laws mention some irrelevant factors to a 
universal behaviour, while the special-science law puts all the basic laws together, 
extracts their common part, and only mentions the relevant factors to the universal 
behaviour. 
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4.2.2 Kim's Argument against Special Sciences 
In contrast to anti-reductionists who argued for the disunity of science by means of 
multiple realization, some reductionists appealed to this notion and argued that i f we 
take it seriously it is strong enough to undermine the generality and autonomy of the 
special sciences. Kim (1992) presented such an argument, which I will first explain 
briefly and then examine its plausibility according to the causal analysis of 
realization. 
Let us start with the point that according to Kim, bridge principles must be 
biconditional statements expressing coextensionality between terms of the reduced 
and reducing theories. Kim (1992, 317) is aware that Nagel did not require this. 
However, he has his own reason to insist on biconditional statements. He thinks that 
an ontologically significant reduction should reduce higher-order properties, by 
identifying them with basic properties. In other words, bridge principles must be 
property identities and not mere property correlations38 (Kim 1992, 317). Therefore, 
he concludes that because coextensionality is a necessary condition for property 
identity, bridge principles must be biconditional. 
As I mentioned in Section 3.4, ontological simplicity is one of the motivations for 
proposing identity statements as bridge principles. In addition, I mentioned that by 
adopting an appropriate ontology and by rejecting the layered picture of properties, 
this motivation would be irrelevant. Now it is the right time to see how the scientific 
ontology, according to the causal analysis of realization, is one-level and flat, such 
that it is not a task of reduction to simplify it more. 
In the causal account of realization, realized and realizer properties belong to the 
same level. Remember that in this framework, conditional causal powers are building 
blocks of the ontology, such that in terms of them we analyze properties. There is a 
flat level of conditional powers. Any property, whether realized or realizer, bestows a 
set of powers, powers individuate properties, and differences between properties are 
only differences between their conditional powers. An important relation here is the 
subset relation. The conditional powers of a realized property are a subset of the 
conditional powers of its realizers. Therefore, according to one interpretation, a 
realized property is just a subset of its realizers; while on another interpretation, 
3 8 Kim in this paper (1992) rejects his former view (Kim 1966). As we discussed in Section 3.5, Kim 
(1966) first believed that reduction does not need identity statements as bridge principles. However, 
here he says that an ontologically significant reduction must identify properties. These two views are 
inconsistent, but what Kim entails from both of them is the same: he insists that bridge principles must 
be biconditional. 
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instantiation of a realized property is a subset of instantiations of its realizers. Al l 
these points show that we do not have a layered picture of properties. By means of 
the subset relation (one-way conditional relation), we have simplified the ontology, 
such that there is no mysterious relation between basic and multiply realizable 
properties. Therefore, we do not need to simplify our ontology by identifying high-
level properties with basic ones (two-way conditional relation). Hence, philosophers' 
justification for requiring identity statements as bridge principles disappears. 
Now let us return to Kim's main point. Kim believes that in a biconditional bridge 
principle, both sides must be kind predicates and therefore suited for laws. Assume 
that M is a high-level property that is identified with Q in a biconditional bridge 
principle: M <-> Q. I f Q is a non-kind predicate, then M could no longer figure in 
special-science laws (Kim 1992, 318). The reason is simple: given the bridge 
principle, we can substitute M by Q in all special-science laws . However, i f Q is a 
non-kind and cannot figure in laws, the results of substitution are no longer laws. 
Therefore, the original statements are no longer laws and M could not figure in any 
law. But we want to save special-science laws, so Q must be a kind predicate. 
The next step in Kim's account is that the sort of Q that we are dealing with under 
multiple realizable properties, i.e. disjunction of heterogeneous kind predicates, is a 
non-kind and unsuited for laws. I f so, special-science predicates are non-kind and 
therefore, special sciences are not general and genuine sciences. Kim has two 
arguments to show that coextensive predicates with special-science predicates are 
non-kind. I will present these arguments here. 
The first argument has an epistemic nature. Assume that we are told that jade is not a 
mineral kind, rather it covers two distinct minerals with two distinct molecular 
structures: jadeite and nephrite. Now consider the following generalization: (L) jade 
is green. Under the new circumstances, we no longer consider this statement, which 
we had considered as a well-confirmed law, as a law. It is a conjunction of two 
separate laws: (LI ) jadeite is green, and (L2) nephrite is green. Kim (1992, 319) 
argues that (L) does not have the 'projectibility' that is a standard mark of 
lawlikeness, 'the ability to be confirmed by observation of "positive instances'". 
Suppose we discover that all of the observed samples of green jade that confirmed 
(L), were samples of jadeite. It means that they confirmed (LI ) and not (L2). Now 
3 9 If the bridge principle is an identity statement, then apparently substituting M by Q does not affect 
lawlikeness, i.e. if a sentence containing M is a law, by substituting M by Q we still have a law. 
However, if the bridge principle is a coextensionality, then the substitution might affect lawlikeness. 
As Dretske (1977, 250) says, 'If it is a law that all F's are G, and we substitute the term "K" [that is 
eternally coextensive with "F"] for the term " F ' in this law, the result is not necessarily a law.' 
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what is the situation of (L)? Is it confirmed by these evidences or not? Kim (1993 a, 
320) thinks that '...we clearly would not, and should not, continue to think of (L) as 
well confirmed'. However, there is a problem here, 
...all the millions of green jadeite samples are positive instances of (L): 
they satisfy both the antecedent and the consequent of (L). As we have 
seen, however, (L) is not confirmed by them, at least not in the standard 
way we expect. And the reason, I suggest, is that jade is a true disjunctive 
kind, a disjunction of two heterogeneous nomic kinds which, however, is 
not itself a nomic kind. (Kim 1992, 320) 
In other words, Kim thinks that there is a conflict here. We do not want to consider 
the supportive evidence of (LI ) as supportive evidence of (L), but they satisfy both 
the antecedent and consequent of (L), and so ought to confirm i t 4 0 . The reason for 
this conflict, according to Kim, is the disjunctive nature of jade. 
Kim's second argument to show that disjunctive predicates are unsuited for laws has 
a metaphysical nature. First, he introduces 'The Principle of Causal Individuation of 
Kinds': 
Kinds in science are individuated on the basis of causal powers; that is, 
objects and events fall under a kind, or share in a property, insofar as they 
have similar causal powers. (Kim 1992, 326) 
By using this principle, he concludes that i f P I , P2 and P3 (realizers of M), are 
heterogeneous as kinds, they are heterogeneous as causal powers. The next step is 
introducing 'The Causal Inheritance Principle': 
I f mental property M is realized in a system at t in virtue of physical 
realization base P, the causal powers of this instance of M are identical 
with the causal powers of P. (Kim 1992, 326) 
Now Kim argues that the latter principle, in conjunction with the physical realization 
thesis, includes mental kinds cannot satisfy the former principle and therefore are not 
scientific kinds. 
Instances of M that are realized by the same physical base must be 
grouped under one kind, since ex hypothesi the physical base is a causal 
kind; and instances of M with different realization bases must be grouped 
under distinct kinds, since, again ex hypothesi, these realization bases are 
4 0 One reason that we do not want to consider the supportive evidence of (LI ) as supportive evidences 
of (L) is that if we allow them to confirm (L), because (L) is simply a conjunction of ( L I ) and (L2), 
they confirm (L2) as well, whatever it is. It means that they will confirm any arbitrary generalization 
(L2). 
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distinct as causal kinds. Given that mental kinds are realized by diverse 
physical causal kinds, therefore, it follows that mental kinds are not 
causal kinds, and hence are disqualified as proper scientific kinds. (Kim 
1992, 327) 
As a result, Kim concludes that disjunctive predicates cannot figure in laws, and 
because special-science predicates are coextensive with this kind of predicates, they 
are non-kind as well. Therefore, there are no general special-science laws. 
4.2.3 The Possibility of Special Sciences 
To reply to the epistemic argument I would like to emphasize that, in the context of 
realization, we do not discuss the disjunction of any two properties, we consider the 
disjunction of two realizing properties that, according to the causal view, have 
something in common. Suppose that the property 'being jade' bestows a set of 
conditional powers a. Therefore, the law (L) can be re-written as: (L*) whatever has 
the set of conditional powers a is green. In addition, suppose that being jade is a 
multiply realizable property: being jadeite and being nephrite are its realizers. 
According to the causal view, we can represent their conditional powers as a + al, 
and a + a.2 respectively. Therefore, laws (LI) and (L2) can be re-written as these: 
(LI *) whatever has the set of conditional powers a + al is green, and (L2*) whatever 
has the set of conditional powers a + a2 is green. Now according to our previous 
discussion, we cannot infer (L*) just from (LI*) . In other words, supportive evidence 
of (LI*) is not sufficient to support (L*). According to (LI*) , we know that having 
conditional powers a + al is sufficient to be green. However, we cannot conclude 
that having a is the only relevant factor to be green. It means that there is no conflict 
here. We thought that (L*) was true, now we do not know whether it is a law or not. 
Our current supportive evidence only supports (LI*) and not (L*). So, Kim's 
contention that any supportive evidence of (LI*) is supportive evidence of (L*) is 
wrong. 
It should be noted that the situation here is different from the situation in table 3. In 
table 3, we know that law (0) is a coarse-grained version of the set of laws (1,2 . . . ) . 
In other words, because we have a vast range of basic laws the inference of the 
special-science law from them is highly confirmed. This means that al, a2 ... and pi, 
f$2... are irrelevant. However, in this example and by limiting evidence that only 
support (LI*) we do not know whether al is irrelevant or not. Irrelevancy of al 
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means i f al is replaced by another factor like a.2, a still brings about greenness. 
Therefore, we need supportive evidence for (L2*) as well. In other words, to say that 
(L*) is a coarse-grained version of (LI*) and (L2*) the minimum requirement is 
supportive evidence for (L2*). In the current situation, it is not the case. 
But why does Kim think that supportive evidence of (LI*) supports (L*) as well? 
Suppose that we have a multiply realizable property P, with two realizers PI and P2. 
Predicate ' M ' designates PI and predicate 'TV designates P2. In addition, suppose 
that a, a + al, and a + a2 are the sets of conditional powers of P, PI and P2 
respectively. Now i f we make the disjunctive predicate ' M or TV that designates P, 
its corresponding set of conditional powers is not a union of corresponding 
conditional powers of the disjuncts, i.e. {a + al} U {a + a2}. However, its 
corresponding set of conditional powers is the intersection of corresponding 
conditional powers of the disjuncts, i.e. {a + al} H {a + a2}, which is a. (See Table 
4) 
Realizer Realizer Realized 
Property PI P2 P 
Predicate 'M' W 'Mor TV 
Causal Powers a + al a + a2 {a + al}(~) {a + a2}=a 
Table 4: The Apposite Direction of Union and Intersection in Disjunctive Predicates and Properties 
Kim thought that the corresponding conditional powers of the realized property 
(being jade) is the union of the conditional powers of the realizing properties (being 
jadeite and being nephrite), i.e. {a + al} U {a + a2} = {a + al + a2}. Therefore, he 
concludes that the supportive evidence of (LI*) support (L*) as well, the claim that 
is false in the causal framework of realization41. 
Now let us consider Kim's second argument. Firstly remember that, as mentioned 
earlier, Kim has modified his Causal Inheritance Principle and added the possibility 
that the causal powers of the realized property might be a subset of causal powers of 
the realizing property. Secondly, it is true that when two kinds or properties are 
4 1 Continuing the epistemic argument Kim (1992, 321) says: disjunctive properties, unlike 
conjunctive properties, do not guarantee similarity for instances falling under them. And similarity, it 
is said, is the core of our idea of property'. I think it should be clear now that in the case of multiple 
realization we have disjunctive 'predicates', but regarding properties we still have conjunction 
(intersection) of conditional powers that saves similarity. For a similar point see Clapp (2001, 125-
132). 
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heterogeneous, their causal power sets are heterogeneous as well. However, this 
point does not mean that these two sets do not have a common subset. In other words, 
the heterogeneity of two sets of causal powers does not conclude that there is no 
common causal power between them. As I mentioned earlier, in the case of 
realization, the causal power sets of two realizers could be distinct (heterogeneous) in 
one sense, but homogeneous in another sense. I f we consider the causal powers 
common between them, they are homogeneous, and i f we consider their unique 
causal powers, they are heterogeneous. 
Kim's argument is fallacious, simply because in the case of multiple realization, 
although each realizer PI, P2 and P3 has a unique set of causal powers, there is a 
common set of causal powers between them. Whenever M is realized, no matter 
whether by PI, P2 or P3, M will have this common subset of causal powers, and 
therefore it can be qualified as a property according to "The Principle of Causal 
Individuation of Kinds". 
Kim concludes from his arguments that because a special-science predicate is 
coextensive with a disjunctive predicate, and the latter is not a kind, therefore the 
special-science predicate is not kind-coextensive. Hence, there can be no general and 
autonomous discipline like psychology42. My arguments show that special-science 
predicates could designate multiply realizable properties, with unified causal powers, 
and therefore they are kind predicates and we could have general special sciences. 
I also hope my argument provided an answer to what Fodor (1997, 160-1) calls a 
'metaphysical mystery': 'How can there be macroregularities that are realized by 
wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanism?' (cf. Batterman 2000, 115) According 
to the causal analysis, there is a common subset of causal powers between all 
realizers of a multiply realizable property, and in virtue of having this subset, they 
realize that property. In addition, I hope my argument showed that special-science 
properties are reducible according to Papineau's (1993, 35) criterion: 
Reducibility to physics does not involve the absurdly strong requirement 
that the instances of the reduced category should share all their physical 
properties. The requirement is only that there should be some physical 
property present in all and only those instances, which then allows a 
uniform physical explanation of why those instances always give rise to a 
certain sort of result. 
4 2 For different objections on Kim's argument, see Fodor (1997), Block (1997), Batterman (2000 and 
2002), Shoemaker (2001), Clapp (2001), and Gillett (2003). 
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What Papineau calls the requirement of reducibility is exactly the definition of 
multiple realization according to the causal framework. 
*** 
Taking everything into consideration, I would like to conclude this chapter with the 
following statements, (i) The causal analysis of realization is one of the available 
accounts to cover the notion of multiple realization. This account in its standard form 
is defendable, and its dimensioned version, or fears about the impossibility of 
multiple realization, do not threaten it. (ii) Given the causal analysis of realization, 
we can defend a version of the unity of science: the nomological content of a special-
science law is a coarse-grained version of the contents of a set of its basic realizer 
laws, (iii) This analysis provides a flat ontology, and therefore takes the burden of 
simplifying the ontology on the shoulder of reduction, (iv) Given this analysis, 
general special sciences are available. 
5 
Multiple Realization (II): A Flat Analysis of Properties 
In this chapter, I wil l present an alternative analysis of the nature of properties, the 
relationship between properties and predicates, and a new account of multiple 
realization. The main reason that we need this new account is that the dominant 
picture of ontology ('the level picture of reality') suffers from serious problems. 
Firstly, I wil l explain the level picture of reality that is based on a semantical analysis 
of properties. In the next section, I will enumerate three main problems with this 
picture which are sufficient to reject it. After that, some problems with the causal 
analysis of realization will be discussed. These two sections lead us to the flat 
analysis of properties, that I will explain its key features and the new interpretation of 
multiple realization according to this analysis in the next section. The next step is to 
show the advantages of the flat view over the level picture of reality. 
By having enough metaphysical grounds, I will move on to the philosophy of science 
and consider the possibility of having a version of the unity of science according to 
the flat analysis. In the next section, I will discuss the second wave of objections 
against the classical model of reduction, based on the multiple realization notion, and 
then consider the situation of the classical model according to the two metaphysical 
frameworks discussed. Finally, I shall finish this chapter by comparing the causal 
and flat views on properties and a discussion about their advantages and 
disadvantages. 
5.1 The Level Picture of Reality 
Following Heil (2003, Ch.2) I call the picture of reality accepted by the vast majority 
of philosophers 'the level picture'. To understand it, we first need to know more 
about the basic presupposition behind this. According to this presupposition (The 
Picture Theory), there is a close relationship between language and reality such that 
linguistic entities reflect ontological entities and we can discover the structure of 
reality by knowing the structure of language. As Heil (2003, 23) puts it 'The 
conception in its most general form is that language pictures reality in roughly the 
sense that we can 'read o f f features of reality from our ways of speaking about it. ' 
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One particular correspondence between linguistic and ontological elements, which is 
our concern here, is the correspondence between predicates and properties. 
According to this conception, any predicate that applies, or would apply, truly to 
objects, designates a property. It means that properties are referents of predicates, 
and more importantly, objects that satisfy a predicate either share one and the same 
property (if we consider properties as universals), or have exactly similar tropes (if 
we consider properties as particulars). For example, because we make true claims 
using the predicate 'is red', there is a property corresponding to it and both my red 
pen and a red apple share it or are exactly similar in respect of it. Heil (2003, 26) puts 
this semantical approach to properties under Principle (O), 
When a predicate applies truly to an object, it does so in virtue of 
designating a property possessed by that object and by every object to 
which the predicate truly applies (or would apply). 
Now it can easily be seen how philosophers could infer the level picture of reality 
from this principle. We have a layered structure of predicates. At the basic physical 
level, we have physical predicates that are projectible and truly used for objects. 
Therefore, there is a level of properties corresponding to them. At a higher level, we 
have special sciences with their own laws and projectible predicates. Therefore, there 
are high-level properties corresponding to them. To sum up, corresponding to 
hierarchical structure of predicates, from the basic fundamental physical to mental, 
we have a hierarchical structure of properties. 
But what is the relationship between these levels of reality? According to a popular 
view, these levels have two characteristics: the first is that, their entities and 
properties are not reducible to the lower levels; and the second, that there is a 
dependency relation between them. This means that we cannot reduce mental 
properties, for example, to physical properties, (the most important reason for 
irreducibility being multiple realization); however, the former are dependent on the 
latter. In this context, dependency means we cannot remove the lower-level items 
without thereby eliminating the higher-levels. The most popular relation for 
expressing dependency is supervenience: two objects cannot be identical regarding 
the basic properties while they are different regarding the high-level ones. The 
following diagram represents a piece of this network. 
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p Rl 
R2 R4 
I 
P R3 
Figure 1: A piece of the mesh of high-level and low-level properties according to the level picture of 
reality 
Here P and Q are high-level properties, p and q are lower-level properties, Rl and R3 
are causal relations, and R2 and R4 are realization relations (p is a realizer of P and q 
is a realizer of Q). 
To see a concrete usage of the semantical approach and a solution to the problem of 
multiple realization, let us consider Hooker's proposal. He (1981) believes that we 
have reduction between scientific theories only by means of identity statements 
between properties. However, the standard problem is that some high-level 
properties (like boiling in macrophysics) can be realized by different basic properties 
(like many particular molecular processes), and therefore we cannot identify the 
high-level property only with one low-level counterpart. To solve the problem he 
suggests (1981, 498) that we can enrich our high-level language by adding proper 
predicates (like 'boils in manner O') so that for any different manner of boiling we 
would have a different predicate. Now by the presupposition that there is a 
correspondence between predicates and properties, we have an enriched set of high-
level properties and we can identify any basic property with one of them. Therefore, 
with a finer-grained view of the high-level properties and by having identity 
statements as bridge principles, we avoid the problem of multiple realization. 
Apart from general problems with the semantical approach that I will examine in the 
next section, this particular suggestion has the problem that it begs the main question. 
According to the multiple realization argument, different basic properties could 
realize the same high-level property. Now, using a finer-grained set of properties at 
the high level does not change this situation. It is possible, and, according to the 
multiple realization argument, true, that two different molecular processes bring 
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about boiling in exactly the same way, i.e. both of them realize the fine-grained high-
level property boils in manner <Pi. To show that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between basic and high-level properties Hooker needs an argument to show that it is 
impossible that two different basic properties realize the same fine-grained high-level 
property (boils in manner &i). In other words, he needs an argument to show that 
multiple realization is impossible. This is exactly our main concern here, and we 
cannot simply suppose it to solve the problem of multiple realization. 
I wil l discuss three main objections to the level picture of reality later. However, let 
me present here a general metaphysical argument against any unrestricted semantical 
approach to properties like Principle (O). According to this principle, any general 
term that can be used truly as a predicate designates a distinct property. However, 
this leads to paradox. Consider for example the predicate 'does not exemplify itself 
(Loux 2002, 35-6). This predicate can be used truly. Many objects like the Taj Mahal 
satisfy it: the Taj Mahal is not self-exemplifying and therefore the sentence 'the Taj 
Mahal does not exemplify itself is true. On the other hand, there are things and 
certain universals that do not satisfy the predicate. The property of being incorporeal, 
for example, exemplifies itself and so does not satisfy the predicate. Now let us 
suppose that according to Principle (O), there is a property corresponding to this 
predicate. However, this leads to a paradox (cf. Russell's Paradox), because this 
property either exemplifies itself or it does not. In the first case, since it is the 
property a thing exemplifies just in case it does not exemplify itself, it turns out that 
it does not exemplify itself. On the other hand, i f the property does not exemplify 
itself, then it turns out that it does exemplify itself, because it is the property of being 
non-self-exemplifying. (A more straightforward example is those predicates that 
express contradictory or incoherent concepts. There is no property corresponding to 
them.) 
This argument shows that to avoid such paradoxes, we must restrict Principle (O) so 
that only a narrow class of predicates directly designates properties. How can we do 
that? I wi l l explain Heil's suggestion later, but let me first consider three main 
problems with the level picture of reality first. 
5.2 Problems with the Level Picture 
In this section, three main problems with the level picture of reality wil l be discussed. 
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5.2.1 The Problem of Causal Powers 
Suppose that P is a high-level property and pi, p2 and p3 are its physical realizers. I f 
an object has either pi or p2 or p3, it has P, and i f it has P, it has pi or p2 or p3. 
There is an important question here: is P distinct from its realizers? In other words, 
how many distinct properties do we have here, three (pi, p2, p3) or four (pi, p2, p3 
and P). Reductionists say that P is not a distinct property, over and above its 
realizers. However, devotees of the multiple realization and level picture say P is a 
distinct and irreducible property. Before we consider this claim, we must have an 
account of the nature of properties. What is a property? According to Heil (1999, 192) 
in most ( if not all) discussions on the multiple realization notion, it is implicitly 
assumed that the identity of a property is determined by the causal powers that it 
contributes to the object which has the property. This account of properties is 
presented and defended explicitly by many philosophers such as Shoemaker (1980), 
Kim (1993a), and Mellor (1991). Suppose being spherical is a property. This 
property has a cluster of causal powers such that when an object has this property it 
has those causal powers, and by virtue of them can enter into causal relations. For 
example, a spherical object is typically capable of rolling, of reflecting light in a 
specific way, and so on. The main point in this account is that we determine and 
recognize properties by their causal powers and by their effects on other things. I f a 
property does not have any causal power, then we cannot recognize it and then we 
cannot speak about and use it. In terms of identity condition, it can be said that two 
causally efficacious properties are identical if, and only if, they have the same causal 
powers. 
Now let us return to our question: i f pi, p2, and p3 are realizers of P, i f we accept 
that P is distinct from pis and that causal powers are essential for properties, then we 
have to show that the causal powers of P are different from the causal powers of pis. 
Let us examine some different proposed relations between the causal powers of P 
and the causal powers of pis. 
The first proposed relation is that the causal powers of P make up a subset of the 
causal powers of each of its realizers. Let us suppose that in object O, pi is the 
realizer of P and pi has four causal powers {cl, c2, c3, c4}. According to this 
proposal, the causal powers of P must be associated with a subset of this set e.g. {cl, 
c2, c3). This is the standard causal account of realization, which we discussed in the 
previous chapter, and has the advantage that it makes clear how each of the realizers 
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of P is sufficient but not necessary for P. I f object O has pi then it has {cl, c2, c3, c4) 
and so it necessarily has {cl, c2, c3), and therefore having pi is sufficient for having 
P. Another advantage of this proposal is that it can provide an account of multiple 
realization that is compatible with functionalism. According to functionalism, 
different creatures can have one common mental property whereas non-mental 
effects of this property are different for each of them. I f being in pain is a mental 
property then non-mental effects of it are different in humans and octopuses. Let us 
assume P is being in pain and has causal powers {cl, c2, c3}. pi is realizer of P in 
human beings and has causal powers{ci, c2, c3, c4), and p2 is realizer of P in 
octopuses and has causal powers {cl, c2, c3, c5). We can see that causal powers of 
pi andp2 are different and so can inter into different causal chains. This point allows 
the non-mental effects of P in these two realizations to be different. There are some 
objections to this causal account of realization and more particularly to Shoemaker's 
revised version of it, but let me leave them to the next part of this chapter, when I 
wi l l consider problems with the causal analysis of properties in detail, and continue 
with two other proposed relations between the causal powers of P and its realizers. 
The second possible relation is that the causal powers of P include all the causal 
powers of each of its realizers. Suppose pi has {cl, c2, c3). The causal powers of P 
must include all of these causal powers and also some additional elements: {cl, c2, 
c3, c4). This proposal has the advantage that it does not allow p\ to absorb P, 
because P has some more powers than pi. 
However, this proposal has some problems. Firstly, it is not clear how we can explain 
that pi is sufficient and not necessary for P. I f object O has pi, it must have 
something more {c4} to have P and so pi is not sufficient for P. The second problem 
is more general. Suppose P is being in pain and pi is its realizer in humans. Now the 
question is: when P is realized in a human, how can we recognize and detect c41 c4 
is a causal power such that i f someone is in pain then she has it, but it is not present 
in the physical realization of pain in humans. Hence, being in pain has some causal 
powers over and above those bestowed by its physical realizers. We do not have any 
way to recognize such transcendental causal powers, because we cannot detect them 
in physical realizations of pain. I f we say P does not have c4, then P is identical with 
pi so P is not a high-level property, but a physical one. 
Another possible relation between the causal powers of P and its realizers is that P 
has some, but not all, of the causal powers of its realizers and, in addition, causal 
powers that each of its realizers lacks. Suppose pi has causal powers {cl, c2, c3, c4) 
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and P has {c2, c3, c4, c5). The problem with this proposal is obvious because it is 
not clear how pi can be sufficient for P. 
The last proposed relation is that each of the realizers of P has all of its causal 
powers but in addition, each of them has some inhibitory causal powers that 
neutralize some causal powers of P. This proposal can solve the problem of 
sufficiency of pis for P, but has another problem. How can we recognize and detect 
those causal powers of P that always neutralize in an object O. What is our reason 
and evidence that when a person is in pain, she has some causal powers but these 
causal powers are neutralized and are not accessible? It seems that we just assume 
these causal powers to solve the problem of high-level properties and they do not 
exist in reality. 
As a result, i f we accept that properties are identified with their causal powers, the 
only available way to show that there is a level picture of reality, i.e. there are distinct 
high-level properties, is to accept the standard causal analysis of realization: the 
causal powers of a realized property are a subset of the causal powers of the realizer 
properties. However, this particular account has its own problems that we will 
discuss later. 
5.2.2 The Problem of Causal Relevance 
Heil (2003, Ch. 2) and some other philosophers (e.g. Kim 1993b) believe that the 
level picture of reality suffers from the overdetermination problem. As mentioned 
earlier, defenders of the level picture believe that Rl in Figure 1 is a causal relation, 
because P and Q are properties and enter into causal chains. Let us suppose that Rl 
and R3 are causal relations. Now there is a question about whether Rl is a distinct 
causal relation from lower-level causal relations (like R3). We know that Rl is 
dependent on R3, because by eliminating R3 we would eliminate Rl, but here our 
question concerns its distinctness. Some anti-reductionists, such as Fodor, say that 
Rl is distinct from R3 because high-level laws are distinct from and irreducible to 
lower-level laws. Therefore, high-level causal relations that are supported by high-
level laws are distinct from lower-level causal relations. Let us suppose that Rl is a 
distinct causal relation from R3. In this case, the event of 'having Q is 
overdetermined: having Q has two distinct causes. On the one hand, because P is 
cause of Q, having Q is caused by having P. On the other hand, i f we have P, we 
have its realizer p, and according to R3 having p is cause of having q. Because q is a 
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realizer of Q, by having the latter we have the former. In other words, there are two 
distinct causal ways from P to Q: one directly from P to Q and the other via p and q. 
To remove this objection, someone might say that having P is the cause of having Q, 
but not a direct cause. Having P directly causes the object to have q and whereas q is 
a realizer of Q, the object has Q. This alternative view has two problems. Firstly, we 
have causation from above here (having P is cause of having q). For some 
philosophers, especially who defend completeness of physics and physical causation; 
this is not an allowable result. According to them, any physical event like having q 
has one sufficient physical cause. Causes from outside the physical realm threaten 
the autonomy of physics. 
In addition, it should be noted that in this model having q is overdetermined. Having 
q has two distinct causes: having P and having p. The reason for the latter is that in 
our particular case when the object has P it has that by having the realizer p, and 
there is a causal relation between p and q. Therefore, apart from the direct causal way 
from P to q, there is a second way from p to q that means overdetermination of q. 
As a result, assuming the level picture of reality and the assumption that high-level 
causal chains are distinct from lower-level chains entails the overdetermination of 
macro or micro-events. Many philosophers believe that there is no systematic causal 
overdetermination. This means that the level picture is problematic and we need an 
alternative account for the situation of high-level laws. 
5.2.3 The Problem of the Inter-Level Relation 
As mentioned earlier, the level picture of reality has two components: irreducibility 
of high-level entities, and their dependency on lower levels. The last objection 
concerns the second component. A proponent of the level picture should look for a 
special relation between levels that is not reduction but captures the notion of 
dependency. The most commonly proposed relation is supervenience. High-level 
properties supervene on lower-level properties, i.e. two objects cannot be identical in 
respect of basic properties while they are not identical in respect of high-level 
properties. However, many philosophers (e.g. Heil (2003, Ch. 4), Kim (1998) and 
Horgan (1993)) believe that supervenience is just a modal relation and is silent on the 
nature of the dependence/determination relation. Kim asserts that supervenience is 
compatible with reduction, emergence and realization. Similarly, Heil believes that i f 
the set of Ps supervenes on the set of ps, then the supervenience is compatible with 
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all of these possibilities: Ps are ps, Ps wholly made up of ps, Ps are caused by ps, or 
Ps and ps both have a common cause. Therefore, the fact that high-level properties 
supervene on lower-level properties does not show that we have the dependency 
relation here. We need a more sophisticated relation to capture the dependency of 
high-level on lower-level properties. 
5.3 Problems with the Causal Analysis of Realization 
In this section, first I will present Heil's objections to the causal account of 
realization. After that, I will mention some ways to defend the causal analysis against 
these objections. Finally, I will discuss my own objections to the causal analysis of 
realization. 
Heil (2003a, 21) believes that i f we discover very simple properties, properties that 
bestow only one causal power, and i f we realize that these simple properties are 
realizers of some other properties, then the causal account would be in trouble. This 
is because the causal powers of the realized property are a subset of causal powers of 
the realizers. Therefore, by rejecting identity between the realized and realizing 
properties, the latter must have at least two causal powers. This situation is in 
contrast with the assumption of very simple properties as realizers. 
However, Heil does not take this problem very seriously. According to him (2003 a, 
22), ' I t could easily turn out that the most fundamental properties are not realizers of 
any property.' In other words, it could turn out that the assumption of very simple 
realizers is not valid, and therefore we cannot reject a metaphysical model of 
properties by a conjecture about the structure of actual world. 
Apart from this, Heil has two metaphysical objections to the causal model. The first 
concerns that interpretation of properties that holds a property is identical with a 
cluster of causal powers and therefore the realized property is a part of the realizing 
ones. The second objection concerns Shoemaker's revised version, according to 
which although properties are identified by causal powers but are not identical with 
clusters of them. Therefore, according to the revised version, although the 
instantiation of the realized property is still a part of instantiations of its realizers, the 
realized property is not a part of its realizers. Let us start with the first objection. 
According to Heil (2003a, 22), 'Arguments for multiple realization, after all, have 
typically been advanced against the possibility of 'type identity." A common 
presupposition of these arguments is that finding a physical property identical with a 
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multiply realizable property is very unlikely. Now, Heil says, according to the first 
interpretation of properties (i.e. properties are clusters of causal powers), it turns out 
that every multiply realizable property is identical with a physical property. Suppose 
that P is realized by pi, p2 and cl and c2 are causal powers of P that therefore 
are common in all pis. Now there are two possibilities here. I f the set of cl and c2 
does not correspond to a real property, then P is not a real property either. As Heil 
(2003a, 22) says, 
Perhaps the powers associated with a multiply realizable property do not 
correspond to a fully fledged property, but only to a proper part of various 
distinct fully fledged properties. This would mean that predicates picking 
out multiply realizable properties did not pick out properties, after all, but 
only collections of powers that go into the makeup of many different 
distinct properties. 
On the other hand, i f this set corresponds to a physical property, it follows that this 
physical property is identical with P (because according to the causal account i f two 
properties have the same causal powers they are identical). Heil (2003a, 22) puts the 
point as follows, 
Now it turns out that every multiply realizable property is identifiable 
with some physical property, the property corresponding to a collection of 
causal powers that make up a proper subset of the causal powers that 
correspond to assorted realizing properties. 
In other words, Heil tries to show that, according to the first interpretation, either 
multiply realizable properties are not real properties, or they are identical with 
physical properties and therefore we have type identity, which seems ironic. 
This argument does not seem persuasive. It is obvious that a proponent of the causal 
account of realization should take the second horn of the dilemma more seriously. He 
believes that the set of cl and c2 corresponds to a property. However, it is not clear 
what Heil has in mind when he claims that this set corresponds to a physical property. 
Firstly, he does not define a physical property, and does not distinguish physical 
properties from other possible kinds of properties like the mental. Secondly, he does 
not explain why the corresponding property with the set of cl and c2 is a physical 
one. Therefore, in his reply, a proponent of the causal account might say that of 
course the set of cl and c2 corresponds to a property. However, why should we say 
that this is a physical property? The property corresponding to the set is P and 
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nothing else. We do not have two properties here, P and a physical property. We 
have only a multiply realizable property, P, corresponding to this set. 
This response, I think, is acceptable in the causal framework of properties. Here our 
basic entities are causal powers. There is a flat level of causal powers, and these 
powers in different combinations make different properties. The distinctions of 
physical/mental or realized/realizing properties are not genuine ontological 
distinctions, and i f they do make any sense, they just distinguish those properties that 
appear as part of other properties (mental, realized) from those that do not (physical, 
realizing). I f this conclusion does not match our previous idea of multiple realization, 
it is not a problem with this account. It only shows that our previous intuition was 
wrong and we must replace it with the new one. The claim that the set of causal 
powers cl and c2 corresponds to a physical property, and therefore the multiply 
realizable property is identical with a physical counterpart does not make sense in the 
causal analysis of properties. The distinction between physical and mental shows 
nothing ontologically important here. 
It seems to me, however, that the first interpretation of the causal account suffers 
from a deeper problem. Probably the most important sort of multiply realizable 
properties are mental properties, like being in pain. In addition to the potentiality of 
doing something (causal powers), these properties have phenomenal characteristics, 
which are accessible only to us as owner of them. Any adequate account of mental 
properties must first recognize and accept these characteristics, then try to put them 
in the picture and explain their relations with the causal powers of mental properties. 
The first interpretation of the causal account reduces properties to causal powers and 
does not explain what the relationship between causal powers and phenomenal 
(qualitative) features is. Therefore, it simply ignores phenomenal features (or 
phenomenal properties) and cannot be a proper theory to deal with mental properties. 
Probably the same reason led Shoemaker to revise his account and withdraw the 
view that properties are identical with causal powers. Therefore, even i f the first 
interpretation can solve the problem of multiple realization, it is not an appropriate 
account for mental properties, and the situation of mental properties is still 
questionable accordingly. 
Regarding the second interpretation of the causal model, Heil has other objections. 
We know that Shoemaker (2001, 94 n . l l ) rejects his previous view, however he 
explains his new alternative briefly, 
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At one time I thought that one could simply identify a property with a 
"cluster" of conditional powers having a certain kind of unity. I f one 
could do that then, because the conditional powers associated with the 
property of being in pain is a proper subset of each of the sets of 
conditional powers associated with the properties that realize pain, one 
could say that the property of being in pain is literally a part of each of 
the realizers properties. In that case there is certainly no question of the 
realizer properties "pre-empting" the realized property with respect to 
causal efficacy - not i f the realized property is a part of the realizing 
property, and is the part that includes the conditional powers involved in 
the episode of causation. For reasons I cannot go into here, I no longer 
want to identify a property with a cluster of conditional powers [ . . . ] . 
While rejecting that identification bars me from construing realized 
properties as parts of their realizer properties, it does not bar me from 
construing instances of realized properties as parts of instances of realizer 
properties. 
This passage is short and vague enough to allow different interpretations. Heil has 
his own interpretation: in Shoemaker's new account, properties are distinct and 
different in kind from powers, however they bestow powers when they are 
instantiated, 
Properties are not powers; properties bestow powers when instantiated. 
One way to understand this idea is to suppose that a property's being 
instantiated is just a matter of its bestowing powers on some particulars. 
The property (a universal) is one thing, its instances (the power it bestows) 
are another. Properties are distinct from their instances but act via their 
instances. In describing an object as possessing a property, we are 
speaking obliquely: the property is not strictly speaking ' in ' the object. 
Rather the object possesses certain powers (these are ' i n ' the object), 
which are the property's instances. (Heil 2003a, 24) 
Let us accept this interpretation for the moment and see Heil's (2003a, 24-5) 
objections to it. The first objection concerns the reason that we still need properties. 
What do they do for us that we must keep them in our ontology? They are separate 
and distinct in kind from their instances; however, the action is all in the instances. 
Therefore, i f we suppose that all a property does is bestow causal powers, and i f we 
accept Heil's interpretation that properties act via their instances, then there is no 
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longer a need to keep properties in addition to their instances in our ontology. An 
obvious reply to this objection is that a property does something more than 
bestowing causal powers. This leads us to a different interpretation of Shoemaker's 
account, which I will discuss shortly. 
Heil's second objection is not clear and valid, as far as I can see. As mentioned, 
Shoemaker explicitly says that according to his new account of properties the 
realized property is not a part of its realizers. However, Heil (2003a, 24) says, 
Second, it is hard not to see realizing properties as complex properties 
that include realized properties as constituents. Shoemaker rejects the 
identification of realized properties with their realizers, but this leaves 
open the possibility that realized properties are components of realizing 
properties. Were that so, were mental properties, for instance, constituents 
of physical properties, then any distinction between mental and physical 
properties would be difficult to uphold and the point of talk of realization-
realization as opposed to reduction - were undercut. 
Because this objection is based on the possibility that a realized property is a 
component of its realizers and Shoemaker explicitly rejects this possibility, I do not 
take it seriously and conclude that according to Heil's interpretation of Shoemaker's 
new account of properties, we no longer need properties in addition to their causal 
powers. 
Apart from Heil's interpretation, different readings from Shoemaker's view are 
possible. As mentioned, a problem with the view that properties are clusters of causal 
powers is that it ignores phenomenal features of properties. Therefore, it is possible 
that Shoemaker revised his former view to bring qualities into account and express 
that properties do something more than bestow causal powers. This is an essential 
requirement, I think, for any account of properties (especially mental properties) and 
we must take it seriously. Nevertheless, bringing qualities into account is not enough; 
we need a clear and coherent picture of them, especially their relations with causal 
powers. However, even i f we understand Shoemaker's revision in this direction, he 
does not clarify how phenomenal features are related to causal powers and what their 
role in the nature of properties is. 
To mention a problem with Shoemaker's view, let us suppose that properties have 
phenomenal characteristics in one way, and so are not identical with clusters of 
causal powers. Now the question is, why does 'instantiation' reduce a property to a 
cluster of causal powers? Shoemaker asserts that an instantiation of the realized 
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property is a part of the instantiations of its realizers. Hence, a property's being 
instantiated is just a matter of its bestowing causal powers. However, what happened 
to its phenomenal aspects and why do we lose them in the process of instantiation? 
Why can't we say that when a property is instantiated, apart from bestowing powers, 
we have some instantiated phenomenal aspects as well? I f so, because instantiation 
of a property is not identical with a cluster of causal powers, then instantiation of the 
realized property is no longer a part of instantiations of its realizers, which 
contradicts Shoemaker's claim. 
To sum up, because Shoemaker does not explain his new account of properties 
explicitly, there are at least two ways to interpret it; both are problematic. According 
to the first interpretation (Heil's), there is no room for phenomenal aspects. The 
essence of a property is bestowing causal powers. However, properties are distinct 
from causal powers and bestow them via their instantiations. A problem with this 
interpretation is that we no longer need properties in our ontology. According to the 
second interpretation, phenomenal aspects are essential for (at least some) properties. 
Consequently, properties are not identical with causal powers because the former 
have something more. However, the relationship between these two features of 
properties (causal powers and qualities) is not clear. More importantly, it is not clear 
why a property reduces to a cluster of causal powers by being instantiated. In other 
words, why do we lose the qualitative aspect in the process of instantiation? These 
points suggest that the causal analysis of realization at most is incomplete. Although 
this analysis can solve many standard problems of realization and gives a clear 
picture of realization in terms of the subset relation, it still has gaps. It needs further 
clarifications about the nature of properties, phenomenal characteristics of properties, 
and their relation with causal powers. 
5.4 The Flat Analysis of Properties 
Now it is time to consider an alternative analysis of properties and the realization 
relation, which does not suffer from problems of the level picture and the causal 
analysis. Heil has mostly developed this analysis, and I wil l use his version here. The 
first principle for Heil (2003a, 13) is that 'Properties are to be distinguished from 
predicates.' This means that not every predicate (even i f it applies truly to objects) 
designates a property. (Remember our previous examples of predicates that do not 
and cannot designate any property.) The second principle concerns the nature of 
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properties. When we say two objects share a property, it means that they have 
something in common. I f we assume properties as universals, this principle says that 
the property is present in both of the objects. Otherwise, i f we (like Heil) assume 
properties as tropes (or modes), the second principle says that the two objects are 
exactly similar in some respect, in respect of that property. Heil (2003a, 13) puts this 
principle as follows, 'objects share a property only i f those objects are precisely 
similar in some respect.' This principle entails that two properties are the same i f 
they are identical (for the universalists), or exactly similar (for the trope theorists). 
Now by applying these two principles we can determine whether a predicate 
designates a single property or not. I f predicate '/>' designates a single property P, 
then any object that satisfies the former possesses the latter. Hence, for the trope 
theorists any two objects that satisfy the predicate are exactly similar in some respect 
(in respect of property P). Heil (2003a, 13) expresses this point as follows, 'A 
predicate names or designates a property only i f it applies to an object in virtue of 
that object's possessing a property possessed by every object to which it truly applies 
or would apply.' In other words, i f two objects satisfy the same predicate, but they 
satisfy it in virtue of having two different (not exactly similar) properties, then the 
predicate does not designate a single property. 
Now consider the predicate 'is red' as an example. I f this predicate designates a 
single property, then every object that satisfies the predicate must possess this 
property. However, because of different shades of red we know that objects that we 
call red are not exactly similar in respect of their colour. They might have different 
colour tropes, which are similar but not exactly similar. This means that the predicate 
'is red' does not designate a single property, and there is no property of being red in 
our ontology. The situation then is that: we have a linguistic entity (a predicate), 
which does not designate a property; rather it gathers and groups a set of similar (but 
not exactly similar) tropes under one name. 
Heil (2003, Ch. 3) extends this point to multiply realizable predicates (say 'being in 
pain'). Here we have linguistic entities that gather a group of similar (but not exactly 
similar) tropes under one name. There are no corresponding properties to these 
predicates, because objects satisfy them do not possess the same property. Our 
ontology includes a flat level of basic properties. According to their similarities, 
these properties are gathered into different groups with different predicates as labels. 
However, there is no high-level property in the world. 
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There are two kinds of predicates. One kind designates single fundamental properties. 
I f scientists discover that the most fundamental properties are, for example, quantum-
mechanical properties, predicates that designate these properties belong to the first 
group. The second group of predicates is those that instead of single fundamental 
properties designate a group of similar (but not exactly similar) properties. Multiply 
realizable predicates belong to the second group. There is no single property 
corresponding to them. Therefore, multiple realization is not a special ontological 
relation between properties, rather this is a familiar concept that one predicate 
designates a group of distinct but similar properties. 
By accepting this framework, one fair question is why are some predicates and 
concepts that gather particular similar properties together more salient to us than 
others? For example, why is the predicate 'is red' so salient and useful for us, while 
we do not gather similar properties of having the length between 5 and 5.1 centimeter 
under a predicate, say '.A"? According to Heil, it is a matter of our perceptual system 
that some predicates are more salient for us. 
This is due, in some measure, to the fact that the properties in question are 
salient - to us - partly owing to the nature of our perceptual system. Were 
we built differently, were we made of different materials, the diverse 
collection of properties that satisfy our concept of redness could well fail 
to stand out. In that case we should have no use for the concept. (Heil 
2003,44) 
The main point of this answer is that usefulness of a concept is not a sign that it picks 
up a property. As Heil (2003, 44) says, 
Concepts do not 'carve up' the world. The world already contains endless 
divisions, most of which we remain oblivious to or ignore. Some of these 
divisions, however, are salient, or come to be salient once we begin 
enquiring systematically. These are the divisions reflected in our concepts 
and in words we use to express those concepts. 
Now let us see how Heil puts causal powers and qualities in his picture of properties. 
According to him, properties are simultaneously dispositional and qualitative. 
Regarding the former, Heil (2003, 76) thinks, ' . . . intrinsic properties of concrete 
objects are distinguished by distinctive contributions they make to powers or 
dispositionalities of their possessors.' This means that two properties are identical 
just so that they make the same contribution to the causal powers of their possessors 
(Heil 2003, 77). For Heil (2003, 77), inert properties with no powers cannot be traced 
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by us, and so we do not have any epistemic access to them, nor can they make any 
difference to the causal powers of their possessors. As a result, there is no place for 
them in our ontology. Therefore, any intrinsic property of concert objects (hereafter 
written as "property" for simplicity) is a dispositional property that bestow powers 
on its possessor, and ' i t is solely by virtue of possessing a given dispositional 
property that an object possesses a given property' (Heil 2003, 79). This shows that 
Heil does not agree with those accounts of properties (e.g. Armstrong's) according to 
which objects' possession of causal powers depends on laws of nature that could 
vary independently of objects' intrinsic properties. He assumes that any property is 
dispositional, and a dispositional property bestows causal powers on its possessor 
directly and necessarily. 
It should be pointed out that Heil's claim that every property is dispositional does not 
mean that properties are purely dispositional (i.e. does not mean that 'all there is to a 
property is its contribution to the dispositionalities of its possessors' (Heil 2003, 97)). 
Heil (2003, Ch. 10) presents some arguments, which are out of the scope of this 
chapter, to show that this assumption is problematic. According to them, 
... we should want to distinguish empty space from a space occupied by 
material bodies. I f we regard bodies as nothing more than relations or as 
nothing more than powers to affect other bodies, it is not clear that we 
have left ourselves with sufficient conceptual resources to make this 
distinction. (Heil 2003, 100) 
To solve this problem he suggests the identity theory, according to which a property 
is simultaneously dispositional and qualitative, and by 'qualitative' he means 
intrinsic qualitative properties of objects, those properties that normally classified as 
'categorical' (Heil 2003, 79). 
[The Identity Theory] I f P is an intrinsic property of a concrete object, P 
is simultaneously dispositional and qualitative; P's dispositionality and 
qualitativity are not aspects or properties of P; P's dispositionality, Pd, is 
P's qualitativity, Pq, and each of these is P; Pd = P q = P. (Heil 2003, 111) 
This principle distinguishes Heil's proposal from those that hold dispositional and 
qualitative are aspects of properties, they are higher-order properties of properties, or 
that dispositionality is grounded in the non-dispositional. 'Functionalism' is an 
example of the last group, saying dispositionalities are realized by qualitative 
properties. Therefore, two objects might be dispositional^ indiscernible but differ 
qualitatively. However, according to Heil (2003, 115), because of the identity theory, 
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...you could not vary an object's qualities without varying its 
dispositionalities; and you could not vary an object's dispositionalities 
without changing it qualitatively. In alerting a ball's shape, a quality, you 
alter its disposition to roll; in changing its colour, another quality, you 
change its disposition to reflect light in a particular way. Altering the 
ball's disposition to roll or to reflect light in a particular way involves 
changing the ball's qualitative make-up. 
Let me leave analyzing Heil's proposal and his identity theory to the last section of 
this chapter and move on to looking at the advantages of Heil's account in the next 
section. 
5.5 Fruits of the Flat Analysis 
In this section, we wil l see how the considered proposal can solve the three problems 
mentioned earlier for the level picture of reality. After that, another consequence of 
this model concerning special-science laws wil l be discussed. Concerning the 
problem of causal powers, it is clear that there is no such problem with Heil's 
account. There is no high-level property with causal powers for us to worry about. 
There are high-level predicates and predicates are linguistics entities, to which we do 
not attribute causal powers. Therefore, by rejecting high-level properties, the 
question of the relationship between causal powers of high and low-level properties 
seems illegitimate. 
Concerning the problem of causal relevance in Figure 1, Heil (2003, 45-6) believes 
that in one sense we can say that P causes Q. However, it should be noted that this 
truth does not hold in virtue of some high-level properties and relations between their 
causal powers. There is no high-level property in the picture. Rl holds in virtue of 
the facts that the truth maker for 'P' (a predicate) is p (lP' holds of a particular object 
at a particular time in virtue of that object possesses p), the truth maker for '(7 is q, 
and the truth maker for the causal relation between P and Q is the basic causal 
sequence between p and q. It means, 'higher-level causal claims are grounded in 
causal occurrences involving the truth-makers for higher-level predicates' (Heil 2003, 
46). Therefore, by accepting the fact that the truth makers for high-level causal 
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claims between predicates are low-level basic causal sequences between properties, 
there is no problem of overdetermination and causal relevance43. 
Finally, regarding the problem of inter-level relation, it should be clear that by 
rejecting high-level properties and introducing high-level predicates the relationship 
between high-level predicates and basic properties is not mysterious. We have 
groups of similar properties with a high-level predicate as their label. 
Apart from these points, Heil's account has other advantages of which I consider two 
concerning projectibility of special-science predicates and ceteris paribus laws in 
special sciences. One question about Heil's proposal is that i f a special-science 
predicate does not designate a property shared by objects that satisfy the predicate, 
how could this predicate figure in genuine special-science laws and in causal 
explanations? In other words, when we discussed the problem of causal relevance 
and Heil's answer to it, one might ask why we can have higher-level causal claims at 
all. Why are special-science predicates projectible and why do we have special-
science laws? 
The identity theory can help us to answer these questions. Properties are identical 
with their dispositionalities and with their powers. This means that when two 
properties are similar, in fact their dispositionalities are similar. In other words, under 
the same circumstances, two objects with two similar properties wil l manifest similar 
powers, and therefore behave similarly. Now remember that a special-science 
predicate designates a family of similar (but not exactly similar) properties. This 
means that these properties have similar causal powers and objects that possess them 
wil l behave similarly under the same circumstances. This is exactly what we mean 
by the projectibility of a predicate. According to Heil (2003a, 26), 
[Similarities between properties that designated by the predicate 'is in 
pain'] could be enough to warrant expectations that creatures in pain -
creatures satisfy the pain predicate - will be disposed to similar behavior. 
4 3 Someone might say that if we consider the mental states like belief and desire as high-level 
predicates whose causal works are done by neurological states, then Heil's account entails 
epiphenomenalism. Heil (2003b, 45) in reply says, 
Your belief, desire, and intention could be epiphenomenal, however, only if they existed 
apart from your neurological condition, which they do not. This is not an identity theory. 
There is no prospect of reducing talk of beliefs, desires, or intentionality to neurological 
talk. Nor is 'type identity' in the cards. Nevertheless, the truth-makers for mental 
predicates ('is a belief, 'is a desire', 'is an intention', for instance) including a range of 
dispositionaHy similar neurological conditions. On this occasion, it is true in virtue of 
your being in state PI that you have these beliefs and desires, and it is true, by virtue of 
your being in P2, that you have this intention. It is true, as well, that your belief and 
desire caused you to form the intention, true in virtue of Pi's causing P2. 
120 
The pain predicate is projectable, not because it designates a single 
property common to all creatures in pain, but because it is indifferently 
satisfied by distinct but similar properties bestowing the right sort of 
dispositionalities on their possessors. The 'causal relevance' of pain to 
creatures' behavior is accommodated by the uncontroversial causal 
relevance of the properties in virtue of which the pain predicate is 
satisfied. 
Therefore, the identity theory permits projectible special-science predicates and 
special-science laws. This means that, contrary to some reductive accounts (e.g. Kim 
1992) that do not accept special sciences as general sciences and claim that we 
cannot have any generalizations about high-level predicates, Heil accepts special 
sciences. 
The same argument can be presented for ceteris paribus clauses in special-science 
laws, which unlike strict and exceptionless basic laws might have exceptions. This is 
a familiar point that some special-science laws are 'hedged' in the sense that 
although they are true for most of the objects that satisfy their predicates, however, 
there are some exceptions, and these counter examples must not be construed as 
falsifiers of the laws. Heil's account can easily cover these cases. Because a special-
science predicate designates a family of imperfectly similar properties, this could be 
enough to expect that some of these imperfectly similar properties might bring about 
slightly different results under the same circumstances. These cases are exceptions of 
special-science laws and do not reject them (Heil (1999, 203-4) and (2003a, n. 16)). 
5.6 The Possibility of the Unity of Science (II) 
In Section 4.2.1, we saw how the causal analysis of realization is compatible with a 
version of the unity of science. In this section, I will show the compatibility of the 
unity of science and the flat analysis of properties. 
As discussed, in the causal account of realization, the ontological building blocks are 
causal powers. The identity conditions of properties are defined in terms of identity 
between their causal powers, and the problem of multiple realization is solved by the 
subset relation between causal powers. Therefore, it is natural to analyze laws of 
nature, especially special-science laws, in terms of causal powers in this framework. 
However, because in the flat framework the central notion is similarity we have a 
different situation. There are two kinds of predicate: fundamental predicates that 
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designate single properties (any two objects that satisfy the predicate are exactly 
similar in respect of the property), and multiply realizable predicates that designate a 
family of similar (but not exactly similar) properties (any two objects that satisfy the 
predicate are similar in respect of those properties). On this basis, there are two kinds 
of laws according to the flat view. Firstly, fundamental laws express causal claims 
connecting two fundamental properties: any object possessing the first corresponding 
property (i.e. belongs to the exact resemblance class for that property), under the 
proper circumstances wil l possess the second corresponding property (belongs to the 
exact resemblance class for that property). Secondly, special-science laws express 
causal claims between two sets of similar properties: any object possesses a member 
of the first corresponding set of similar properties, under the proper circumstances 
wil l possess a member of the second corresponding set of similar properties. As we 
can see, the central notion here is similarity, and we classify laws on basis of the 
extent of the similarity (perfect or imperfect) between properties designated by 
predicates that are used in these laws. 
The table below shows a special-science law and its corresponding fundamental 
realizer laws. T ' and are two multiply realizable predicates, which designate two 
sets of similar properties: pl,p2... and ql, q2... respectively. 
The special-science law ' P ' L a w ( O ) 
Fundamental realizer laws pi —> ql Law (1) 
p2 —» q2 Law (2) 
Table 1: a special-science law and its corresponding fundamental realizer laws 
Now let us see what the content of Law (0) is. Prima facie, this law says that any 
object possessing one of the similar properties {pi, p2...}, under the proper 
circumstances, wil l possess a specific property from the set of similar properties {ql, 
q2...}, via one the fundamental laws {pi —• qi). We can divide this prima facie 
content into three parts: (a) there is a similarity relation between pi realizing 
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properties: pi ~ p2 ~ p3 ..., (b) there is a set of fundamental laws: {pi —> qi}, and (c) 
there is a similarity relation between qi realizing properties: ql ~ q2 ~ q3 .... 
The first point about these three parts is that the last claim is expected from the first 
two, i.e. i f pis are similar, and i f any pi under the same circumstances brings about a 
qi, then we would expect that qis are similar as well. This is exactly the same point 
that Heil (2003a, 26) says in answering the question 'why are high-level predicates 
projectible?' 
[Similarities between properties designated by the predicate 'is in pain'] 
could be enough to warrant expectations that creatures in pain - creatures 
satisfy the pain predicate - will be disposed to similar behavior. 
The reason of this claim is this; properties are identical with their dispositionalities. 
Therefore, similarity between properties means similarity between dispositionalities. 
When an object has a particular dispositionality (a particular set of causal powers), 
the object manifests particular behaviours under certain circumstances. Therefore, i f 
two objects have similar dispositionalities, they manifest similar behaviours under 
the same circumstances. I f so, clause (c), which expresses similarity among 
manifestations of a set of similar properties under the same circumstances, is 
predictable from the conjunction of clauses (a) and (b), and the content of Law (0) is 
reducible to contents of (a) and (b). 
However, consideration of the actual special-science laws casts a doubt on this prima 
facie interpretation of Law (0). Consider this law as an example of special-science 
law: ' I f a creature suffers from pain (i.e. satisfies the predicate 'being in pain'), and i f 
the creature for some reason does not intend to suffer from pain, then the creature 
acts to get rid of the source of the pain.' According to the previous interpretation, this 
law says two things about the world: firstly, it expresses a similarity relation among 
members of a set of (probably endless) properties that are designated by the predicate 
'being in pain', and secondly, it expresses a set of (probably endless) fundamental 
laws connecting each of these properties to a corresponding fundamental property. 
This interpretation has a problem. When we know the mentioned special-science law 
we do not know all actual similar realizers of 'being in pain'. We only know 
realizers of 'being in pain' in some familiar creatures. For example, we know that 
'being in pain' is realized in human beings by the brain state (property) pi, and in 
octopuses by p2, and so on. More importantly, even i f we claim that we know all 
actual realizers of 'being in pain', we cannot claim that we know all possible 
(probably endless) realizers of 'being in pain'. By knowing the mentioned law, we 
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cannot claim that we know a possible realizer of 'being in pain' in a different 
possible world and in a radically different creature. In other words, clause (a) is 
much richer than the special-science law and by knowing the latter we cannot claim 
that we know the former. 
A suggestion to solve this problem might be that we have to limit clause (a) to only 
those actual realizers of 'being in pain' that we know of. Therefore, the law does not 
enumerate the entire pis, and the entire set of fundamental laws {pi —> qi}, but 
instead expresses a similarity relation between few actual samples of pis and their 
corresponding fundamental laws. For example, clause (a) is something like this: 
there is a similarity relation between properties pi... pn. However, this suggestion 
ignores the projedibility of the special-science law. We want to have a law which, in 
addition to the actual and familiar examples of pain in familiar creatures, says 
something about any possible instance of pain. 
Therefore, we need an account of the content of special-science laws that saves their 
projectibility, but does not mention all possible realizers of their predicates. My 
suggestion is this: suppose that pi a is realizer of 'being in pain' in a familiar 
creature (no matter which one, but for the moment suppose human being), and ql is a 
realizer of 'avoidance behavior' in the same creature. The content of Law (0) can be 
expressed in two parts. (A) A fundamental law expressing that there is a nomological 
relation between pi and ql, (Law (1): pi —> ql), and (B) Under the same 
circumstances, any property similar to pi (say pi), brings about a property (say qi) 
similar to what pi brings about (ql). 
The first clause shows that Law (0) is based on pain experience in some familiar and 
well-known creatures (like human beings), and the second clause guarantees that 
Law (0) is projectible and so is applicable to other creatures who experience pain. 
Clause (A) is a fundamental law, a nomological relation between two realizers of the 
high-level predicates, no matter which one (Law (1) or Law (2) or . . . ) . Clause (B) is 
a general principle that is common to all special-science laws, saying that under the 
same circumstances similar properties bring about similar results. Because this 
general principle appears in all special-science laws, let me call it 'the similarity 
principle' and consider it in more detail. 
The similarity principle is exactly the same principle that we appealed to in order to 
claim that the third part of the first interpretation of content of Law (0) is expectable 
from the first two parts (i.e. (c) is predictable from (a) and (b)). At that stage, I 
argued that because pis are similar and each of them brings about another property 
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(qis) by a fundamental law, qis should be similar as well. As mentioned, Heil accepts 
this principle and his explanation for the projectibility of special-science predicates is 
based on this principle. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the second interpretation 
of the content of Law (0), I only added the clause (B) to save projectibility of the 
special-science law. In the flat framework of properties, i f someone wants to defend 
special sciences with projectible predicates, she needs a principle like the similarity 
principle, saying that similarity among properties that is in fact similarity among 
their dispositionalities brings about similarity among manifestations of the properties 
under the same circumstances44. 
Now let us consider the epistemic situation of the similarity principle. It seems to me 
that this principle is a conceptual truth about the similarity relation. Its justification is 
not because this principle has been examined many times in many different situations 
and has enough supportive evidence. In other words, we do not accept this principle 
as an empirical generalization obtained by induction. The reason is clear; induction 
itself is an application of this principle. We argue, for example, that similar samples 
of water will behave similarly under the same circumstances; all of them boiling at 
the same temperature. In other words, in inductive reasoning, by appealing to the 
similarity principle, we argue that because similar properties under the same 
circumstances will bring about similar results, and because we have enough evidence 
that a particular property under particular circumstances brings about a particular 
result, therefore any other similar property wil l bring about the similar result. 
The reason for accepting the similarity principle, rather than induction, is that it is a 
conceptual truth, and its truth stems from the nature of the similarity relation. It is 
built in the similarity relation such that similarity per se means that under the same 
circumstances two similar things behave similarly. Therefore, although the similarity 
principle has some empirical content and is not tautology, it is not an empirical claim. 
It is a conceptual truth about the nature of similarity. 
Now let us see where all of this leaves us. We analyzed the content of a special-
science law into two parts: one is a fundamental law belonging to the basic level (say 
ultimate physics); another one is a conceptual truth about the nature of similarity, 
which is common in all special-science laws. By keeping in mind that for our present 
4 4 The clause 'under the same circumstances' is absolutely vital for the similarity principle. We are 
not talking about manifestation of one property (or two similar properties) under the similar 
circumstances. Chaotic systems show that one property (or two similar properties) in two similar but 
slightly different circumstances (different initial conditions) may bring about radically different results. 
The similarity principle does not guarantee that similarity among circumstances brings about 
similarity among manifestations. 
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purpose it is not important which one of the fundamental laws (Law (1) or Law (2) 
or . . .) or which combination of them is placed in the first part of the analysis, we 
reach this conclusion. There is a unity between special-science laws and fundamental 
laws. This is the unity of content: the content of a special-science law (i.e. what it 
claims about the nomological connections in the world) can be analyzed in terms of 
content of some fundamental laws plus a conceptual truth about the nature of 
similarity. This means that although a special-science law expresses this content in a 
unique and different way, what it says (its content) is nothing more than what basic 
sciences (for example ultimate physics) say about the world. Regarding the content 
of laws, the special and basic sciences are unified. 
This analysis shows that the flat framework of properties, like the causal framework, 
can bring a version of the unity of science. As mentioned, for some philosophers the 
idea of the unity of science is more important than particular inter-theoretic accounts 
of reduction. I f so, even i f these two metaphysical frameworks cannot solve 
problems of the classical account of reduction, they can save the deeper idea of the 
unity of science45. 
5.7 The Possibility of Reduction 
This section is devoted to considering the effects of multiple realization on the 
classical account of reduction. Following our previous terminology, the second wave 
of objections to the classical model of reduction was based on the notion of multiple 
realization. These arguments were so powerful that many philosophers considered 
the main problem with the classical model to be multiple realization. In what follows, 
I wil l argue that by taking either the causal or the flat view of realization and by 
considering Nagel's account of reduction (not the accounts that others attributed him), 
we can save a version of the classical account. 
Putnam was one of the pioneer philosophers who introduced the notion of multiple 
realization into the philosophy of mind to criticize a dominant theory in the 1960s, i.e. 
the brain-state theory. According to this theory, every mental kind is identical with a 
(perhaps undiscovered) neural kind. For example, being in pain as a mental kind is 
4 5 In Chapter 6, I will argue that the unity of special and basic sciences does not mean that by having 
the latter we do not need the former. In other words, although the content of special-science and basic 
laws are unified, this does not mean that the special sciences are unnecessary. I will argue that, 
contrary to the unity of content, special sciences could provide high-level explanations that are not 
obtainable by fundamental sciences. 
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identical with C-fiber firing as a neural kind, and every creature having pain has this 
neural state. Putnam (1967) argues that mental sates are multiply realizable, in the 
sense that a wide variety of creatures can have, for example, pain. Now i f the brain-
state theory is true then there must be some physical-chemical kind common to this 
wide variety of neural structures. According to Putnam, the current scientific 
evidence is against the hypothesis that every mental kind is identical with a neural 
kind. Although it is not impossible that such a hypothesis holds. 
Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claim. 
He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism (not 
just a mammal) is in pain i f and only i f (a) it possesses a brain of a 
suitable physical-chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical-
chemical state. This means that the physical-chemical state in question 
must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a 
mollusc's brain (octupuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), etc. At 
the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the 
brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even i f 
such a state can be found, it most be nomologically certain that it will also 
be a state of the brain of any extra-terrestrial life that may be found that 
wil l be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the 
supposition that it may be pain. 
It is not altogether impossible that such a state wil l be found.... Thus it is 
at least possible that parallel evolution, all over the universe, might 
always lead to one and the same physical "correlate" of pain. But this is 
certainly an ambitious hypothesis. (Putnam 1967, 228) 
After this passage, Putnam briefly mentioned a possibility for a brain-state theorist: a 
mental kind might be identified with the disjunction of its realizers. However, 
Putnam did not take this option very seriously and regarded it as an ad hoc 
assumption. 
Granted, in such a case the brain-state theorist can save himself by ad hoc 
assumptions (e.g., defining the disjunction of two states to be a single 
"physical-chemical" state), but this does not have to be taken seriously. 
(Putnam 1967, 228) 
The possibility that Putnam dismissed might be interesting for some reductionists. I f 
we could identify a multiply realizable kind belonging to a special science (say being 
in pain) to the disjunction of its realizers, then we can use this identity statement as a 
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bridge principle in Nagel's account of reduction and reduce the special science to 
more basic theories (e.g. neurology or physics). In other words, accepting identity 
between a multiply realizable kind and the disjunction of its basic realizers means 
that all special sciences are in principle reducible to more basic sciences. Fodor 
discussed this possibility in detail and tried to show that this option faces serious 
difficulties. 
5.7.1 Fodor's Argument 
In his classic paper 'Special Sciences', Fodor distinguishes between physicalism 
(generality of physics) and reductivism (unity of science). Fodor (1974, 100) accepts 
token physicalism, according to which ' . . . all the events that the sciences talk about 
are physical events'. Token physicalism is compatible with the generality of physics 
and its basic position among the sciences (Fodor 1974, 101); however, it is weaker 
than type physicalism and reductivism. According to type physicalism, every 
property mentioned in the laws of any science is a physical property' (Fodor 1974, 
100). It is obvious that type physicalism concludes token physicalism; however, 
token physicalism does not conclude type physicalism. 
What is reductivism? According to Fodor (1974, 100), reductivism is the 
conjunction of token physicalism with the assumption that there are natural kind 
predicates in an ideally completed physics which correspond to each natural kind 
predicate in any ideally completed special science'. It is obvious again that 
reductivism concludes token physicalism, as one of its components, but is not 
concluded by it. Reductivism is a false doctrine, according to Fodor, which cannot be 
concluded by any true thesis like token physicalism. To see why reductivism is false, 
we first need to clarify the notion of a natural-kind predicate. According to Fodor 
(1974, 102), 
P is a natural kind predicate relative to S [a scientific theory] i f f S 
contains proper laws of the form Px —• ax or ax—• Px; roughly, the 
natural kind predicates of a science are the ones whose terms are the 
bound variables in its proper laws.4 6 
Fodor accepts that the murky notion of natural kind is viciously dependent on the equally murky 
notions of laws and theory. However, he does not see any serious problem in this circularity and 
thinks that there are interesting things in the circle (Fodor 1974, 102). 
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Now we need to know why Fodor defined reductivism as a conjunction of token 
physicalism and the idea that every natural kind is, or is coextensive with, a physical 
natural kind. According to Fodor (1974, 102), reductivism has the premise that 
every predicate which appears as the antecedent or consequent of a law of the special 
sciences must appear as one of the reduced predicates in some bridge [laws]'. This 
shows that Fodor's definition of reduction has three elements: firstly, every predicate 
of the reduced science should appear in a bridge law; secondly, these bridge laws 
should have biconditional forms and connect a natural-kind predicate from the 
reduced science to a natural-kind predicate from the reducing one (Fodor 1974, 98); 
and finally, any special science is reducible to physics (at least in principle). Now by 
having this definition and the definition of natural-kind predicates (i.e. that they 
apply to the bound variables in proper laws), it easily follows that every natural-kind 
predicate of special sciences is coextensive with a physical natural kind. Therefore, 
Fodor defines reductivism as conjunction of token physicalism and this conclusion. 
The rest of Fodor's paper is devoted to showing that reductivism, as defined above, 
is false. Accepting that there is very unlikely to be a type-type identity between the 
special-science and physical properties, Fodor focuses on coextensionality between 
natural-kind predicates of the special sciences and of physics. He has three objections 
to this thesis, 
... (a) to paraphrase a remark Donald Davidson made in a slightly 
different context, nothing but brute enumeration could convince us of this 
brute co-extensivity, and (b) there would seem to be no chance at all that 
the physical predicate employed in stating the coextensivity is a natural 
kind term, and (c) there is still less chance that the co-extension would be 
lawful (i.e., that it would hold not only for the nomological possible world 
that turned out to be real, but for any nomologically possible world at all). 
(Fodor 1974, 104) 
Then Fodor moves to the issue of the multiple readability of the special-science 
predicates and considers the possibility that we take a disjunction of the possible 
realizers of a special-science predicate as its coextensive predicate. Let us suppose 
that '5" is a special-science predicate designating a multiply realizable property, and 
PI to Pn are realizers of the property. In this case, we have the bridge statement 
below that looks like a coextensionality; 
Sx <-> (Plx or P2x or ... or Pnx ) 
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However, Fodor argues that on the right hand side of this statement there is not a 
natural-kind predicate, because we have not had any physical law with such a 
complex predicate (see the definition of a natural-kind predicate above). Therefore, 
the statement is not a law (one of its predicates is not a natural-kind predicate), and 
cannot be used as a bridge law in the classical model of reduction (Fodor 1974, 108). 
In summary, natural-kind predicates of the special sciences, because of multiple 
realizability, are not coextensive with physical natural kinds, and their 
coextensionality with disjunctions of physical natural predicates is not lawlike and 
cannot be used instead of bridge laws in reduction. Therefore, natural-kind predicates 
of the special sciences cannot be reduced, and consequently the special sciences are 
not reducible to physics. 
5.7.2 A Reply within the Fodorian Framework: Local Reduction 
There are at least two ways to criticize Fodor's argument. In the first, Fodor's 
assumptions and arguments are taken for granted, but it is shown that within the 
Fodorian framework we can still have reduction. In the second, however, Fodor's 
arguments and his presuppositions are criticized. In this section, I will mention an 
example of the first group, and in the next one, I will turn to the second group of 
arguments. 
Lewis (1969) presented the earliest reply to Fodor. His main point is simple and 
straightforward. Take pain as a mental state. This mental state might be identical 
with a particular brain state in human beings and to some other brain states in other 
creatures. In other words, a multiply realizable state can have 'local' identities with 
particular realizers within particular species or kinds of system. On the other hand, 
the concept of this multiply realizable state can be the same in different species or 
systems. The concept of pain is the same in different organisms, but in different 
organisms, it is identical with different brain (or even nonbrain) states. 
A reasonable brain-state theorist would anticipate that pain might well be 
one brain state in the case of men, and some other brain (or nonbrain) 
state in the case of mollusks. It might even be one brain state in the case 
of Putnam, another in the case of Lewis. No mystery: that is just like 
saying that the winning number is 17 in the case of this week's lottery, 
137 in the case of last week's. The seeming contradiction (one thing 
identical to two things) vanishes once we notice the tacit relativity to 
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context in one term of the identities. Of course no one says that the 
concept of pain is different in the case of different organisms. (Lewis 
1969,233) 
Although Lewis himself did not explicitly apply this solution to present an account of 
reduction, other philosophers developed 'local reduction' on the basis of his 
suggestion. Kim (1992, 1993b) argues that multiple realization rules out reduction of 
general (structure-independent) special sciences (e.g. general psychology), but it 
permits reduction of 'local' (structure-dependent) special sciences (e.g. reduction of 
human psychology). The reason is that within a particular structure-type, we can 
identify multiply realizable states with particular basic realizers, and these identity 
statements play the role of bridge principles and facilitate the classical account of 
reduction. 
Many philosophers believe that local reductions are sufficient for any reasonable 
scientific or philosophical purpose. Kim, for example, thinks that local reduction is 
the rule rather than the exception in science. Churchland (1986, Ch. 7), Hooker 
(1981), and Enc (1983) are other philosophers who have presented examples of 
concrete local intertheoretic reductions where a given reduced concept is multiply 
realized at the reducing level. In these cases, by identifying the multiply realizable 
target with a particular physical property, scientists have achieved empirically 
important local reductions. A familiar example is the concept of temperature. 
Temperature in a gas is identical with mean molecular kinetic energy. Temperature 
in a solid, however, is identical with mean maximal molecular kinetic energy, since 
the molecules of a solid are bound in lattice structures and hence restricted to a range 
of vibratory motions. Temperature in a plasma is something else entirely. Even a 
vacuum can have a (blackbody) temperature, though it contains no molecular 
constituents. However, when we restrict our domain and consider the identity of 
temperature and mean molecular kinetic energy in a gas, we will obtain a local 
reduction: the laws of classical thermodynamics (e.g. the Boyle-Charles law) are 
reducible to statistical mechanics. Therefore, Fodor's argument cannot block the 
possibility of reduction47. 
4 7 Some recent anti-reductionists (e.g., Endicott (1993)) presented a more sophisticated version of 
multiple realization. According to their account, which goes back to Block (1978), a given mental 
kind can be realized in a particular structure-type via distinct neural events at different times. As a 
result, we have to identify a mental kind to one of its realizers in a structure-type at a given time. 
Therefore, we cannot even reduce a local psychology restricted to a structure-type. In reply, Kim 
(1992) and Bickle (1998, Ch. 4) argued that a guiding methodological principle in contemporary 
neuroscience assumes some continuity of underlying neural mechanisms within and across species. 
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5.7.3 A Different Reply: Rejecting Fodor's Argument 
Instead of trying to reconcile Fodor's argument with local reductions, some 
philosophers have taken a different approach: Fodor's argument is not accurate and 
cannot block the possibility of reduction 4 8. In this section, I wil l develop my 
objection to Fodor, which is along the same lines. Fodor's definition of reduction is 
problematic. As mentioned, Fodor's definition has three elements; (i) every predicate 
of the reduced science should appear in a bridge law, (ii) these bridge laws should 
have biconditional forms and connect natural-kind predicates from the reduced 
science to natural-kind predicates from the reducing one, and (iii) any special science 
is reducible to physics (at least in principle). There are two possibilities here: either 
Fodor thought that this is Nagel's definition of reduction, or he suggested this as his 
own version. Both ways are blocked. 
As we discussed in Chapter 1, Nagel does not require conditions (ii) and (iii). 
According to Nagel, a bridge principle can have a conditional (not necessarily 
biconditional) form (Nagel 1961, 354). Moreover, there is no necessity in his account 
where being a special science necessitates reducibility. Nagel only enumerates some 
(formal and non-formal) conditions, indicating which special sciences at their current 
stages are reducible and which are not. Therefore, i f Fodor supposed that his 
definition was Nagel's definition, he misunderstood Nagel and what he rejected was 
a stronger version of reduction49. 
It might be said that Fodor had his own justification for defining reduction so that it 
requires biconditional connections between natural-kind predicates from the reduced 
science and natural-kind predicates from the reducing one (i.e. coextensionality of 
the special sciences and physical natural-kind predicates). As we discussed in 
Chapter 3, some philosophers argued that because of ontological and explanatory 
requirements, bridge principles must be identity statements between properties. 
There is no evidence in Fodor's paper to support that he had such a motivation. 
However, even i f we accept that Fodor was concerned about ontological simplicity 
and therefore suggested coextensionality between natural-kind predicates, our 
4 8 See for example Richardson (1979). For different objections to Fodor, see Enc (1983), Wilson 
(1985), Keeley (2000), and Clapp (2001). 
4 9 Fodor (1974, 114, n. 2) accepts that his version of reductivism is stronger than what many 
philosophers of science presented. However, he thinks that many of the liberalized versions of the 
unity of science and reductivism still suffer from the same basic defects. I do not agree with him on 
this point. 
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metaphysical considerations about the nature of properties and the realization 
relation show that property identities are not required for reduction. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.2, according to the causal analysis there is a flat level of causal powers as 
building blocks and we do not have a layered picture of properties to be simplified by 
reduction. 
The same result is obtained from the flat analysis. According to this account, we 
have a flat and simple ontology of properties. There is no level picture of reality, and 
therefore there are no layers of properties. Properties may be gathered according to 
their similarities under different predicates, but there is no corresponding higher-
level property. Our property ontology is simple per se, and there is no task of 
simplification of ontology for any account of reduction. This means that, i f Fodor's 
reason to insist on biconditional bridge principles is simplifying ontology, we no 
longer need such a restriction. The bridge principles need not be biconditional; they 
must only facilitate deduction of the reduced-theory laws from the reducing-theory. 
5.7.4 Disjunctive Predicates and Projectibility 
In the last section, I argued that bridge principles can be conditionals and we do not 
need coextensionality. Therefore, i f lAf is a natural-kind predicate of a special-
science designating a multiply realizable property and ' p i ' is a natural-kind predicate 
designating a realizer of M in a particular system, the bridge principle (pi —> M) is 
acceptable, as long as it facilitates deducing the special-science laws from more basic 
laws. Now, in this section, I would like to consider the situation of bridge principles 
like ((pi or p2 or ...) <-> M)) that connect lM' to the disjunction of all predicates 
designating Afs realizers. As mentioned, Fodor in his classic paper (1974) believes 
that a bridge principle must be a law. we need bridge laws in reduction. The 
mentioned bridge principle, according to Fodor, is not a law, because on its left hand 
side (involving a disjunctive predicate) there is no natural-kind predicate. The reason 
is that this disjunctive predicate had not appeared in any proper physical law before it 
appeared in the bridge principle (i.e. it did not have an independent certificate as a 
natural-kind predicate). Therefore, the disjunctive predicate is not a natural-kind 
predicate, the mentioned principle is not a law, and in the absence of bridge laws, 
there is no reduction. 
Kim does not find Fodor's argument persuasive. He (1992, 318) believes that Fodor 
did not explain why bridge principles must be laws. We can imagine bridge 
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principles that do not necessarily connect kinds to kinds, they connect a kind to a 
disjunction of kind-predicates and yet with nomic necessity. (For example, the 
following bridge principle has nomic necessity, but only the first clause is a law and 
the whole sentence does not express a law. ' A l l metals either have the property of 
expanding when heated or are made of green cheese.' (Block 1997, 110)) Kim 
himself does not accept these as bridge principles, but the point is that he thinks 
Fodor did not present an independent argument to reject them. According to Kim, we 
need an independent reason to show that the predicates on both sides of a bridge 
principle must be suited for laws (kind-predicate). 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, Kim's argument is this. Assume that M is a multiply 
realizable property that is identified with Q in a biconditional bridge principle: M <-> 
Q. I f Q is a non-kind predicate, then M could no longer figure in special-science laws 
(Kim 1993, 318). The reason is simple: given the bridge principle, we can substitute 
M by Q in all special-science laws. However, i f Q is a non-kind and cannot figure in 
laws, the results of substitution are no longer laws. Therefore, the original statements 
are no longer laws and M could not figure in any law. But we want to save special-
science laws, so Q must be a kind predicate. 
The next step for Kim is to show that the disjunction of predicates designating 
realizers of a multiply realizable property is not suited for laws. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.2, Kim has two epistemic and metaphysical arguments for this: the 
disjunctive predicate is not projectible and the disjunctive property does not satisfy 
the principle of causal individuation of kinds. In section 4.2.2, I argued that both of 
these objections are not valid in the causal framework of realization. Here I only 
show that they are not valid in the flat analysis of properties as well. According to 
this analysis, when two objects satisfy the disjunctive predicate either they have 
exactly similar properties or they have imperfectly similar properties. These 
similarities guarantee that we can expect similar behaviours under the same 
circumstances. Therefore, the disjunction of predicates designating a set of similar 
properties is projectible in the sense that by knowing the behaviours of an object 
satisfying one of them we can predict what behaviours another object satisfying 
another of them would have. Moreover, objects satisfying the disjunctive predicate 
via similar properties have similar causal powers. Therefore, according to the 
principle of causal individuation of kinds (see Section 4.2.2); the disjunctive 
predicate is a kind predicate. As a result, Kim's independent reason to insist on 
kinds-to-kinds bridge principles does not work, and there is no reason to prohibit us 
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from considering a biconditional connection like (pi or p2 or ... M), which has 
nomic necessity, as a bridge principle5 0. 
Sober has developed the same point. Consider the following derivation of a higher-
level law: 
P i f f Al or A2 or ... or An. 
Q i f f Bl or 52 or ... or Bn. 
I f ,4/ then 5/ (for each / = 1,2,...,n). 
I f ,47 or A2 or ... o r t h e n Bl or B2 or ... or 5«. 
I f P then 0. 
[P and Q are multiply realizable properties with Ais and 5?s realizers] 
According to Sober (1999, 552-3), 
Even i f laws cannot be disjunctive, why does the above derivation fail to 
explain why " i f P then Q" is a law? After all, the conclusion wil l be 
nomologically necessary i f the premises are, and Fodor does not deny that 
the premises are necessary. Are we really prepared to say that the truth 
and lawfulness of the higher-level generalization is inexplicable, just 
because the above derivation is peppered with the word "or"? 
After this, Sober raises the interesting question 'why must laws be nondisjunctive?' 
He (1999, 553) mentions laws with disjunctive predicates, e.g. 'water at a certain 
pressure will boil i f the ambient temperature exceeds 100° C. This law seems to be 
disjunctive - it says that water will boil at 101° C, at 102 0 C, and so on.' One might 
say, however, that in the law about water different disjuncts bring about boiling 
water by the same type of physical process, whereas each realizer of a high-level 
Fodor (1997) replied to Kim and argued that Kim's independent reason for the unsuitability of 
disjunctive predicates for laws is not correct. Fodor argues that being jade (a disjunctive property) and 
being in pain (a multiply realizable property) are not similar, and the inference from the 
unprojectibility of jade to the unprojectibility of pain is not warranted. Then, he argues that the reason 
for the unprojectibility of the open disjunction corresponding to pain is that the property that is 
designated by the disjunction is intrinsically unfit for projection. Block (1997, 116) pointed out that 
this solution strengthens Kim's argument, 'since that open disjunction is nomologically equivalent to 
pain, pain is just as non-projectible and non-kind-like as that open disjunction.' Block (1997, 120) 
suggests the Disney Principle saying 'that laws of nature impose constraints on ways of making 
something that satisfies a certain description.' According to this principle, realizers of a complex 
property like thinking are not radically heterogeneous; they are to some extent similar and 
homogeneous, and therefore we can have deep scientific generalizations about them. Block's 
suggestion is very similar to the causal and flat analyses of realization, according to which realizers of 
a multiply realizable property have something in common or are similar, and therefore we can have 
projectible generalizations using their disjunction. 
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kind brings it about by a different physical process. According to Sober (1999, 553), 
'the point is correct, but it remains unclear why this shows that laws cannot be 
disjunctive.' However, our previous metaphysical considerations show that the point 
is not even correct. According to the causal analysis of realization, all realizers of a 
multiply realizable property bring it about by having the same causal powers. And 
according to the flat view, they bring it about by having similar causal powers. 
Therefore, there are not radically different physical processes here, and the situation 
is similar to the law about water. 
In short, there is no reason to restrict bridge principles to biconditionals. Even i f we 
restrict bridge principles to biconditionals there is no reason to suppose that they 
must be laws. A statement with nomic necessity can play the role of bridge principles. 
There is no reason to show that disjunction of predicates designating realizers of a 
multiply realizable property are not suited for laws. In addition, there is no reason to 
suppose that laws cannot have disjunctive predicates. Therefore, any one-way 
conditional that connects a realizer to a realized property, or any biconditional that 
connects a realized property to disjunction of its realizers, can play the role of a 
bridge principle. Multiple realization is not an obstacle for the classical model of 
reduction. 
5.8 A Comparison between Two Analyses of Properties 
In this final section, I wil l compare the causal and flat analyses. As we saw, both of 
them give clear accounts of the possibility of multiple realization, and the standard 
problems with the level picture of reality do not apply to them. In addition, both have 
important effects on the reduction debate: the unity of science is still defendable; 
there is no need for property identity statements or biconditional bridge principles in 
the classical account of reduction, and the classical account of reduction for special 
sciences still works. 
Apart from these common points, there are some differences between these two 
frameworks. As discussed in Section 5.3, the causal analysis needs more clarification 
about the nature of properties, their phenomenal features, and the relation between 
phenomenal features of properties (if any) and their causal powers. The later 
Shoemaker does not present a clear and positive account of properties, especially the 
place of qualities ( i f any) in the picture. He only says that properties are distinct from 
their instances, and when a property is instantiated, we only have a set of causal 
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powers. As discussed, i f we accept Heil's interpretation of Shoemaker that properties 
act via their instantiations, then we face the problem that we no longer need 
properties. Alternatively, i f we take the interpretation that properties do something 
more than merely bestowing causal powers, and they have qualitative characters as 
well, then we face the problem that Shoemaker does not present a positive account of 
qualities and their relations to dispositions. More importantly, he does not answer the 
question 'why does a property reduce to a set of causal powers and lose its 
qualitative features when it is instantiated?' 
Contrary to this, Heil presents a clear and positive view on properties, and especially 
on the role of qualities. He has the identity theory: with this view, a property is 
simultaneously dispositional and qualitative. This theory not only recognizes 
qualities, but also suggests a relationship (identity) between qualities and causal 
powers. The identity theory is an alternative for those philosophers of mind who 
think that instead of focusing on the mere problem of mental causation, we should 
pay more attention to the phenomenal and qualitative characters of mental states, and 
their relations to the causal powers of brain states. Therefore, the flat analysis has the 
advantage over its causal rival that is clear about the nature of properties, and the 
place of qualities in the picture. 
However, the central notion in Heil's account, i.e. (perfect and imperfect) similarity, 
needs more consideration, while the central notion in the causal analysis, i.e. the 
subset relation between sets of causal powers, is clear. To see this point, let me 
present Heil's (2003, 151-2) key points about the notion of similarity. Firstly, 
similarity (whether perfect or imperfect) between two properties is intrinsic to the 
properties. Secondly, similarity is not reducible to any other more basic notion like 
identity, and so is a primitive notion, not explicable further. Thirdly, similarity 
between properties is an objective notion, which is mind independent. Lastly, there is 
an important difference between similarity of properties and similarity of objects: 
objects are not similar tout court, but only in some particular respects. Two objects 
might be similar in a particular respect because of having similar properties, while 
they might be different in other respects. However, properties are similar tout court; 
two similar properties are similar per se and not in virtue of anything else. 'Objects 
are similar by virtue of possessing similar properties; properties, in contrast, are not 
similar in virtue of anything' (Heil 2003, 152). Fifth, as I mentioned earlier, some 
similarities between properties are more salient to us than others. This fact depends 
on our perceptual systems, but does not show that similarity between properties is 
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mind dependent. And the last point that is vital for the following discussion is that 
similarity comes in degrees: p may be more similar to q than to r. According to Heil, 
this point does not affect the objectivity of the notion. 
This formulation of the notion of similarity opens a new horizon in metaphysics of 
science. Let us start with the point that because similarity between properties comes 
in degrees, we have a spectrum corresponding to it. At one end, we have perfect 
similarity. This means that i f we consider properties as universals then two properties 
are identical, and i f we consider them as tropes (modes) then they have exact 
resemblance. I f a predicate designates perfectly similar properties (or alternatively 
identical universals), then it is projectible. This is because when two objects satisfy 
the predicate, they possess two perfectly similar tropes (or share a universal); 
therefore, they manifest perfectly similar (identical) behaviours under the same 
circumstances. In the middle of the spectrum, we have imperfect similarity. In this 
case, a predicate designates a set of imperfectly similar properties. Special-science 
predicates belong to this type. As discussed, Heil believes that imperfect similarity 
can guarantee projectibility of the predicates. Getting closer to the other end of the 
spectrum, there are predicates designating radically different properties, whose 
similarity is very low (e.g. 'is a property'). These predicates obviously are not 
projectible. The reason is that there is nothing (or very little) in common between the 
properties to guarantee similarity between their manifestations under the same 
circumstances. 
There is a connection between similarity among properties, projectibility of 
predicates and having exception in laws. To the extent that similarities among a set 
of properties is high, the designating predicate is projectible. And to the extent that a 
predicate is projectible, the laws that the predicate appear in have less exception (see 
the last paragraph in Section 5.5). Therefore, all of these notions are connected 
together and all come in degrees. This new picture in the metaphysics of science 
rejects the traditional dichotomies of similar/dissimilar, projectible/non-projectible 
and exception-less/with-exception. Predicates cannot be categorized into two 
separate groups of projectible and non-projectible. One the other hand, when two 
predicates are projectible it does not mean that they are projectible with the same 
degree. The mentioned schema allows us to have spectrums with different degrees of 
similarity, projectibility and having exception. 
Despite this interesting picture of the three connected notions which can be obtained 
from Heil's analysis, there is a problem in the heart of this analysis that needs further 
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work. Imperfect similarity, unlike perfect similarity, is not a transitive notion. This 
means that the degree of similarity between a and b might be r, and the degree of 
similarity between b and c might be r as well, but it does not follow that the degree 
of similarity between a and c is r. For example, the colour red is imperfectly similar 
to the colour orange (suppose that their degree of similarity is r), and the colour 
orange is imperfectly similar to the colour yellow (suppose that their degree of 
similarity is r); however, it is not the case that red and yellow are imperfectly similar 
with the same degree r. This characteristic of imperfect similarity shows that Heil's 
proposal needs further work to account mapping predicates into properties. Suppose 
that predicate 'P' designates two similar properties pi and p2 for which the degree of 
similarity is r. There is a set of properties similar to pi with degrees of similarity 
more than or equal to r (circle cl in Figure2). Similarly, there is a set of properties 
similar to p2 with degrees of similarity more than or equal to r (circle c2 in Figure2). 
There are properties, e.g. p3, which are similar to p2 with degrees of similarity more 
than or equal to r, but their degrees of similarity with pi are less than r. Now when 
Heil claims that predicate 'P' designates a set of similar properties, which set does he 
mean? Does this set include p3? Given that 'P' designates pi and the minimum 
acceptable amount of similarity is r, then 'P' does not designate p3. However, given 
that 'P' designates p2 and the minimum acceptable amount of similarity is r, then 'P' 
designates p3. Therefore, because imperfect similarity is not transitive we need a 
more sophisticated relation to map predicates into properties. This relation must 
provide a criterion to decide whether a given property belongs to a set of similar 
properties or not. Finding this relation is not impossible, but Heil did not discuss it 
and so his account needs further work in this direction. 
pi* 
c2 cl 
Figure 2: Imperfect similarity is not transitive 
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Contrary to Heil, Shoemaker's view is clear in this regard. For him, similarity is not 
the central notion; rather identity is at the heart. I f two properties are realizers of a 
higher-level property, then some of their causal powers are identical. Shoemaker's 
account does not suffer from vagueness when it comes to the notion of similarity. 
In brief, I would like to conclude that both of the causal and flat analyses of 
properties and realization need further clarification. It is true that both of them can 
solve the standard problems with the dominant picture theory of reality, both present 
a clear account of multiple realization, both save the idea of the unity of science, and 
both have the same consequences regarding the reduction debate. However, each of 
them has its own problems. The causal analysis needs further clarification of the 
nature of properties and their qualitative features. The flat analysis needs further 
clarification of the notion of similarity and its gradualness. 
*** 
As a conclusion, the following issues have been discussed in Chapter 5. An 
exposition from the flat analysis of properties and realization has been presented. It 
was shown that this analysis does not suffer from the standard problems with the 
level picture of reality, and can bring about a version of the unity of science. The 
second wave of objections to the classical model of reduction was discussed and it 
was argued that both the causal and flat frameworks save this model. Finally, it was 
argued that the causal analysis needs further clarification of the nature of properties, 
while the flat analysis needs more work on the notion of similarity. 
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Part Two 
Negative Accounts of Reduction 
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Explanatory Reduction? 
In the first part of this thesis, I defended a version of reduction, mainly based on 
Nagel's classic account. Moreover, I tried to bring metaphysical considerations on 
the scene, especially the issues concerning properties, and show that either by 
adopting a flat ontology (e.g. Heil's) or by a more classic approach based on causal 
powers (e.g. Shoemaker's), we can defend a version of the unity of science: unity of 
the content of special-science and basic laws. The second part of the thesis, 
containing three chapters, however, has a different aim. Instead of arguing positively 
for my approach to reduction, I would like to examine some alternative approaches 
and show that they are problematic. In other words, instead of saying what reduction 
is or should be, I would like to investigate what reduction is not and cannot be. This 
chapter is devoted to critical discussions on those accounts of reduction that define it 
in terms of explanation (explanatory reduction). In the next chapter, I will consider 
those accounts that define it in terms of supervenience. Finally, in Chapter 8 I will 
critically analyze functional accounts of reduction. 
This chapter has two main aims. First, I shall try to show that those accounts of 
reduction that define it in terms of explanation are problematic. Traditionally the 
reduction of scientific theories has been defined in two ways. Firstly, a necessary 
condition for reduction of one theory to another is that the latter plus some bridge 
principles concludes every law of the former. Whereas, according to the second way, 
a necessary condition for reduction is that anything that the reduced theory can 
explain, must be explainable by the reducing theory as well. Such a conception of 
reduction can be found in early literature on the issue (e.g. Kemeny and Oppenheim 
(1956), Oppenheim and Putnam (1958)), as well as recent works (e.g. Kincaid (1987, 
353) and Sober (1999)). It is interesting to point out that philosophers have suggested 
this concept of reduction almost for reducing macro to micro theories. Therefore, the 
first aim of this chapter is to show that by analyzing the nature of explanation, 
particularly its contrastive nature, defining microreduction in terms of explanation is 
problematic. 
The second aim is to show that i f we reduce a theory to another (according to any 
valid model of reduction), and i f we truly believe that there is a unity between 
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contents of special-science and basic laws, this does not mean that reduced theories 
and laws are dispensable. This would be a consequence of the first argument. I f 
special-science laws can provide explanations that are not achievable by means of 
basic laws, then at the end we need to keep our special-science laws, even they are 
reducible. However, the case of thermodynamics shows that even i f we ignore 
contrastive why-questions there is another reason for indispensability of some 
macro-theories. Before discussing these issues we need more clarification about the 
notion of explanation, and especially its contrastive nature. This is the topic of the 
next section. 
6.1 Contrastive Explanation 
I f we accept the point that explanation is an epistemological activity, increasing our 
understanding of what-is-explained (the explanandum), a fair question is, what might 
this explanandum be? It is difficult to explain an event, say the last earthquake in Iran. 
Any event has many (infinite) aspects, and explaining each of them is different from 
others (cf. Hempel 1965, 421-3). For example, the earthquake happened last year and 
this aspect needs a separate explanation from others, say the earthquake's happening 
in the south of Iran. Therefore, it might be said that by different descriptions of the 
same event, we capture different aspects of it, and the object of an explanation is a 
description of an event that is normally a sentence. 'Why did the last earthquake in 
Iran happen last year?' or 'Why did the last earthquake in Iran happen in the south of 
the country?' 
However, this is not true in all cases. In some explanations, we want to narrow our 
scope more, and, instead of one plain description of an event, ask "why-questions" 
about one particular element of that description. For example, we want to know why 
the last earthquake in Iran happened last year rather than five years ago. Here we 
have a space of two alternatives: last year and five years ago, our why-question 
concerns this contrast and its scope is more limited than the previous question. 
Generally, we call questions with the form 'why p rather than qT contrastive 
questions. Contrastive explanations answer contrastive questions. 
Another way to reach the contrastive explanations is taken by Lewis. According to 
his causal theory of explanation (1986, 185) 'to explain an event is to provide some 
information about its causal history.' Roughly speaking, for Lewis (1986, 184-5) any 
event on which our target event has causal dependency is a part of its causal history. 
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And the criterion of causal dependency is counterfactual dependency. Therefore, 
explaining an event means providing some information about events that on which 
the target event counterfactually depends. However, it is obvious that the causal 
history of any event is a too long, dense and branchy chain of events beginning with 
the big bang (cf. Mi l l 1911, 214-218). Therefore, it is not feasible to provide a 
maximal true answer to any why-question and, generally, it is not required. We have 
to select some relevant parts of a causal chain and present it as the explanation of the 
event. But what information is relevant and what is not? Apart from other possible 
answers, one way is to consider context of the why-question. In some why-questions, 
we have an explicit or implicit 'rather than...' clause: ' w h y p rather than qT These 
clauses show that main concerns of the questioner are those parts of the causal 
history that differentiated p from q, and other parts are irrelevant to her question. 
Contrastive explanation is an issue in the so-called pragmatics of explanation. In 
contrast with theories of explanation that may focus on product of explanation, 
metaphysics of explanation, nature of explanation and its relation to causation, laws 
of nature and similar issues, the pragmatics of explanation focuses on the act and the 
process of explanation. For philosophers who work on this topic (e.g. van Fraassen 
(1980), Garfinkel (1981), Lewis (1986), Upton (1990)), explanation is an answer to 
a why-question and its relevancy depends on the presuppositions and the interests of 
the questioner. Generally, the context of a why-question and particularly its space of 
alternatives are crucial factors in evaluating the relevance and adequacy of an 
explanation. As an example, van Fraassen invites us to consider an apparently clear 
plain question 'Why did Adam eat the apple?' When we add various foils to this 
question, it becomes apparent that it can mean many different things. 'Why did 
Adam eat the apple rather than doing something else with it?' is a different question 
from 'why did Adam eat the apple rather than Eve?' There would be no common 
explanation to both of these contrastive why-questions. In each, by different foils, we 
have different contexts, and relevancy of any explanation must be considered relating 
to the contexts. In what follows I shall consider some points about the relationship 
between contrastive and non-contrastive questions and then review a proposed 
approach to explain contrastive why-questions. 
First, it should be pointed out that existence of contrastive why-questions does not 
necessarily mean that all why-questions have a contrastive nature. In some 
apparently plain questions we have some implicit 'rather than...' clause, e.g. when 
you ask me why I was late for our appointment, you ask why I was late rather than 
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on time. But this is not true for all cases. Some people might suggest that any plain 
question 'why /?' can be construed as 'why p rather than not-/?'. Whether this 
suggestion is true or not depends on the strategy that we adopt to answer contrastive 
why-questions. For example, according to the 'causal triangulation' method proposed 
by Lipton to answer contrastive why-questions (I shall explain it shortly), this 
suggestion does not work. Because according to Lipton (1990, 221), his strategy 
misbehaves for these 'global' contrasts. Therefore, we do not have any a priori 
reason that any plain why-question is convertible to a contrastive one. However, this 
does not undermine the important role that contrastive why-questions play in our 
ordinary and scientific investigations, whether all why-questions are contrastive or 
not. The point that we need and use contrastive explanations to answer contrastive 
questions is enough for our purpose in this chapter, which is comparing two theories 
regarding explanations that they provide for contrastive why-questions. 
The second point is about the reduction of contrastive why-questions to non-
contrastive, and therefore reduction of contrastive explanations to non-contrastive 
ones. Lipton (1990, 212-5) considered some proposed non-contrastive questions to 
reduce the contrastive question 'why p rather than qV Here I do not repeat his 
arguments to show that proposed reductions are not valid. However, I wil l just 
mention his two main points, used repeatedly in all of the arguments. The first point 
(Lipton 1990, 211) is that explaining a contrast is sometimes easier than explaining 
the fact alone (cf. Garfinkel 1981, 30). Lipton's (1990, 212) reason is that 'to explain 
'P rather than Q' is to give a certain type of explanation of P, given 'P or Q\ and an 
explanation that succeeds with the presupposition will not generally succeed without 
it. ' However, there is no reason to say that explaining a contrast is always easier than 
a fact alone. This is Lipton's (1990, 212) second point that in some cases explaining 
a contrast is harder than explaining the fact alone. According to him (1990, 212), 
One reason that explaining a contrast is sometimes harder than explaining 
the fact alone is that explaining a contrast requires giving causal 
information that distinguishes the fact from the foil , and information that 
we accept as an explanation of the fact alone may not do this. 
These two points help Lipton to argue that we may not be able to reduce a 
contrastive question to a non-contrastive question, because in some cases explaining 
the contrast is harder and in some cases easier than the non-contrast. 
Now let us briefly review a proposed approach to answer contrastive why-questions. 
We mainly focus on Lipton's (1990) proposal, which was presented to solve 
145 
problems of Lewis's (1986) account, and wil l not consider other proposals (e.g. 
Sober (1986), Hitchcock (1996 and 1999)). Lewis (1986, 196) suggests that to 
explain a contrastive why-question, 
... what is wanted is information about the causal history of the 
explanandum event, not including information that would also have 
applied to the causal histories of alternative events, of the sorts indicated, 
i f one of them had taken place instead. In other words, information is 
requested about the difference between the actualized causal history of 
the explanandum and unactualized causal histories of its unactualized 
alternatives. 
As an example, i f I ask 'why did Lewis go to A's house rather than B's house', one 
possible explanation would be that A invited him, whereas B did not. This is a 
relevant explanation because A's invitation is a part of the actualized causal history 
(his visiting A), whereas this is not a part of the unactualized causal history, i.e. i f he 
had gone to visit B, A's invitation would not have been a part of that causal history. 
Lipton (1990, 215-7) criticized this suggestion. One of his reasons is that Lewis's 
account allows non-explanatory causes. Suppose that both A and B had invited 
Lewis, but he went to A's anyway. According to Lewis's account, we can still 
explain this by pointing out that A invited him, since that invitation still would not 
have been the cause of a trip to B's. Yet i f B invited him as well, the fact that he 
received an invitation from A clearly does not explain why he went there rather than 
to visit B. 
To remove such objections Lipton (1990, 217) proposed his own solution, the 
difference condition. T o explain why P rather than Q, we must cite a causal 
difference between P and not-Q, consisting of a cause of P and the absence of a 
corresponding event in the history of not-Q. As this definition shows, Lipton 
requires an actual difference between P and not-g, in contrast with Lewis who 
requires a counterfactual difference. In our previous example, Lewis's invitation to 
A's does not explain why he went there rather than to B's, while there is an invitation 
in the history of his visit A, there is also an invitation in the history that leads him not 
to go to visit B. 
One important question in contrastive explanation is under which circumstances can 
a contrast make a sensible contrastive why-question, and is giving it a contrastive 
explanation required? In other words, what are the requirements for a contrast to 
make a sensible contrastive why-question? For example, it does not make sense to 
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ask 'why did Lewis go to A rather than I get the job?' According to Lipton, the 
difference condition imposes some restrictions on contrasts, and only allows some of 
them to make sensible contrastive why-questions. 
... [T]he central requirement for a sensible contrastive question is that the 
fact and the foil have a largely similar history, against which the 
difference stands out. When the histories are disparate, we do not know 
where to begin to answer the question. (Lipton 1990, 218-9) 
In other words, to the extent that p and no\-q have more similar causal histories, 
giving an explanation to the question 'why p rather than qV is easier. In some cases, 
i f their causal histories are radically separate it is not even possible to provide any 
answer to the contrastive question. I will use this point in my next arguments 
concerning the relationships between reduction and explanation. 
6.2 Reduction and the Pragmatics of Explanation 
In what follows, I shall examine the adequacy of those accounts of reduction that 
define it in terms of explanation: to reduce T2 to Tl it is necessary that the latter can 
provide an explanation for anything that the former can. In other words, for any why-
question that T2 can answer, Tl must answer it too. Keeping in mind our previous 
considerations about the pragmatics of explanation, particularly the point that the 
relevance of an explanation depends on its context, I would like to highlight one 
feature of the above definition of reduction. To reduce T2 to Tl it is essential that Tl 
explains exactly the same things that T2 explains, i.e. answers exactly the same 
questions that T2 answers. In other words, we have to consider contexts of 
explanations that T2 provides, and in each case check whether the counterpart 
explanation that Tl provides is relevant in this context. To illuminate this point let us 
suppose that 72 can answer the contrastive question 'why p rather than qV In this 
case, a necessary condition to reduce T2 to Tl is that the latter answers exactly the 
same question. I f Tl can only answer the question 'why pT, or any other questions 
rather than 'why p rather than qT, then the main requirement of reduction is not 
satisfied. In such case, T2 provides an explanation that is not achievable by Tl. 
Therefore, T2 is not reducible. 
Some philosophers who have defended explanatory reduction simply ignored the 
pragmatics of explanation. Sober (1999) is among them. He suggests that i f P is a 
multiply realizable high-level property that can explain a singular occurrence, its 
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realizer (say p\) can explain the same singular occurrence too. Then he (1999, 547) 
argues that the fact that the latter explanation tells us more than we want to hear does 
not mean that what is said fails to be an explanation. This is exactly where Sober 
forgets the pragmatics of explanation. Our concern is not that basic theories can 
provide some explanation for high-level events (questions). We want to know 
whether these explanations are relevant in the context of high-level why-questions. 
We want to know, in the same context and by the same contrastive classes that we 
have at the high-level, whether more basic explanations can answer the same 
questions. For example, i f the high-level theory can answer the question 'why p 
rather than qV, while the basic theory cannot, (suppose it can only explain 'why pT), 
then we do not have reduction, although each theories provides some explanation of 
p. Considering the pragmatics of explanation is necessary for any account of 
explanatory reduction. 
6.3 Reduction and Explanation (I): Explaining a Micro-Event 
Alan Garfinkel is one of the pioneering philosophers who have paid attention to the 
pragmatics of explanation. In the first chapter of his book, Forms of Explanation: 
Rethinking the Questions in Social Theories (1981), he considers this issue, and in 
particular the role of alternative spaces and contrasts in explanation. He concludes as 
follows, 
To summarize, explanations have presuppositions which, among other 
things, limit drastically the alternatives to the thing being explained. 
These presuppositions radically affect the success and failure of potential 
explanations and the interrelation of various explanations. Call this 
explanatory relativity. 
A perspicuous way to represent this phenomenon is the device of contrast 
spaces, or spaces of live alternatives. The structure of these spaces 
displays some of the presuppositions of a given explanation. (Garfinkel 
1981,48) 
Using this conception of explanation, he devotes the second chapter of the book to 
reductionism. He tries to show that those accounts of (micro)-reduction that define it 
in terms of explanation are wrong. It is not surprising to see that he considers the 
pragmatics of explanation in his assessment of reduction. 
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So in order to assess a claim of reduction, we need a notion of when two 
explanations are explaining the same thing... In particular we can say that 
i f the reduction is to be successful, the two explanations must have the 
same object. This means that they must be about the same phenomena and 
also that they must construe the problematic in the same way. Not only 
must they be talking about the same thing ... but they must have contrast 
spaces that line up in the right way... Otherwise the reduction will fail. 
(Garfinkel 1981,50-1) 
He begins with a particular concrete example. Suppose that we have an ecological 
system composed of foxes and rabbits. There are periodic fluctuations in the 
population levels of the two species. The reason is simple; when foxes begin to eat 
rabbits, we finally face the situation where there are too few rabbits. This causes 
foxes to die off, because there are too few rabbits left to sustain them. This new 
situation causes rabbits to multiply. After a while, there is enough food for foxes and 
so they begin to multiply, and so forth. 
In this system, we have two macro and micro-theories. At the macro-level, we have 
some differential equations that represent the above fluctuations in populations of the 
species. However, at the micro-level we have a theory that explains what happens to 
any particular fox or rabbit, in terms of its behaviour, neighbouring animals, the 
surrounding environment and so on. For example, this micro-theory can explain why 
the particular rabbit r passed closely to a tree behind which the fox / was lurking, 
why this fox was hungry and how he caught the rabbit and ate it. 
Garfinkel presents a contrastive why-question concerning a micro-event. 'Why was 
this particular rabbit eaten rather than not eaten?' He believes that a macro-
explanation, using high-level predicates and vocabularies, can answer this question 
nicely. According to him (1981, 54), 'The cause of the death of the rabbit was that 
the fox population was high.' The micro-theory can also provide an explanation for 
the death of the rabbit, 'Rabbit r was eaten because he passed through the capture 
space of f o x / . However, Garfinkel's main point (1981, 55-6) is that the object of the 
latter explanation is not 'the death of the rabbit', but rather 'the death of the rabbit at 
the hands of fox / at place p, time t, and so on.' In other words, the macro-level 
explanation answers the contrastive question 'Why was this particular rabbit eaten 
rather than not eaten?' However, the micro-level explanation answers the contrastive 
questions like, 'Why was this particular rabbit eaten by fox/rather than fox/*?' , or 
'Why was this particular rabbit eaten at time t rather than time t*T and so on. 
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Therefore, Garfinkel concludes that there are some particular contrastive questions 
concerning micro-events for which macro-theories can provide answers, but micro-
theories cannot. It entails that defining (micro)-reduction on the base of explanation 
does not work. 
However, this argument does not seem persuasive to me. Firstly, it relies on a 
particular example in a particular field of study, and does not give any formal 
account of the micro-event that we cannot explain. Moreover, we do not know 
whether this conclusion is applicable to any other macro/micro-theory, or is 
restricted to this particular case. Secondly, the micro-event about which Garfinkel 
asks a contrastive question has a probabilistic nature. The death of the rabbit r had 
some degree of probability less than one. This is obvious from both the explanations 
too; neither claims that the events and facts cited as explanans determined the death 
of the rabbit. It is possible that the level of foxes was high, or the rabbit passed 
through the field of the fox, but the rabbit survived. Now the point is that asking 
contrastive why-questions about probabilistic outcomes that have some probability of 
not occurring, and therefore providing indeterministic contrastive explanations for 
them, is a controversial issue in the philosophy of science. Some philosophers (e.g. 
Lewis (1986, 197)) believe that we cannot provide any causal contrastive explanation 
for a chancy outcome. Their reason is this: the actual causal history of the actual 
chance outcome does not differ at all from the unactualized causal history that the 
other outcome would have had i f that outcome had happened. However, some 
philosophers (e.g. Hitchcock (1999)) have defended the possibility of such 
explanations. Garfinkel's argument against reduction is based on the possibility of 
such explanations, but he does not provide any account for this possibility. This 
means that his argument against reduction is at most incomplete and needs an 
account of indeterministic contrastive explanation. 
Let us put aside these general remarks and ask a simpler question. Can the micro-
theory in this particular example provide an adequate answer to the mentioned 
contrastive question? I think it can. As I said above, the outcome event (the death of 
the rabbit), had a probability of less than one. First, let us see how the macro-
explanation answers this question. As far as I can see, the only information that this 
explanation provides is that because of the increase in the fox population, the 
probability of the death of the rabbit increased. It increased as far as the probability 
of death was higher than the probability of survival. In short, the macro-explanation 
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says that, because the probability of the death was (so) higher than the probability of 
the survival, the rabbit was eaten. 
Now my claim is that the micro-theory can provide exactly such an explanation. The 
micro-theory can say what the probability of the death of the rabbit r by a particular 
fox / / was. I f the rabbit was lucky and escaped fox f l , then it probably went to the 
zone of another fox, f2. Similarly, the micro-theory tells us what the probability of 
the death of the rabbit by fox f2 was, and so on for any particular fox. Now, by 
having a body of information about the probabilities of the death of the rabbit by 
different foxes, and by having the exact number of foxes and their distributions, the 
micro-theory can calculate the accurate probability of the death of the rabbit by one 
of the foxes. This probability has a direct proportion with the number of foxes such 
that by increasing the latter (under the normal circumstances, not for example in the 
limiting case that foxes saturate the whole area such that the probability of the death 
reaches its maximum value one) the former will increase. 
On the other hand, the probability of the survival of the rabbit is the complement of 
the probability of his death. 
Pr (the survival of the rabbit) = 1 - Pr (the death of the rabbit) 
This shows that, by increasing the number of foxes, the probability of the survival of 
the rabbit decreases. Now adding these two parts, the micro-theory says that by 
increasing the number of foxes the probability of the death of the rabbit goes up and 
up in comparison with the probability of his survival. This is exactly what macro-
explanation says about the death of the rabbit. Therefore, in this particular case, the 
mentioned contrastive why-question is not a good example to show that the macro-
theory can provide explanations that the micro-theory cannot. 
6.4 Reduction and Explanation (II): Explaining a Macro-Event 
In this section, I will present my own suggestion for those contrastive why-questions 
that we can explain by means of macro-theories. However, explaining them by 
means of micro-theories is impossible or very unlikely. Suppose we have a complex 
system, composed of considerable number of interactive elements (e.g. a container of 
gas composed of billions of molecules interacting with each other). For this system, 
suppose that we have a macro-theory and a micro-theory. The former deals with the 
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behaviour of the system as a whole, and the latter with the behaviour of the elements 
individually. (In our example, say thermodynamics and the kinetic theory of 
particles.) In addition, suppose that the macro-theory uses some multiply realizable 
predicates each of which has a literally infinite number of realizers at the micro-level. 
Predicates that refer to a particular number as a threshold and classify all numbers 
below (or above) that in one group are examples of such predicates. For example, the 
predicate 'having the temperature less than 100 0 C is an example, because there are 
infinite real numbers less than 100. Let us suppose that P and Q are two multiply 
realizable macro-predicates with infinite micro-realizers. (In our example, say P is 
'increasing the pressure of the gas', and Q is 'decreasing the pressure of the gas'.) 
My claim is that contrastive why-questions at the macro-level with the logical form 
'why P rather than QT that are explainable by the macro-theory, are not easily 
explainable by the micro-theory. To consider a concrete example, let us focus on this 
candidate, 'under the circumstances C, why did the pressure of the gas increase 
rather than decrease?' Here, according to the context of the question, and by keeping 
the pragmatics of explanation in mind, we are not interested in knowing the exact 
amount of change in the pressure. Our contrast class is {increasing pressure, 
decreasing pressure}. Before going to examine the situation of this question at the 
micro-level, it should be noticed that we are not dealing with an indeterministic event 
here. According to the macro-theory, it is necessary that under the circumstances C, 
the pressure of the gas will increase. Therefore, the problems with the indeterministic 
contrastive explanations are not relevant here. 
What is the translated version of this question at the micro-level? Here we do not 
understand P and Q; therefore, we have to use their realizers,pl,p2... and ql,q2 .... 
Instead of 'why P rather than QT we have to ask 'why pi (the actual realizer of P) 
rather than {ql, q2...}T In our example, the predicate 'decreasing the pressure' is a 
disjunctive predicate consisting of infinite disjuncts like 'decreasing r percent in the 
pressure', which r is between 0 and 100. For any particular r, there are many 
microstate realizers. For example, there are many distributions of molecules that their 
corresponding pressure is equal to decreasing 2% in pressure. 
How can we answer the corresponding contrastive question at the micro-level, i.e. 
'why the actual realizer pi rather than {qj, q2...},7 This contrastive question is equal 
to the following matrix of contrastive questions. 
why pi rather than ql + why pi rather than q2+ ... 
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There are two problems with this matrix of contrastive why-questions. First, it is 
literally infinite, because Q has literally infinite realizers and in some cases (like our 
example), each realizer of Q has many realizers for itself. Providing such amount of 
explanation is not feasible in any sense. In reply, one might say that this shows this 
macro-explanation is available in principle at the micro-level. I do not want to 
consider the clause ' in principle' here. Personally, I think that providing infinite 
micro-explanations for a simple macro-question is not what we intuitively have in 
mind, when speaking about reduction. But i f someone finds it satisfactory, I have no 
objection. 
The second problem with this matrix shows that the situation is not as easy as the 
reductionist might think. In the matrix, we put pi with any of the qjs and made a 
contrastive why-question. As discussed earlier, however, not every contrastive 
question has an answer. I f I ask a non-sensible question 'why did Lewis go to A 
rather than I get the job?' there is no answer. As Lipton argues, to make a sensible 
contrastive question, the fact and the foil must have a largely similar causal history. 
In our matrix, we do not have any restriction to accept or reject questions. It is 
possible, and certainly the case, that some of the contrastive questions in the matrix 
cannot be answered at all. For example, there is nothing in common between causal 
histories of the actualized realizer (say increasing 2% in pressure via a particular 
distribution of atoms) and an irrelevant foil like 'a particular distribution of atoms 
corresponding to decreasing 78.45% in pressure'. This fact shows that we cannot 
provide answers to all elements of the matrix, and therefore macro-theories can 
explain some contrastive questions that micro-theories cannot. We cannot define 
reduction of a macro-theory to a micro-theory in terms of their explanatory equality. 
Domotor (1982) suggested that to reduce a macro-theory dealing with a system's 
behaviours to a micro-theory dealing with behaviours of its elements, we need a third 
mediating macro-theory that is probabilistic rather than deterministic. For example, 
he considers the reduction of phenomenological thermodynamics to kinetic theory of 
particles by means of introducing a probabilistic theory (Domotor 1982, 8-13). 
Without considering the details of his argument, intuitively it seems promising to me 
that a third probabilistic macro-theory could solve the mentioned problem. For 
example, a third theory like statistical mechanics may provide answers to any 
contrastive question that thermodynamics answers and the kinetic theory of gases 
cannot. But as I discussed we need more work to reconcile contrastive explanation 
and probabilistic theories. However, my main point is that Domotor's suggestion is 
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not a response to my argument. It might be shown that the reduction of a macro-
theory to another probabilistic theory is possible. But it does not show that we can 
reduce a macro-theory dealing with systems as wholes to a micro-theory dealing with 
behaviour of individual elements. More importantly, even i f we reduce the macro-
theory to a third intermediate probabilistic theory, this does not conclude that the 
main macro-theory is dispensable. The case of thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics is an interesting example, one which I shall consider in more detail in the 
last section of this chapter. I will show that even i f we accept the reduction, we still 
need thermodynamics. 
6.5 The Map of Partitions at the Underlying Space 
As we saw, Garfinkel presents some contrastive why-questions about micro-events 
that the macro-theory could answer properly, and the micro-theory cannot. But this is 
not all he has against microreduction. He wants to make a stronger claim, not only 
that microreduction is impossible in practice, but also that it is impossible in theory. 
To see this point, let us consider his example (1981, 64). Suppose a car is stopped at 
a set of traffic lights, the lights change, and the car proceeds. Considering the 
underlying physics, we had a steady and stable distribution of mass and energy 
before the lights changed. This distribution was stable against many physical changes. 
For example, it was stable against changes in the temperature or the shade of the red 
light. However, by a very small change in the energy distribution (the lights changing 
from red to green), which was negligible from a physical point of view, we had an 
enormous effect; a large mass was set into motion. In other words, the underlying 
space is cut into partitions of irrelevant differences, whereas these partitions are 
separated by critical points. For example, when the light is red we have an irrelevant 
partition of all shades of red. Whatever shade of red the light had, there was no 
difference in the outcome of the system. However, the critical point is turning from 
red to green. This tiny change, which from a physical point of view is similar to 
change from one shade of red to another, makes a huge difference at the higher-level. 
Garfinkel (1981, 64) claims that 'what is necessary for a true explanation is an 
account of how the underlying space is partitioned into basins of irrelevant 
differences, separated by ridge lines of critical points'. In other words, to explain the 
phenomenon at the upper-level we need to know what changes are really relevant to 
the outcome, and what changes are not. Now Garfinkel claims that by means of 
154 
micro-theories we cannot discover the sensitivity of the outcome to changes. From a 
physical point of view, the difference between two shades of red and the difference 
between a shade of red and a shade of green are similar. According to Garfinkel 
(1981, 64-5) the partitions at the underlying level do not arise from this level, they 
are imposed by the upper-level and the macro-theory which governs this level. In our 
example, physics does not explain why red and green lights produce such radically 
different outcomes; the system of driving and the rules that drivers are committed to 
them impose such partitions to the underlying level. Therefore, Garfinkel concludes 
that, because to explain such phenomena we need to know the sensitivity of the 
outcome to underlying changes, the micro-theories cannot explain the sensitivity, and 
the macro-theory imposes them on the underlying level. Hence, microreduction is 
impossible in principle. 
There are two points about this particular example. First, our case here is not a 
strictly physical causal one. This means two things; (1) the light changing from red 
to green is not a sufficient cause for the driver to move on; it is at best a necessary 
condition; (2) what is needed to add to this necessary condition to bring about the 
result has a normative nature; according to the driving rules to which our driver is 
committed, drivers must ( if the road ahead is clear) move on when the light changes 
from red to green. The second clause is important for my purpose. This shows that 
the changing light does not physically cause the movement of the car. Apart from 
physical causal connections, we have normative elements. I f this claim is true, we 
can conclude that Garfinkel's example at most shows irreducibility of normative 
high-level theories, theories in them apart from physical causal connections some 
things are imposed by rules from the higher to the lower level. Among others, moral 
theories are examples of such normative cases. However, my concern here is not 
normative theories. I would like to study the reducibility of physical high-level 
theories in which only strictly physical causes act. In summary, Garfinkel's example 
at best is irrelevant to the issue of reducibility of physical theories, and he cannot 
extend his conclusion to them. 
The second point about this example is that someone might extend it to physical 
theories as well. We know familiar examples of chaotic complex physical systems, in 
which a small change in the underlying distribution (particularly a small change in 
the initial conditions) might bring about huge differences at the higher-level. The 
chaos phenomenon and its relationships with philosophical concepts like prediction, 
explanation and determination are out of the scope of this chapter. However, I just 
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mention two brief points in this regard. The first concerns the relationship between 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions and predictability. A chaotic system is 
predictable in principle in the sense that ' i f we could exactly specify the initial 
conditions, all further states would follow from straightforward calculation' (Kellert 
1993, xi). However, the problem is that our initial condition specification must be 
impossibly accurate. This means that to specify the initial conditions we need an 
infinitely large device for storing and manipulating data (at least for times far enough 
in the future). Now as Kellert (1993, xi) says we face the question that 'Is our 
inability to construct such a device really to be seen as a practical limitation?' Some 
philosophers believe that this is a 'practical' problem in nature, and so chaos does not 
present anything against 'in principle' predictability. Another group deems it as an 
' in principle' inability, yet the third group believes that'... there is a place where the 
line between "in theory" and "in practice" blurs' {ibid). Therefore, the point that in 
some physical systems the outcome is strictly sensitive on the initial conditions at 
most can prove unpredictability. However, to claim irreducibility in the sense that we 
discuss in this chapter, we need to bridge unpredictability to the impossibility of 
explanation. The mere fact that we cannot predict something is not enough to 
conclude that we cannot explain it. It is a controversial claim, which needs lots of 
philosophizing. 
The second point about chaos is its relationship with determinism. Unpredictability 
does not necessarily mean indeterminism. Some philosophers (e.g. Earman (1986), 
Hunt (1987), Stone (1989) and Smith (1998)) have tried to show that chaotic systems 
are deterministic, while unpredictable. On the other hand, some other philosophers 
(e.g. Kellert (1993, Ch. 3)) argued that i f chaos theory is combined with quantum-
mechanical considerations, it leads us to doubt the doctrine of determinism itself. 
Therefore, although Garfinkel may be right that in normative systems the high-level 
facts impose some partitions on the basic level, this claim is controversial in physics 
and needs further argument, among them the issues of completeness of physics and 
the very definition of determinism. 
These considerations lead me to conclude that Garfinkel's second point against 
reduction is not persuasive; it can only work for non-physical and normative theories. 
In the next section, by focusing on thermodynamics, I shall argue that even i f we 
reduce a macro-theory to another intermediate probabilistic theory, the macro-theory 
is not dispensable. 
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6.6 A Case Study of Thermodynamics: An Indispensable Macro-Theory 
Thermodynamics and its reducibility to statistical mechanics is perhaps the most 
discussed case in the reduction literature. Most of the discussions were about the 
possibility of finding counterpart concepts at the micro-level for key concepts of 
thermodynamics, e.g. temperature, pressure, equilibrium and entropy. However, in 
this section I will consider a point that few philosophers have considered. We know 
that the thermodynamic picture of the world has some special and unique features 
that we cannot find easily in the other physical pictures, including statistical 
mechanics. As Sklar (1993, 367) says, at the heart of these features are 'the idea of 
equilibrium states as attractor states for systems and of the time-asymmetric nature of 
the approach to equilibrium.' Now the question is, i f these features are unique and 
cannot be found easily in other physical theories, particularly in statistical mechanics, 
what do we need at the micro-level to do justice to them? 
Forgetting technical issues, the dominant answer to this question is that at the basic 
level we need a basic posit about probability distributions over initial conditions of 
systems. This means that by having a structural constraint on the probabilities of the 
initial conditions, we can reduce thermodynamics and its unique features to statistical 
mechanics. As Sklar says, 
... [T]he most crucial features of the thermodynamic aspects of the world, 
the features like approach to equilibrium and time-asymmetry that 
appears as a surprise from the purely mechanical viewpoint of the world, 
appear at the reducing level only because a basic posit [...] is introduced 
at the reducing level in order to carry out the reduction. This is the posit 
of uniform probability over not too small and not too complex regions of 
phase space for initial conditions of a system. 
[...] We can summarize the situation by saying that statistical mechanics 
successfully reduces thermodynamics by replacing the structural 
constraints on the world imposed by the latter theory by its fundamental 
autonomous law - the Second Law - with a structural constraint on 
probabilities of the initial conditions of systems characterized at the 
micro-level. (Sklar 1993, 368) 
Now let us see what the nature of this structural constraint is. Firstly, it does not 
contradict our theory at the micro-level. On the one hand, we have a mechanical 
picture according to which initial conditions of the system are freely choosable. On 
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the other hand, the structural constraint tells us to select one particular initial 
condition, among many other possible alternatives. Secondly, this structural 
constraint does not stem from our mechanical theory at the micro-level. It has a 
thermodynamic nature. From a mechanical point of view, one set of initial conditions 
does not have any preference over any other set. According to Sklar, 
The underlying compositional and dynamic theories leave open what the 
initial conditions of a system are to be at the micro-level. And these 
theories leave open the possibility of there being some interestingly 
characterizable distribution of those initial conditions in the probabilistic 
sense. (Sklar 1993, 372) 
The only reason that we choose a set of initial conditions is its conforming to the 
thermodynamic constraint; other physical theories say nothing, neither suorting this 
choice nor against it. From an ontological point of view, selecting a set of particular 
initial conditions introduces nothing over and above the ontology of the reducing 
theory. However, this selection is something autonomous and not part of the 
reducing theory: only thermodynamic considerations can justify it. 
Now what can be concluded from this kind of relation between a macro and micro-
theory? In our previous discussion we saw that a macro-theory might be 
indispensable because it can provide answers to some contrastive why-questions that 
the corresponding micro-theory cannot. The case of thermodynamics shows that even 
i f we ignore contrastive why-questions some macro-theories are indispensable for 
another reason. These theories impose structural constraints from the upper-level to 
the lower-level, so that without them, lower-level theories cannot reduce macro-
theories. This is the reason why some macro-theories are indispensable, even i f we 
reduce them to more basic theories, or even i f we ignore contrastive why-questions. 
Garfinkel (1981, 68-74) points out nearly the same fact. According to him, in some 
micro-theories, any combination of individual elements is not possible. In these 
systems, we have structural presuppositions, which impose restrictions on the 
individual elements when they combine to make a collection. These presuppositions 
come from upper-level theories and do not follow from the nature of individual 
elements. According to Garfinkel the real micro-level consists of a set of individuals 
together with a nontrivial sociology, and in such systems we do not have 
microreduction. The micro-theory needs extra elements from outside to explain 
macro-events. 
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*** 
In this chapter, I tried to criticize explanatory accounts of reduction, according to 
which a necessary condition for reduction of T2 to Tl is that the latter answers any 
why-questions that is answered by the former. First, I introduced the notion of 
contrastive explanation and then argued that in the definition of reduction we have to 
consider the pragmatics of explanation. This means that two theories answer the 
same question if, and only if, they explain the same event with the same contrastive 
classes. By rejecting Garfinkel's suggestion, I suggested a kind of macro-event that 
the macro-theory can easily explain; however, its explicability according to the 
micro-theory is problematic. In the next section, I criticized Garfinkel's argument for 
those partitions at the micro-level that are imposed by the macro-theory. At least, I 
argued, extending this issue from normative theories to causal ones is not so easy. 
Instead of that, by focusing on thermodynamics, I showed that in some cases a 
macro-theory imposes structural constraints on a probabilistic micro theory, so that 
we need these constraints to reduce macro-theories. This structural constraint ensures 
that the macro-theory is not dispensable. 
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Reduction by Means of Supervenience? 
In this chapter, I shall examine those accounts o f reduction that try to define it in 
terms o f the notion of supervenience. Traditionally many philosophers found the 
notion o f supervenience attractive because they thought this notion had the 
potentiality to combine physicalism and non-reducibility. In other words, to 
formulate a non-reductive physicalism, allowing autonomy and non-reducibility o f 
higher-level entities and theories (particularly mental entities) and yet allowing their 
dependency on the physical entities, the notion of supervenience was the most 
popular candidate. However, some philosophers have argued that strong versions o f 
supervenience that we may use to formulate non-reductive physicalism conclude the 
possibility o f epistemic reduction. I f their argument is correct, then we cannot 
formulate non-reductive materialism by means o f supervenience, but also those cases 
that we thought are non-reducible, are indeed reducible. As discussed in Section 
5.2.3, supervenience does not bring about ontological reduction. This means that 
supervenience is only a modal relation, expressing a kind o f covariance, and its 
modal force is not strong enough to imply ontological reduction. When As supervene 
on Bs, for example, this is compatible wi th all o f the fol lowing alternatives: As are 5s, 
As and Bs are effects o f a common cause, Bs are parts o f ,4s and so on. Now i f the 
argument o f philosophers who tried to obtain epistemic reduction f rom 
supervenience is correct, then although supervenience is not strong enough to imply 
ontological reduction, it can give us epistemic reduction. 
In what follows I w i l l try to challenge this claim and show that supervenience does 
not imply epistemic reducibility. I w i l l start with a short exposition o f the notion o f 
supervenience, its different types, and those types that have been used in the 
reduction debate. In the next section, I w i l l consider some accounts o f reduction 
based on the notion of supervenience. After that, I w i l l introduce and analyze some 
proposed objections to these accounts. I have sympathy with some of them, while 
others I reject, because o f my previous discussions on the nature o f properties and 
multiple realization. I w i l l end this chapter by presenting my own argument showing 
that supervenience does not bring about reducibility. 
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7.1 Supervenience and Its Varieties 
The core idea o f supervenience is the idea o f dependent-variation. This means that 
when As supervene on 5s, then variation in A-respects depends on variation in B-
respects. In other words, we cannot have ,4-respect variation without having B-
respect variation. Two things cannot be different regarding ^-respects unless they 
have some difference regarding B-respects. As an example, i f we take properties as 
the relata of the supervenience relation, and i f we hold that mental properties 
supervene on physical properties, then there is no variation in the mental-respects 
without counterpart variations in the subvenient physical properties. I f two persons 
differ in respect o f their mental properties, there must be some difference in their 
physical states. Equally, i f two persons are identical regarding their physical 
properties, they must be identical regarding their mental properties. 
However, this general intuition behind the notion o f supervenience could be 
formulated in different ways, with different modal strength, and according to the 
objects that we select for comparison regarding their A and 5-respects. The first 
group of definitions is obtained when we compare things regarding A and B-
respects5 1. Therefore, we select two things and then compare them regarding two sets 
o f properties. However, in the second group of definitions we select two possible 
worlds and then compare them regarding two sets o f properties. 
Further division is possible in the first group of definitions. We can select two things 
f rom the same possible world, or f rom two distinct worlds. I f we select f rom the 
same possible world, then we have 'the weak supervenience'': 'A-respects weakly 
supervene on 5-respects = df for any possible world w, 5-twins in w are /4-twins in w ' 
(McLaughlin 1995, 24). Otherwise, i f we select two things f rom two different 
possible worlds we have 'the strong supervenience'': ',4-respects strongly supervene 
on 5-respects = df for any possible worlds w and w* and any individuals x and y, i f x 
in w is a 5-twin o f y in w* then x in w is ,4-twin o f y in w*' (ibid). In the second 
group in which we compare the two possible worlds, we have 'the global 
supervenience'': 'A-respects globally supervene on 5-respects = df all worlds that are 
5-twins are .4-twins' (McLaughlin 1995, 30). 
5 1 In the rest of this chapter I simply assume that A and B are two families of properties. Therefore, 
comparing two things regarding /i-respects means their comparison regarding A-properties. If they 
exemplify the same properties from this set they are identical regarding A, otherwise they are different 
in this regard. 
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A l l o f these three versions o f supervenience share one feature: they are holistic in the 
sense that we do not have a one-to-one relation between properties. Suppose for 
example that mental properties strongly supervene on physical properties, all that this 
claim gives us is that i f two persons f rom two different possible worlds have the 
same physical properties, then they must have the same mental states (both are happy, 
not in pain, thinking about a same thing and so on). However, this claim says nothing 
about which particular physical properties are responsible for bringing about a 
particular mental property, say being in pain. This holistic feature o f supervenience 
makes it inappropriate for the purpose of reduction. What we normally expect in the 
traditional model o f reduction are bridge principles, connecting one property 
(concept) f rom the reduced theory to one property (concept) f rom the reducing 
theory. Therefore, we need amendments in the above definitions to obtain one-to-one 
connections. Here I w i l l only mention three counterpart definitions that change the 
holistic nature o f supervenience to provide one-to-one relations, and w i l l not discuss 
the ways in which we could obtain them from the original definitions. Two of these 
new definitions are used to define reduction. In the next section, I w i l l explore the 
ways o f obtaining these new definitions. When I consider the problem o f obtaining 
reduction f rom supervenience, I discuss problems with these new definitions. 
The counterpart one-to-one relation o f weak supervenience is this. 
A weakly supervenes on B = df necessarily, i f anything has some property 
F in A, then there is at least one property G in B such that that thing has G, 
and everything that has G has F. (McLaughlin 1995, 25) 
Corresponding to strong supervenience, we have the fol lowing definition. 
(*) A strongly supervenes on B = df necessarily, i f anything has some 
property F in A, then there is at least one property G in B such that that 
thing has G, and necessarily everything that has G has F. (ibid) 
Finally, corresponding to the global supervenience this definition is proposed. 
(**) [A globally supervenes on B = dfj for each property F in A, i f F is 
exemplified by some object x, then there is a condition C that is 
equivalent to a conjunction o f all the exemplifications o f properties in B 
such that necessarily i f C obtains, and there is no exemplification o f a 
property in B that is not entailed by C , then x has F. (Grimes 1995, 114) 
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7.2 Reduction by Means of Supervenience 
Many philosophers have tried to show that some versions o f supervenience imply 
reducibility. Amongst them, these names can be mentioned: K i m (1978, 1983, 1984, 
and 1990), Rosenberg (1985), Bacon (1986) and Grimes (1995). In this section, first 
I w i l l explore Kim ' s account that claims strong supervenience implies reducibility. 
After that, Grimes's argument that global supervenience can do the same job w i l l be 
considered. 
As mentioned, we need one-to-one relations between properties (concepts) to 
proceed with reduction. Let us see how K i m makes the one-to-one version o f the 
strong supervenience. Suppose that the set o f properties A supervenes on the set o f 
properties B. This means that i f x and y (not necessarily belonging to the same 
possible world) are indiscernible regarding 5-properties, then they are indiscernible 
regarding ,4-properties. Now we make the set o f B-maximal properties. A n object x 
either has a particular property in B (say P) or does not have it. I f x does not have P, 
and i f we suppose that the negation o f a property is a property (a crucial assumption 
that I w i l l discuss later), then we can say x has ~ P (not-P). Now concerning the set B, 
any object x has a chain o f properties. It has some of the original properties in B, and 
the negation o f some of the original properties. I f we conjoin all the members o f this 
chain, we w i l l obtain a member of the B-maximal set. This means that in any member 
of the B-maximal set, every 5-property is presented either in its original form or in its 
negation. These properties conjoin together and make a member o f the B-maximal set. 
In addition, the B-maximal set contains all possible ways that we can combine these 
properties. In brief, the B-maximal properties are the strongest consistent properties 
constructible in B. Any object necessarily has one o f them, and cannot have more 
than one. To illuminate this set let us suppose that B has three members {P, Q, R}. 
The B-maximal set in this case has eight members: {(P & Q & R), (~ P & Q & R), (P 
&~Q&R),(P&Q&~R),(~P&~Q&R),(~P&Q&~R),(P&~Q&~R), 
(~P8c~Q&~R)}. 
Another crucial assumption that K i m needs is that the set B must be closed under 
Boolean operations. This means that any construction o f properties that connects 
members o f B by Boolean operations is still a property, and belongs to B. Now it can 
be seen that i f an object has a property (say F) f rom the supervenient set A, then there 
is at least one property in B (say G) that this object has. This subvenient property (G) 
is the same member o f the B-maximal set that this object has. In addition, necessarily 
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any other object that has G has F. The reason is simple: A supervenes on B, and 
therefore i f two objects are indiscernible regarding B (having the same B-maximal) 
they must be indiscernible regarding A. 
We still need one further step to obtain the one-to-one relation between properties. 
We would like to define supervenience such that it allows multiple realization. This 
means that, we would like to keep the possibility open that two objects might have 
different subvenient properties, while they are indiscernible regarding supervenient 
properties. In other words, two objects might have different B-maximal properties, 
while both have the same supervenient property. This possibility prevents us treating 
a supervenient property and its counterpart B-maximal property as identical or even 
coextensive. The standard solution to this problem is this: take all possible B-
maximal properties that an object which has F might have one o f them (say Gl, 
G2...). Make a disjunction o f these properties (say G, G= WGi). Because B is closed 
under Boolean operations, G is a member of B. Now G and F are coextensive. Any 
object that has F has one o f the disjuncts o f G, and therefore has G. On the other 
hand, any object that has G also has F. The reason is this. When an object has G, it 
has one o f its disjuncts, say Gl. We have already seen that having Gl is sufficient for 
having F. Therefore, there is a one-to-one relation between properties in the case o f 
strong supervenience. (i.e. we have obtained the (*) definition in the last section f rom 
the original definition o f strong supervenience). The holistic nature o f strong 
supervenience has been changed into a one-to-one relation between properties. 
Now it is time to see how K i m obtains reducibility f rom this one-to-one relation. As 
we discussed the issue in previous chapters, some philosophers, including Nagel, do 
not restrict bridge principles to biconditionals. However, some philosophers, 
including K i m , believe that the only logical form that can play the role o f bridge 
principles is the biconditional. As mentioned, K i m argues that bridge principles must 
be identity statements, and because coextensionality is a necessary condition o f 
identity, therefore bridge principles must be biconditionals, expressing 
coextensionality. Accordingly, it is not surprising to see that K i m construes Nagel's 
model o f reduction just as derivation o f laws o f the reduced theory f rom laws o f the 
reducing theory, by means o f bridge principles that meet the condition o f 'strong 
connectability': 
Each primitive predicate P o f the theory being reduced is connected with 
a coextensive predicate Q of the reducer in a biconditional law of the 
164 
form: "for all x, Px i f f Qx"; and similarly for all relational predicates. 
( K i m 1990, 151) 
I f this condition is met, K i m says, we can rewrite laws o f the reduced theory in terms 
o f the vocabulary o f the reducing one. To do this we only need to substitute the 
original terms with their coextensional counterparts f rom the reducing theories. Now 
derivational reduction is guaranteed. Either these new laws belong to the set o f pre-
existing laws o f the reducing theory, or we simply add them as additional laws. In 
both cases, we can derive laws of the reduced theory f rom the laws of the reducing 
one, which means we reduce the latter to the former. 
It can be seen, K i m says, that when we have strong supervenience between two sets 
of properties we have one-to-one connections between properties. This one-to-one 
connection is exactly what we need in the condition o f strong connectability. 
Therefore, we can conclude that when set A o f properties supervenes on set B, any 
theory, T2, that expresses nomic relations among elements of A is reducible to any 
theory, Tl, that expresses nomic relations among elements o f B. In other words, 
strong supervenience implies epistemic reducibility. 
Grimes (1995) presented a slightly different argument to show that strong 
supervenience implies reducibility. Referring to Nagel's original account, he realized 
that Nagel did not restrict the bridge principles to biconditionals. According to Nagel, 
one-way conditionals might play the role o f bridge principles. Therefore, Grimes 
rejects 'the condition o f strong connectability', and believes that any one-way 
conditional, according to which having a property f rom the reducing theory is 
sufficient for having a property from the reduced theory, can play the role o f bridge 
principles. Now it can be seen that by having strong supervenience we have such 
one-way conditionals. As discussed, any B-maximal property (say Gl) is sufficient 
for having a supervenient property (say F). These one-way relations can be used as 
bridge principles, and therefore we can obtain reduction f rom strong supervenience. 
This approach, according to Grimes (1995, 113), has the virtue o f not being sensitive 
to the issue o f disjunctive properties. Even i f someone rejects disjunctive properties 
and says that the subvenient set o f properties is not closed under disjunction, she can 
confirm the achievability of reduction f rom strong supervenience. In Grimes' 
account, we do not need coextensionality, and therefore we do not need to make one-
to-one relations between properties by means o f disjunctive subvenient properties. 
However, what makes Grimes' article notable is his attempt to obtain reduction f rom 
global supervenience. For the first step, he suggests that global supervenience 
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implies condition-to-property conditionals. Suppose A globally supervenes on B. 
This means that all possible worlds that are indiscernible regarding B are 
indiscernible regarding A. Now suppose that we select a supervenient property F in a 
possible world w. When F is exemplified some members of the set B are exemplified 
in w as well , and some are not. Let us assume that condition C is the conjunction o f 
all the exemplifications o f 5-properties in w. Now it can be claimed that obtaining 
the condition C in any other possible world is sufficient to exemplify the property F. 
For i f in any possible world, say w*, we obtain C, it means that this possible world is 
indiscernible f rom w regarding B-properties. According to global supervenience, w* 
and w are indiscernible regarding ^-properties too. Now, because in w we have the 
property F, in w* we have F as well . This means that obtaining the condition C is 
sufficient to have the particular supervenient property F. Grimes (1995, 114) puts 
this condition-to-property relation as follows, 
[A globally supervenes on B = df ] for each property F in A, i f F is 
exemplified by some object x, then there is a condition C that is 
equivalent to a conjunction o f all the exemplifications o f properties in B 
such that necessarily i f C obtains, and there is no exemplification o f a 
property in B that is not entailed by C, then x has F. 
This one-way condition-to-property conditional is sufficient to bring reduction. As 
we saw earlier, Grimes does not restrict bridge principles to biconditionals, and 
accepts one-way conditionals as well . Now he claims that this new relation can work 
in exactly the same way that one-way relations between properties do, and bring 
about reduction according to the same arguments . 
Grimes takes a further step and claims that in addition to condition-to-property 
conditionals, global supervenience implies one-way property-to-property 
conditionals. He suggests that global supervenience of A on B implies the fol lowing 
claim: 
For each property F in A, there is a property G in B such that necessarily 
for every object x, i f x has G, and no other object y has a property in B, 
then x has F. (Grimes 1995, 115) 
The only difference is that the conditionals entailed by global supervenience include a certain 
qualification as part of the antecedent, namely, that there is no exemplification of a property in B that 
is not entailed by C. Grimes (1995, 114) believes that this minor difference does not make any 
problem. [T]his qualification is not in any way peculiar or untoward. Instead, it simply functions 
as a type of ceteris paribus clause, a clause that, as many have emphasizes, is essential to almost any 
genuine law of nature.' 
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Here G is equal to conjunction o f all properties in B that x possesses. This definition 
says that i f the only object that exemplifies a property in B is x, i.e. i f comparison 
between two possible worlds regarding 5-properties is equal to comparison between 
x and its counterpart regarding 5-properties, then the condition C in the (**) 
definition is a conjunction of a set of 5-properties exemplified by x. Therefore, C 
becomes a property and we have a property-to-property conditional. Now we have 
exactly the same situation that we had in the case o f strong supervenience: one-way 
relation between properties. This relation is sufficient to bring about reducibility. 
Therefore, Grimes claims that global supervenience implies one-way condition-to-
property and property-to-property conditionals, which each is sufficient to imply 
reducibility. 
7.3 Disjunctive Properties and Similarity 
In the rest o f this chapter, I w i l l consider arguments against the general strategy o f 
deriving reducibility f rom supervenience. I shall start with some proposed objections 
that are not acceptable according to my previous discussions o f multiple realization. 
After that, I w i l l consider some acceptable proposed objections. Finally, I w i l l 
explain my own objection to this philosophical programme. The first objection 
concerns the issue o f similarity. Generally, properties are understood as sources o f 
similarity. When two objects are red for example, either they exemplify the same 
property ( i f we take properties as universals), or they have exactly similar tropes ( i f 
we take properties as particulars). However, one objection might be that in 
disjunctive properties we lose this notion o f similarity. Teller (1983, 58) presents this 
example to criticize Kim's account o f reduction by means of supervenience, 
. . . [Cjonsider the property 55 which an object has either by being a 
molecule with 55 hydrogen atoms in it or by being an object which 
weights 55 tons. Now what do two objects which have the property 55 
have in common? I want to say, absolutely nothing i f the two objects are 
both 55 by virtue o f satisfying the two different disjuncts.... Two such 
objects have nothing in common by virtue o f both having property 55 in 
the way that two red things do have something in common by virtue of 
their both being red. 
According to this objection, a property must ensure some kind o f similarity among 
objects that have it. Now i f an alleged property fails to do this, this means that it is 
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not a genuine property. Disjunctive properties, according to this argument, cannot 
guarantee similarity; therefore, they are not real properties. This means that the 
subvenient counterpart o f high-level properties, which is disjunctive, is not a real 
property. Hence, strong supervenience cannot provide property-to-property 
connection, and reduction. 
K i m (1990, 153-4) was aware o f this objection. However, he does not find it 
compelling. According to him, we are discussing reduction o f theories here, and 
theories are couched in their distinctive theoretical vocabularies. Then he concludes, 
... [ I ] t seems that we allow, and ought to allow, freedom to combine and 
recombine the basic theoretical predicates and functions by the usual 
logical and mathematical operators available in the underlying language, 
without checking each step with something like the resemblance criterion; 
that would work havoc with free and creative scientific theorizing. (K im 
1990, 153, Italic mine) 
I do not find Kim ' s reply satisfactory, and more importantly I think it contradicts his 
own view in the same paper. When he (1990, 152) considers the question 'given that 
disjunction is a permissible property-forming operation, is it proper to form infinite 
disjunctions?' he replies, 
.. . [T]he answer has to be yes. I don't see any special problem wi th an 
infinite procedure here . . . . We are not here talking about predicates, or 
linguistic expressions, but properties; I am not saying that we should 
accept predicates o f infinite length.... ( K i m 1990, 152, Italic mine) 
As we can see, in the first quotation K i m says that the relata are predicates and so 
there is no need to worry about the criterion o f resemblance, which is applicable only 
to properties. However, in the second quotation K i m says that the relata are 
properties and so we do not need to worry about the length o f the disjunction. One 
possible way to resolve this conflict is to take the view that corresponding to any 
theoretical predicate there is a property in our ontology. K i m does not take such a 
view, but we know that this is the standard semantical analysis o f properties whose 
problems were discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
Although I do not accept Kim's reply, I do not find the objection persuasive. Two 
kinds o f case must be separated. In the first case, a disjunctive property is made by 
disjunction o f irrelevant and distinct properties. In this case, the disjunctive property 
does not guarantee similarity and the objection is valid. However, in the second case 
we have a disjunctive property where all o f its disjuncts are realizers o f a multiply 
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realizable property (predicate). We do not discuss disjunction o f any two arbitrary 
properties here . In this case, our previous discussions about multiple realization 
show that the objection is not valid. First, let us consider the issue in the causal 
framework. Here the multiply realizable property has a set o f causal powers, which is 
a subset o f the causal powers o f all of its realizers. Therefore, when two objects have 
that property, they have some real causal powers in common in virtue o f which both 
exemplify the property. This means that Teller's point, that when two objects have 
the property 55 they have nothing in common, is not applicable to our case. Here we 
have a core set of causal powers that any object having the multiply realizable 
property has. Similarly, according to the flat framework it can be said that realizer 
properties are similar to each other. This means that any two objects that satisfy a 
multiply realizable predicate have something in common. They might have different 
realizer properties, but these properties are similar, and this similarity is what the 
objects have in common. 
Now we can conclude that i f by defining reduction in terms o f supervenience we 
correlate a disjunction o f irrelevant subvenient properties to a supervenient property, 
then the objection is valid and the disjunctive property cannot guarantee similarity. 
However, i f we correlate the disjunction o f a set o f realizers to a multiply realizable 
property (predicate), then the objection is irrelevant. It seems to me that in real and 
concrete examples o f reduction by means o f supervenience the second option is the 
case, and therefore the objection is not va l id 5 4 . 
7.4 Disjunctive Properties and Laws of Nature 
Teller's second objection to Kim ' s account is that even i f we accept that Boolean 
combinations o f properties (including disjunction) are still properties, 'Boolean 
combinations like the ones we are considering w i l l never figure in physical laws in 
5 3 This is exactly the point that Clapp (2001, 124-126) presents in reply to Armstrong's point that 
disjunctive properties violate the principle that a genuine property is identical in its different 
particulars. 
5 4 Rosenberg (1985) tried to derive reduction of biology to its lower-level counterparts (chemistry and 
physics) from supervenience of the former on the latter. His work is based mainly on Kim's account. 
However, he has two additional assumptions: (i) determinism entails supervenience, and (ii) the 
finitude of nature, according to which the number of possible realizations of a biological kind is finite. 
For a critical view of Rosenberg's argument, especially the finitude of nature, and a critical view of 
obtaining reduction from supervenience see Kincaid (1987). Zangwill (1998) has also discussed the 
issue of infiniteness of disjuncts in disjunctive subvenient properties. He argues that reduction must 
have an epistemological dimension, and the issue of infiniteness prevents Kim's model of reduction 
from having an epistemological dimension. 
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any science remotely like the physics we know today' (Teller 1983, 59). This means 
that the counterpart subvenient property coextensive with a supervenient property is 
very fat and unusual (because o f endless and heterogeneous possible realizations o f a 
supervenient property), which could never figure in laws o f the subvenient science. I f 
so, and i f we keep in mind that Nagel's goal for reduction is obtaining laws o f the 
reduced theory f rom laws of the reducing theory, then we can conclude that because 
disjunctive properties at the subvenient level do not figure in laws o f this level, laws 
of the supervenient science could not be derived f rom laws o f the subvenient science. 
Hence we do not have Nagelian reduction. 
In reply to this objection, I would like to appeal to the distinction that I made in the 
previous section: the disjunction o f endless heterogeneous properties is different 
f rom the disjunction of realizer properties. The objection might be valid for the first 
case; however, in the second case which seems closer to real examples of subvenient 
disjunctive properties, the objection is not relevant. We have discussed this point in 
Section 5.7.4, and here I only repeat some key points. We have familiar examples o f 
disjunctive laws in physics. Any physical law indicating a threshold is disjunctive, 
(e.g., 'water at a certain pressure w i l l boil i f the ambient temperature exceeds 100° 
C is a disjunctive law with literally endless disjuncts.) One might say that in 
physical examples, all disjuncts bring about the result by the same mechanism, while 
realizers o f a multiply realizable property (predicate) bring about the result by 
different physical mechanisms (i.e. they are heterogeneous). Our metaphysical 
reflections show that according to both the causal and the flat analyses o f realization 
this is not the case. According to both o f these frameworks, there is something in 
common among all the realizers, they either have a shared set o f causal powers or are 
similar properties. Therefore, realizers of a multiply realizable property (predicate) 
are not radically heterogeneous; they bring about the result by the same (or similar) 
mechanisms. Hence, there is not a clear distinction between normal physical 
disjunctive predicates and the disjunction o f the realizers o f a multiply realizable 
property (predicate): both can appear in laws. 
Although Teller's objection regarding disjunctive properties (predicates) is not 
persuasive, there is a point in Kim's account that makes it problematic. As mentioned, 
K i m believes that by having one-to-one connections between high-level and lower 
level predicates (the condition of strong connectability), we can re-write high-level 
laws in terms o f lower level predicates. Now i f these 'images' o f the high-level laws 
are already present at the lower-level, then there is no problem in deducing the 
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original high-level laws f rom the lower level laws. I f these 'images' are not present 
at the lower level, then we add them to the lover level laws and derive the original 
high-level laws from the new set o f lower level laws. 
This solution, however, is problematic. The main point in Nagelian reduction is to 
explain the laws of the reduced theory by means o f the laws o f the reducing theory 
plus bridge principles, such that this explanation brings epistemic pay-offs (whether 
empirical or historical). The main aim, however, is not just to do some logical 
exercises by deducing the former f rom the latter without any pay-offs. I f we add 
images o f the high-level laws to the lover-level laws, and deduce them again f rom 
this set, we have not obtained any epistemic gain in fact. Block has also raised this 
objection against Kim's proposal. 
Laws of the reducing theory together with "bridge" laws or definitions are 
supposed to explain the laws o f the reduced theory. This condition is 
often ignored in the debate over multiple realizability because o f the 
widespread positivist assumption that explanation is just deduction. I f the 
terms of the upper level theory are all definable in lower level terms, 
explanation o f the upper level laws is said to be trivial . The upper level 
laws can be deduced f rom the lower level theory plus definitions, and i f 
the lower level theory isn't rich enough, the "images" o f the upper level 
laws can simply be added to the lower level theory. As images o f laws, 
they w i l l be nomically necessary. But i f one has to do psychology to 
discover basic laws of physics, the deduction o f those laws o f psychology 
f rom their images in physics won' t be as explanatory as one might wish. 
(Block 1997, 111) 
This point leads me to my main objection to Kim's proposal that has a wider scope, 
and I w i l l discuss it in the last section o f this chapter in more detail. In Kim's account, 
it is not important how a scientific theory connects a set o f properties together. The 
only relevant factor for a theory to be a reducer is that it features a set o f properties in 
its laws. But what kind o f nomic relations hold between these properties is not 
important for the purpose o f reduction. In other words, the nomic content o f a theory 
is irrelevant to reduction. For example, as long as a theory figures the disjunctive 
properties at the subvenient level, it is enough to deem it a reducer theory. We do not 
consider how this theory connects these properties to each other, and what kind of 
nomic relations is suggested between them. The nomic content o f this theory is 
irrelevant, as far as it uses some particular vocabulary. However, I would like to 
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emphasise that an account o f reduction that is neutral about nomic contents o f 
theories seems too weak. We need more restrictions and conditions on the content o f 
a theory to deem it as the reducer of another theory. The requirement that it must use 
a set o f properties is too weak. 
7.5 The Negation Operation 
Post (1983) has presented a powerful argument against Kim ' s account, which can be 
used against that part o f Grimes' account that connects strong supervenience to 
reducibility as well . Post discusses the negation operation in particular. He (1983, 
165) argues that even i f we accept that a Boolean construction f rom 5-properties is a 
property, it is not clear whether it is a B-property. To illuminate this point, consider 
the negation operation and suppose that B is the set o f physical properties including 
P: being an electron. Now the negation of this property (the property o f not being an 
electron) is not a physical property. Suppose it is a physical property. This means 
that anything that has i t (e.g. numbers, classes, thoughts, pains) has a physical trait 
simply because it is not an electron. This is obviously absurd, for example, saying 
that numbers have some physical properties, like not being an electron, not having 
mass, and so on. Therefore, the set o f physical properties is not closed under the 
complementation operation. Another example is the set o f moral properties that is not 
closed under this operation. Electrons are not morally good or bad, therefore they 
have the property o f not being good. I f we suppose that the set o f moral properties is 
closed under negation, then we have to accept that electrons have moral properties. 
To generalize this point, we can say that not every set o f properties would be closed 
under the negation operation. Some sets are closed and some are not. It is something 
we need to check in any particular case. In addition, we know that the set o f (micro) 
physical properties is not closed under complementation. This means that the B-
maximal properties that we make by using negation o f some physical properties are 
not necessarily physical. Therefore, the coextensive (or sufficient) property that we 
construct for a supervenient property is not a physical property. Thus, we have not 
reduced the supervenient properties to the set o f subvenient physical properties. We 
have reduced it to a different non-physical set o f properties, which cannot satisfy our 
aim o f reduction. 
I have sympathy with Post's argument; however, I think we must avoid treating it as 
a general strategy that can block any reduction by means o f supervenience. This 
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argument at most shows that some sets o f properties (including physical properties) 
are not closed under some Boolean operations (e.g. negation), therefore we cannot 
use these sets as subvenient base o f reduction. However, this argument is silent about 
those sets that are closed under Boolean operations. Thus, we still can have reduction 
by these subvenient bases. As Zangwill puts the point, 
The fact that propertyhood (or physical propertyhood) is not preserved 
under some Boolean operations does not show that it is not preserved 
under others. I f we are not to be completely liberal about property 
construction, we need some way o f spotting which logical operations 
preserve propertyhood. (Zangwill 1998, 154) 
A n d I add that the fact that some sets are not closed under Boolean operations does 
not show that others are not closed as well . We need some criterion to check which 
sets are closed and which sets are not, under Boolean operations. 
7.6 Equivalency between Holistic and Non-Holistic Versions of Supervenience 
McLaughlin (1995, 29) presents an argument to show that the non-holistic versions 
o f supervenience are stronger than the original definitions. Take strong 
supervenience as an example. According to the original definition (SI): ^-respects 
strongly supervene on 5-respects i f f for any possible worlds w and w* and any 
individuals x and y, i f x in w is a 5- twin o f y in w*, then x in w is the ,4-twin o f y in 
w*. While according to the non-holistic version (S2): A strongly supervenes on B i f f 
necessarily, i f anything has some property F in A, then there is at least one property 
G in B (where G is the disjunction of all possible 5-maximal properties that are 
sufficient for F) where that thing has G, and necessarily everything that has G has F. 
In addition let us suppose that two relations R and R* are equivalent only i f it is 
impossible for some x to have relation R with y, while it does not have relation R* 
with y. 
Now it can be shown that SI and S2 are not equivalent. To see this let us assume that 
the subvenient set B is closed under Boolean operations and contains all possible 
constructible properties. Now take a proper subset o f B that includes no negative 
properties, no conjunctive properties and no disjunctive properties. The set A still has 
the SI relation wi th this proper subset, i.e. objects that are indiscernible regarding the 
proper subset are still indiscernible regarding ^-properties. However, A does not 
supervene on the proper subset according to the S2 definition. The reason is that this 
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proper subset, according to its definition, is not closed under Boolean operations. 
Therefore, SI and S2 are not equivalent 5 5. 
What can be inferred from this argument? We can say that the kind o f relationship 
that is required to bring about reduction is not the original relation o f supervenience. 
We can obtain reduction f rom some relations, but these relations are not 
supervenience as we traditionally conceive it (i.e. a dependent-variation relation). 
We need stronger relations. McLaughlin (1995, 30) argues that while the original 
(holistic) definitions of weak and strong supervenience characterize 'dependent-
variation' relations, one-to-one versions o f weak and strong supervenience 
characterize 'dependence-determination' relations. For according to these versions 
having any property F in A requires having at least one property G in B (the 
dependency component) such that having G suffices for having F (the determination 
component). To conclude, the relation that brings about reducibility is not 
supervenience in its traditional concept. We might call it 'supervenience', but we 
should be aware that it involves something more than the idea o f dependent-
variation 5 6 . 
7.7 Supervenience as the Necessary Condition of Reduction 
Our previous discussions showed that apart f rom the problem considered in Section 
7.4, other objections to the project o f defining reduction on the base o f supervenience 
are either irrelevant or have narrow scope. In particular, we have not had a 
compelling argument against reduction by means o f global supervenience5 7. In this 
section, I w i l l present my own argument against the whole project o f obtaining 
reducibility f rom supervenience, which is applicable to global and strong 
supervenience. 
Let us assume for the moment that thermodynamic properties (strongly or globally) 
supervene on the mechanical properties o f atoms and molecules. This means that for 
any thermodynamic property, we have a mechanical property or condition that is 
5 5 This is the case even if we, like Grimes, reject coextensionality and only say that for any /i-property 
we have a sufficient property in B. This is also the case for weak supervenience. 
5 6 For a similar argument see Post (1983), and for some critical points on it see Teller (1985). 
5 7 Another objection that is proposed by Seager (1991) and Kim (1992) is that the bridge principle that 
connects a multiply realizable property to the disjunction of its realizer is not a genuine law; because it 
cannot be confirmed in the way that genuine laws can be confirmed. This objection is again about 
multiple realization rather than reduction by means of supervenience. I have discussed this point in 
Section 4.2.2, and replied in Section 4.2.3. 
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sufficient for it. Therefore, i f supervenience is sufficient for reduction, 
thermodynamics is reducible to mechanics. However, it should be noticed that this 
alleged reduction is neutral about the nomic relations (laws) that exist in these 
theories. To see the point let us assume that apart f rom thermodynamics, we have 
another theory T H E R M O D Y N A M I C S that employs exactly the same terms, 
predicates, concepts and properties that thermodynamics is using. However, the only 
difference between them is that they suggest different nomic relations among the 
predicates. For example, in contrast with thermodynamics that says under a constant 
volume i f the pressure of a gas is increased its temperature w i l l be increased, 
T H E R M O D Y N A M I C S says the temperature w i l l remain constant. N o w according to 
the same arguments, i f thermodynamics is reducible (by means o f supervenience) to 
any other theory, T H E R M O D Y N A M I C S is reducible too (given suitable bridge 
principles which w i l l be different in each case). To be reducible, according to this 
account, the only requirement is that the set of high-level predicates (properties) 
supervenes on a more basic set o f predicates (properties). Because thermodynamics 
and T H E R M O D Y N A M I C S use the same set o f predicates (properties), either both 
are reducible to a particular lower level theory or neither is. Similarly, 
thermodynamics and T H E R M O D Y N A M I C S are reducible to any other theory that 
employs the same set o f predicates (properties) that mechanics employs, whatever its 
nomic content is. 
To illustrate this characteristic an analogy might help. Suppose we want to examine 
the resemblance of two polygons. The first step might be checking the number of 
vertices in both. I f two polygons do not have the same number o f vertices, they do 
not resemble each other. This step is similar to finding some corresponding predicate, 
property or condition at the subvenient level for each supervenient property. 
However, this is not enough. Apart f rom vertices, we need to check sides. For 
example, we need to check that the ratio o f lengths o f two corresponding sides is the 
same for any other corresponding pairs. This is exactly the step that does not exist in 
reduction by means o f supervenience. We do not check the nomic relations among 
properties, the ways that a theory connects them to each other. 
Why is this account of reduction not acceptable? Firstly, in concrete scientific cases 
we want to consider the reducibility o f a particular theory with unique relations 
among its terms to another particular theory with unique nomic content. Reduction 
by means o f supervenience ignores the nomic contents of scientific theories, and 
classifies them only according to the properties/vocabulary they use. Theories that 
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use the same properties/vocabulary are in one group, whatever their nomic contents 
are. Therefore, the answer that this account provides regarding reducibility is 
different from the answer that we expect, that reducibility should be extremely 
sensitive to laws of the theories. In other words, the 'reduction' that this account 
defines has a different meaning from the reduction that we traditionally and 
intuitively understand. To obtain the traditional conception of reduction we have to 
put more restrictions on reduction by means of supervenience. We have to change it 
so that makes it sensitive to the content of laws, in addition to isolated predicates. 
The second reason that this account of reduction is too weak and cannot be qualified 
as a sophisticated account of reduction is that it ignores the non-formal conditions of 
reduction. As discussed, apart from the formal condition of derivability, Nagel 
requires more restrictions on reduction. He mentions three non-formal conditions. A 
review of these conditions shows that all of them concern the nomic content of 
theories. For example, Nagel says that reduction must have a scientific significance 
and provide more knowledge and deeper understanding of the two theories. It should 
help us to discover new laws or increase degrees of confirmation of the present laws. 
In general, therefore, for a reduction to mark a significant intellectual 
advance, it is not enough that previously established laws of the 
secondary science be represented within the theory of the primary 
discipline. The theory must also be fertile in usable suggestions for 
developing the secondary science, and must yield theorems referring to 
the latter's subject matter which augment or correct its currently accepted 
body of laws. (Nagel 1961, 360) 
These conditions make Nagel's account different from a logical exercise in which 
some sentences are derived from others. However, reduction by means of 
supervenience ignores these conditions, and is therefore too weak and without any 
epistemic dimension. 
In reply to these points, one might say that we can simply add the non-formal 
conditions to the accounts of reduction by means of supervenience to compensate for 
their flaws. In other words, one might say that having the supervenience relation is a 
necessary condition for reduction that must be supplemented by other conditions, 
like the non-formal ones. I think this option is not as simple as it seems. As we 
discussed the point in Section 1.6, the non-formal conditions make Nagel's account a 
reduction without necessity. This means that formal considerations do not necessitate 
reduction. Reducibility is a contingent matter that, even by satisfying all the formal 
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conditions, must be examined for any particular theory. Even for a particular theory, 
its reducibility to another theory should be checked at different stages of its 
development. However, reduction by means of supervenience is a reduction with 
necessity: i f supervenience, then necessarily reduction. Adding the non-formal 
conditions to this account removes this modal force. We could have supervenience 
without reduction. Therefore, the first result of adding the non-formal conditions to 
the account of reduction is that supervenience no longer entails reduction. This is not 
a trivial change. Many advocates of reduction by means of supervenience support it 
because it can provide a sense for the clause ' in principle' in the definition of 
'reductionism': any non-physical theory is reducible to physical theories in principle. 
They argue that supervenience guarantees reduction, i f current physics does not use 
disjunctive subvenient predicates (properties), a complete physics in the future wil l 
use them. However, i f we accept that supervenience does not guarantee reduction, 
then it cannot give sense to the clause ' in principle'. An advocate of reductionism 
must find another reason to support the claim that any non-physical theory is 
reducible to physical theories in principle. 
However, someone might accept this change. According to her, we add the non-
formal conditions to the accounts of reduction by means of supervenience and only 
hold that supervenience is a necessary condition of reduction, which needs the non-
formal conditions to be sufficient, i.e., the supervenience relation does not guarantee 
reducibility but is necessary for it. This proposal has some problems. 
The original holistic definitions of weak, strong and global supervenience cannot 
cover indeterministic causation. In the case of indeterministic causation, effects do 
not (weakly, strongly, or globally) supervene on their causes. Two things can be 
indiscernible regarding the indeterministic causes, but they are discernible regarding 
the effects. This means that i f we define reduction in terms of supervenience, then 
theories involving properties and predicates relevant to indeterministic causes cannot 
play the role of reducer theories. In other words, reduction by means of 
supervenience excludes indeterministic theories as the bases for reduction. For 
example, we cannot reduce high-level physical theories to many important parts of 
modern physics, like quantum theory. However, these indeterministic theories are 
our best and most comprehensive basic theories, and reductionists tend to suppose 
them to be reducing theories. Incompatibility of reduction by means of 
supervenience with indeterministic reducing theories is one of the most important 
problems with this kind of reduction (cf. Crane and Mellor 1990, 205). 
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To conclude, I tried to show that defining reduction of scientific theories in terms of 
the modal relation of supervenience is not possible. Some of the proposed objections 
to this project are not relevant, and can be answered by having a firm ontological 
ground. For example, by adopting the causal or flat views of multiple realization, we 
can show that the objection that disjunctive properties do not save similarity is 
irrelevant to reduction. Some other objections, for instance the one regarding the 
negation operation, are acceptable, but have narrow scopes of application. They 
cannot reject every possible reduction by means of supervenience. My main 
objection to this project concerns the non-formal conditions of reduction, which are 
absent. I argued that reduction by means of supervenience is not sensitive to the 
nomic content of theories, and so is too weak. On the other hand, adding the non-
formal conditions to this account has its own consequences. Firstly, it takes the 
modal force of this account and changes it from an account of reduction with 
necessity to an account of reduction without necessity. Secondly, the supervenience 
relation per se is not appropriate to make a necessary condition of reduction. It 
cannot be applied to indeterministic causation, and therefore excludes indeterministic 
theories to be reducers. 
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8 
Functional Reduction? 
In this chapter, I shall consider an account of reduction of properties by means of 
functionalizing them. Functional reduction is one of the most recent proposed models 
of reduction. Proponents of this model think that it can solve problems of the 
previous models (e.g. Nagel's model or reduction by identity statements), and has 
further benefits: unification of the issues of prediction, explanation and reductive 
explanation. Therefore, it can be used in defining 'emergent' properties. The chapter 
starts with a short exposition of functional reduction, based on the Kim's proposal. 
Then I shall argue that his account of reducibility is inadequate. Two kinds of 
functionalization (MR and BA) wil l be separated. 2L4-functionalized properties are 
reducible according to the functional definition of reducible properties. However, in 
the case of Mi?-functionalized properties, reducibility of a property depends on 
reducibility of its neighbours in a causal network. 
8.1 Functional Reduction 
After defending an account of reduction based on the supervenience relation, Kim no 
longer finds it persuasive and has presented his objections to this account (2003). As 
a new alternative, Kim now defends an account of reduction according to that relata 
of the reduction relation are properties, rather than scientific theories. He explains 
this view in different works, and we focus here on his paper 'Making Sense of 
Emergence'. 
As a rule Kim accepts mereological supervenience, according to which 'all 
properties of a physical system supervene on, or are determined by, its total 
microstructural property' (Kiml999, 7). By 'microstructural property', he means, 
'the system's basic micro-constituents, their intrinsic properties, and the relations 
that structure them into a system with unity and stability as a substance' (ibid). But 
how can we separate emergent from reducible properties? Kim thinks that the key 
idea here is predictability and so we can separate reducible (resultant) properties 
from emergent properties by means of their predictability,'... resultant properties are 
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to be those that are predictable from a system's total microstructural property, but 
emergent properties are those that are not so predictable' (Kim 1999, 7-8). 
We can imagine two kinds of predictability: theoretical and inductive. Emergent 
properties are inductively predictable. This means that i f we have enough correct 
observations that systems with microstructural property M have emergent property E, 
we can predict that i f this particular system has M at time t, then E wil l emerge at t. 
However, emergent properties are not theoretically predictable. Kim (1999, 8) argues, 
'we may know all that can be known about M- in particular, laws that govern the 
entities, properties and relations constitutive of M- but this knowledge does not 
suffice to yield a prediction of E\ Therefore, i f we could not predict E by complete 
knowledge of M at the basic level, then E is an emergent property. Whereas any 
property is exclusively either reducible or emergent (regarding a given basic level), 
by converting the mentioned criterion, the general definition of reducible properties 
is obtained: 
The General Definition of Reducible Properties (GD): knowing all 
that can be known about microstructural property M at the basic level-
such as laws that govern the entities, properties and relations 
constitutive of M- is sufficient to yield a prediction of E. 
After this general definition, Kim presents two examples to show how this criterion 
works. According to the first case, i f the concept of E lies entirely outside the 
concepts in which our theory of M is couched, then E is an emergent property. As an 
example, according to Kim, a phenomenal property of experience (a "quale") is 
entirely outside the concepts of our physical or psychological theories and so is an 
emergent property. According to the second case, E is emergent in the following 
situation too, 
it may be that we know what E is like - we have already experienced E-
but we may be powerless to predict whether or not E - or whether E 
rather than another emergent E* - wil l emerge when a complex is formed 
with a novel microstructural M * that is similar to M in some significant 
respect. (Kim 1999, 8) 
After this general definition of reducible properties, Kim presents a more operative 
definition, the functional definition of reducible properties (FD). Let us assume that 
B is the domain of properties serving as the reduction base. To reduce E to B, we take 
three steps (Kim 1999, 10-11): 
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Step 1: E must be functionalized - that is, E must be construed, or re-
construed, as a property defined by its causal/nomic relations to other 
properties, specifically properties in the reduction base B. 
Typically we have something like this, Having E= def Having some property e in B 
such that (i) cl...cn cause e to be instantiated, and/or (ii) e causes fl...fm to be 
instantiated. This means that having E by definition means having some property e 
such that e has a certain causal role (C) in B. 
Step2: Find realizers of E in B. 
Step3: Find a theory (at level B) that explains how realizers of E 
perform the causal task that is constitutive of E. (i.e., the causal role 
specified in Step 1, Q 
According to this functional model of reduction, i f we can causally functionalize 
property E at level B (by causal task C), and find its realizers at this level, and then 
find a theory at level B that explains how realizers of E perform C, E is reducible to 
B. I f not, E is emergent. 
8.2 Multiple Realization, Functionalization and Inadequacy of FD 
In this section, I consider Kim's main definition, FD, by means of a special kind of 
functionalized properties. David (1997, 139) introduces two kinds of functionalism, 
common-sense functionalism and the-best-available-scientific-theory functionalism. 
In common-sense functionalism our source for the specification of the functional role, 
which we use to define of the target property, is common-sense knowledge. For 
example, 'being in pain is the cause of groans' is a part of our common-sense 
knowledge that we use in functionalizing pain. However, in the-best-available-
scientific-theory functionalism our source is the best available scientific theories, for 
example being in pain (or its neurophysiological realizers) is a cause of secretion of 
hormone X. 
Based on this categorization, but not exactly similar to it, I will introduce two other 
kinds of functionalism: functionalizing E in terms of some other multiply realizable 
properties/predicates (MR-functionalism), and functionalizing E in terms of some 
basic and non-multiply realizable properties (5^-functionalism). Let us suppose that 
we want to functionalize a high-level property/predicate E, which can be realized by 
basic properties. There are two possible ways here. According to the first (MR-
functionalism), we functionalize E in terms of its causal role that it plays between 
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two other high-level properties/predicates C and F, C is cause of E and E is cause of 
F58. The important thing here is that both of C and F are multiply realizable. 
Therefore, we define E such that each of its realizers is caused by one of C's realizers 
and causes one of F's realizers (Figure 1). 
C E -» F 
T t t 
realization relation realization relation realization relation 
{cl...ck...} -> {el...en...} -» {/7.../m...} 
Figure 1: Functionalizing E by means of two other multiply realizable properties/predicates 
(MK-functionalism) 
In the second kind of functionalism (5/i-functionalism), we functionalize E in terms 
of the causal role that its realizers play at the basic level: having E =def having some 
property e that is caused by c and causes /(where c, e, and/belong to the basic level 
B) (Figure 2). 
E 
T 
realization relation 
I 
c —> {el...en...} —» / 
Figure 2: Functionalizing £ by means of basic properties (S^-functionalism) 
When Kim speaks of functionalizing E, he allows both of MR and BA. His main 
demand is that E must be functionalized in terms of the basic properties. (See step 1 
above.) But both of MR and BA functionalize E in terms of basic properties. In BA, 
having E means having some property e that is caused by c, and causes/(where c, e, 
and /belong to the basic level). And in MR having E means having some property e 
that is caused by one of the realizers of C and causes one of the realizers of F (where 
It seems to me that there is a connection between common-sense functionalism and MR-
functionalism. When we want to functionalize our concept of a property/predicate, say pain, we 
usually use our common-sense knowledge and define it as a causal link between two other high-level 
properties/predicates. Being in pain is caused by tissue damage and is a cause of groans. Tissue 
damage, groans and pain do not belong to the basic neurological level; they can be realized in 
different ways at this basic level. Most of (not necessarily all of) common-sense functionalizing are 
A4/?-functionalizing, but this does not exclude the-best-available-scientific-theory functionalizing to be 
MR. 
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these realizers belong to the basic level). In addition, Kim's two concrete examples 
show that he accepts MR as a way of functionalizing E. Kim (1999, 10) 
functionalizes the property of being a gene like this, 
.. .the property of being a gene is the property of having some property (or 
being a mechanism) that performs a certain causal function, namely that 
of transmitting phenotypic characteristics from parents to offsprings. 
As for functionalizing pain, he says (1999, 13), 
Suppose that pain could be given a functional definition- something like 
this, being in pain is being in some state (or instantiating some property) 
caused by tissue damage and causing winces and groans. 
Now let us see what FD says about the reducibility of BA and M/?-functionalized 
properties. To be reducible according to FD, in addition to step 1 (functionalizing the 
property), steps 2 and 3 must be satisfied. Step 3, finding a theory, is a purely 
empirical task and we will not consider it here. However, step 2, finding realizers of 
the target property at the basic level, is conceptual rather than pure empirical. In the 
case of 5^-functionalized properties, there is no problem in step 2. According to the 
causal role that we functionalize E by it, every property at the basic level that is 
caused by c and causes/(where c and/belong to the basic level B) is a realizer of E. 
Because c and /are two particular properties at the basic level and we know them by 
complete knowledge of B, there is no conceptual problem to find realizers of E at this 
level. Any property that is caused by c and causes/is a realizer of E. 
However, the situation of step 2 for MR-functionalized properties is not so clear. Our 
definition here (Figure 1) says that having E connects to these conditionals: (a) ' i f C, 
then £ ' and/or (b) ' i f E then F\ Whereas C and F do not belong to the basic level B, 
complete knowledge of B says nothing about them. (For example suppose that 
neurophysiology is our basic level, this science says nothing about pain or groans. 
These properties are not used in this science.) By complete knowledge of B, we 
cannot know whether our present microstructural property is caused by C and/or 
causes F or not. This means that we cannot find realizers of E at the basic level just 
by complete knowledge of B. To do this task we have to know the sets of realizers of 
C and F at the basic level. Then by means of them, we can decide i f our present 
microstructural property is caused by one of C's realizers and/or causes one of F s 
realizers then it is a realizer of E. In other words, decision about a microstructural 
property in particular, and finding realizers of E in general, depends on knowing the 
sets of realizers of C and F. But how can we determine the realizers of C and F (say 
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tissue damage and groans)? The situation of these two sets are exactly similar to the 
situation of the realizers of E, they are realizers of high-level properties. The only 
way to determine c/'s is defining C as a functional property that has some causal 
relations with other properties (e.g. C is caused by A and causes E). Now each basic 
property that can satisfy this functional role is a realizer of C and so is one of cis. 
But, i f we want to functionalize our concept of C (such as the case of £), it is very 
probable that we functionalize it by means of two other high-level properties which 
each have a set of realizers at the basic level (in our example A and E are high level 
properties). In other words, it is possible and even very probable that we 
functionalize C in MR way. 
Where does this leave us? To find realizers of E (step 2), we have to be able to 
decide whether or not our present microstructural property is a realizer of E. For this 
purpose, we have to know the sets of realizers of C and/or D. C is another high-level 
property that is normally functionalized by some other high-level properties (like A). 
Finding the set of C's realizers requires finding the set of A's realizers. The situation 
of A is exactly similar to C, E and D. And therefore, we have a chain of high-level 
properties where finding realizers of one of them depends on finding realizers of the 
rest. These sets of realizers make a network at the basic level and we cannot have 
only one of them in isolation. To know one of them we need to know some of its 
neighbours. 
To find these sets of realizers at the basic level, we need a starting point. This 
starting point fixes and determines at least one set of realizers at the basic level, and 
by this, we can proceed and find the rest. The most likely option for this starting 
point is that we functionalize at least one of our high-level properties not in MR but 
in BA way. For example, i f by a conceptual connection we BA-functionalize C, then 
finding realizers of E wil l be possible. However, this option changes the nature of 
Kim's proposal. Kim suggested his proposal to answer questions like 'is the 
particular property E reducible to more basic properties in 5 ? ' To answer this 
question Kim requires two things: a functionalized version of E and a scientific 
theory deals with 5-properties. However, taking the mentioned option means that in 
addition to these two elements, the reducibility of E depends on other factors. The 
reducibility of E depends on 5y4-functionalizability of some other distinct properties. 
I f there is a 5,4-functionalizable property in the chain that contains E, E is FD-
reducible. I f not, E is emergent. In fact, this option changes the reducibility of a 
property from an intrinsic feature of it to a relational feature. To answer a question 
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about the reducibility of a particular property we must consider BA-
functionalizability of some other distinct properties. The reducibility of E (say being 
in pain) depends on existence of a conceptual connection between a distinct property 
(say being happy) and its basic realizers. I f E appears in a chain that one of its 
members is 5/4-functionalizable, then E is reducible. However, i f the same E appears 
in a chains without any &4-functionalizable property, then E is emergent. This 
relational account is not what we intuitively expect from a reduction account. We 
expect that the reducibility of E is defined in terms of E, the set of basic properties B 
and a scientific theory, independent of other distinct properties. 
To conclude, i f we reject MR as an acceptable way of functionalizing, we add many 
properties to the list of emergent properties (like our concepts of multiply realizable 
mental properties, e.g. pain). By rejecting MR, we have to accept pain as an emergent 
property, which obviously contradicts with Kim's overall strategy. On the other hand, 
accepting MR leads us to consider the reducibility of a functionalized property as 
a relational feature of it. 
185 
Part Three 
What Reduction is and is not 
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9 
A Modest Account of Reduction 
In this last chapter, I wil l try to formulate my modest account of reduction by 
summing up all the points discussed in the previous chapters. This account is mainly 
a developed version of Nagel's account, but it has a metaphysical flavour to remove 
the standard problems with Nagel's account. In what follows, first I will sketch a 
portrait of this account, and then I wil l consider some of its features and 
consequences. In the last section, I will consider an alternative account of reduction 
and its similarities and dissimilarities with my account. 
9.1 A Portrait 
As I discussed the point in Section 3.2, approximation is a vital component of any 
sophisticated account of reduction. Let us suppose that 77, T2 and B.P are the sets of 
reducing laws, reduced laws and bridge principles respectively. When we add (*) to 
one of them, we make an approximation of it (e.g. 77* is a set of reducing laws 
which is distinct from 77, but is an approximation to it, and B.P* is a set of bridge 
principles that can be approximately true). According to Nagel's classic model, the 
only acceptable formal structure for reduction is Tl+B.P \- T2, in which Tl and T2 
are the original reducing and reduced theories and B.P is the set of strictly true bridge 
principles. However, in my interpretation we can also use approximate counterparts 
of these three elements. Therefore, eight different formal structures are available for 
reduction: 
(i) Tl+BP (- T2 (ii) 77 * +BP \- T2 (iii) 77 +BP* \- T2 
(iv) Tl +BP \-T2* (V) Tl * +BP* f- T2 (vi) Tl * +BP \-T2* 
(vii) Tl+BP* |- T2* (viii) T1*+BP* |- T2* 
(For example, according to the seventh option, i f we deduce an acceptable 
approximation of the reduced laws from the original set of reducing laws and a set of 
approximately true bridge principles, then we have reduction.) 
As this schema shows, the notion of reduction completely depends on the notion of 
approximation (similarity or analogy). As discussed the point in Section 3.2, we have 
a clearer conception of approximation in the case of bridge principles; however, we 
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still need reliable accounts of similarity (analogy) between laws and theories to 
capture the different respects in which two theories/laws might be similar. Therefore, 
despite the work that has been done on the notion of similarity between scientific 
theories and laws, the formal schema of reduction cannot be regarded as complete 
unless we have a comprehensive account of similarity between theories in different 
respects. These accounts must formulate the conditions of similarity, and satisfy 
some basic requirements, among them the fact that similarity comes in degrees. 
Our previous discussions revealed some points about bridge principles. (1) As I 
discussed the point and presented an example of Hempel in Section 1.5, it is not 
necessary that to connect a property/predicate from the reducing law to a 
property/predicate from the reduced law we only use one bridge principle. We might 
have a set of bridge principles. A set of bridge principles is acceptable as long as its 
members are jointly necessary and sufficient for deducing the reduced law from the 
reducing law. (2) Bridge principles are not limited to laws. Initial and boundary 
conditions and identities are examples that can be used as bridge principles, but are 
not laws. (3) Moreover, as discussed in Section 5.7, sentences that have nomic 
necessity (i.e. they are true in all nomically possible worlds), but are not laws, can be 
used as bridge principles. For example, the sentence 'all metals either have the 
property of expanding when heated or are made of green cheese' (Block 1997, 110), 
is not a law, but has nomic necessity because it is implied by a law. This condition 
allows us to use sentences that connect multiply realizable properties/predicates to 
their realizers as bridge principles, without any worry about their lawlikeness. (4) 
Our considerations in Section 5.7 showed that we could even consider a sentence that 
connects a multiply realizable property/predicate to its realizers as a law. As 
discussed, disjunctive laws exist in physics. I f the only point that distinguishes 
disjunctive physical laws from bridge principles is that in the physical laws all the 
disjunct properties bring about the effect by the same mechanism, then this condition 
is met in the bridge principles too. Our candidate metaphysical frameworks, whether 
the causal or the flat conceptions of properties, guarantee that the realizers are not 
radically heterogeneous, and that they bring about the realized property/predicate by 
the same or similar mechanisms. (5) As discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, there is no 
need to restrict the bridge principles to identity statements, between things or 
properties. Bridge principles can be identity statements between things, but they are 
not limited to this kind. On the other hand, two main motivations for restricting 
bridge principles to property identity are irrelevant. As discussed in Section 3.4, 
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bridge principles do not need explanation, and therefore the controversial point that 
identity statements do not need explanation is irrelevant in the context of reduction. 
Moreover, we do not expect reduction to simplify our ontology. Two discussed 
metaphysical frameworks of realization present simple pictures of properties, in 
which reduction may not simplify our ontology. 
Our discussions in Chapters 6 and 7 showed that defining reduction of scientific 
theories and laws in terms of explanation (explanatory reduction) or supervenience 
(reduction by means of supervenience) are not successful projects. In the case of 
explanation it should be pointed out that the cash-value of reduction is not reducible 
to explanation. We might reduce a macro-theory to a micro-theory, while the former 
still provides explanation that the latter cannot. Moreover, in Chapter 8,1 argued that 
changing the relata of reduction from laws and theories to properties and defining 
functional reduction of properties is problematic. 
The first wave of objections to Nagel's account, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
includes two problems of inconsistency and meaning variance. I argued that these 
objections are not applicable to Nagel's original account, or to any extended version 
of it. As to the problem of meaning variance, there are two possible answers. By 
rejecting the presupposition that common meaning is a necessary condition for 
deducibility and adopting a causal account of reference (Yoshida) we can remove 
this problem. Alternatively, by accepting a description theory of reference but 
distinguishing between different and radically different meanings (Nagel), we can 
save the possibility of reduction. As to the problem of inconsistency, I argued that by 
allowing approximation in reduction, this problem is removed. 
The second wave of objections to Nagel's account, discussed in Chapter 5, includes 
the point that those sentences which connect multiply realizable properties/predicates 
to their realizers are not suitable as bridge principles. In Sections 5.7.1- 5.7.4, I 
argued that my candidate metaphysical frameworks allow this kind of sentence to 
play the role of bridge principle. This means that reducing laws of the so-called 
'special sciences' does not have any peculiar or unique problem over reducing 
physical laws. This does not mean that all special-science laws are reducible to 
physics in principle. It shows that i f other conditions of reduction are satisfied 
(including formal and non-formal conditions), the mere fact that a theory or law uses 
multiply realizable properties/predicates does not block its reducibility. 
Apart from the formal considerations, any valuable reduction must satisfy some non-
formal conditions. I explored Nagel's non-formal conditions, to which later 
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reductionists and anti-reductionists did not pay sufficient attention, in Section 1.6. 
The essence of these conditions is that reduction must be a significant scientific and 
empirical achievement, rather than a logical exercise between two sets of sentences. 
Reduction must be in the direction of the unity of science, in the sense that it 
connects different parts of science together and increases the degree of confirmation 
for the reduced and/or reducing laws. Reduction must provide further confirmation 
for the involved laws and theories and provide clues for new scientific discoveries. 
As mentioned in section 1.7, Nagel only discussed reduction of a true or 
approximately true theory, which is in use, to a true more comprehensive theory. 
Therefore, when he claims that reduction must have epistemic 'gain', he only 
recognizes scientific and empirical gains and requires that reduction must bring with 
it valuable empirical achievements. However, as pointed out in Chapter 3 (and will 
be pointed out shortly), we may want to consider as reductions cases of theory 
change in which less comprehensive theories are found to be false. In these cases, 
Nagel's non-formal conditions cannot be satisfied. Therefore, I would like to add that, 
apart from the scientific and empirical gains that Nagel discussed, a reduction might 
have different gains, e.g. a reduction might have a valuable 'historical gain' and 
explains why scientists rationally believed in a strictly speaking false theory for a 
long period of the history of science. I will explain this point in more detail shortly, 
but here I would like to emphasize that any valuable reduction must satisfy the non-
formal conditions to ensure that the reduction has considerable epistemic gains. 
These include scientific and empirical as well as historical gains. 
Finally, the mentioned schemata cover many important reductions in the history of 
science, and have many concrete examples in its support. It covers the reductions of 
the impetus theory, Kepler's laws and Galileo's laws to Newtonian mechanics, as 
well as physical optics to electromagnetic theory, thermodynamics to statistical 
mechanics, classical mechanics to special relativity, classical celestial mechanics to 
the general theory of relativity, classical mechanics to quantum theory, geometrical 
optics to wave optics and the special theory of relativity to the general theory. In the 
case of false theories, this account covers reductions of early phlogiston theories of 
reduction, calcinations and respiration to Lavoisier's theory as well as the caloric 
theory of heat to kinetic theory of heat. 
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9.2 The Relata and the Aim of Reduction 
Silberstein (2002, 82) categorizes different accounts of reduction on the basis of two 
questions. The first is a question of the relata: 'Reduction is a relation, but what types 
of things may be related?'(/'6/t/) The second is a question of the link: lIn what way(s) 
must the items be linked to count as a reduction?' (ibid) Regarding the question of 
the relata, he distinguishes two possible answers: real world items and 
representational items. In an ontological reduction, the relata of reduction are real 
world items like properties, events or entities. However, in an epistemological 
reduction the relata are representational items like theories, concepts, models, 
frameworks or regularities. 
With regard to the first question, the account of reduction set out in the previous 
section is a type of epistemological reduction. It is clear that in this account the relata 
are scientific theories or laws (epistemologically construed), both of which are 
representational i tems 5 9 . With regards to the second question, satisfying the 
mentioned formal structure and the non-formal conditions are required for reduction. 
However, one might raise an interesting point that considering theories as the relata 
of reduction is not so simple. Consider the paradigm example of reduction of the 
perfect gas laws of thermodynamics to classical mechanics. Friedman rightly points 
out that this reduction is not the reduction of a theory at all. 
The perfect gas equation is but a highly specialized consequence of 
equilibrium thermodynamics. To reduce this consequence to mechanics is 
to accomplish little of real value. For we have not thereby eliminated even 
the theoretical need for laws and concepts of thermodynamics. We have 
done nothing to simplify the overall structure of physics. (Friedman 1982, 
21) 
Two points must be distinguished in this passage. Firstly, reducing one single law 
from a theory does not mean reducing the whole theory. Secondly, according to 
Friedman, after the reduction of a theory, we ought not need its laws and concepts 
anymore. I agree with the first point that the reduction of a single law must not be 
treated as the reduction of the whole theory. To make this point clearer I would like 
to say that the primary relata in the discussed model of reduction are scientific laws. 
Reduction in the first place is a relation between scientific laws. We normally reduce 
Under some construals laws are not representational items, e.g. when they pre-exist their discovery. 
However, in this context I take laws as statements in scientific theories with representational character. 
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a law to a body of laws (to a theory). However, this does not mean that a scientific 
theory cannot be reduced. I f all axioms, basic assumptions and scientific laws of a 
theory are reducible, then the theory is thereby reducible. 
However, Friedman's second point is not plausible. He claims that the aim of 
reduction is to eliminate the theoretical need for laws and concepts of the reduced 
theory. According to him, reduction must increase conceptual and nomic simplicity. 
In what follows, I will first show that reduction does not bring about conceptual or 
nomic simplicity and then present my own version of the aim of reduction. As 
mentioned in Section 1.7, Nagel believed that reducing T2 to 77 does not involve the 
elimination of T2's concepts. This means that even in the classical form of reduction 
in which we do not use the notion of approximation; reduction does not mean 
conceptual simplicity. I would like to strengthen this point with three further 
considerations. Firstly, in the model of reduction that I defend, we use the notion of 
approximation. This means that in some cases, instead of an original theory (T2) we 
first make an approximation of it (T2*), with slightly different concepts, and then 
reduce this new theory. This process shows that even i f reduction brings about 
elimination of the concepts of T2*, we have not eliminated the concepts of the 
original theory T2. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 6, explanatory reduction is 
problematic. This means that we might have reduction in the sense that I defend, but 
the reduced theory can still answer contrastive why-questions that the reducing 
theory cannot. This point shows that, even in the case of reduction we still need laws 
and concepts of the reduced theories. Finally, as mentioned in Section 6.6, in some 
cases like thermodynamics, we select particular initial conditions at the level of 
reducing theory only because of some constraints of the reduced theory. This point 
shows that some high-level laws, regularities and concepts are indispensable, even i f 
we reduce the theory that they appear in. 
Now we face a question about the aim of reduction. I f reduction does not entail the 
dispensability of concepts and laws of the reduced theory, and i f reduction of T2 to 
Tl does not show that 77 is more basic, or entities that are dealt with in 77 have 
ontological priority to entities that are dealt with in T2, what is the aim of reduction? 
In my view, the aim of reduction is to make a network of interconnected laws and 
theories. Different laws and theories are connected by reduction. Any genuine 
reduction has epistemic gains: i f the reduced law/theory is still in use, the reduction 
increases its degree of confirmation and provides new clues for more discoveries. On 
the other hand, i f the reduced law/theory is false, the reduction shows why the 
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scientist had rationally believed in it, why it appeared true, and how an 
approximation of it can be reduced to the next comprehensive theory. Therefore, in 
one sense the aim of reduction is to unify science. Reduction can show the unity of 
science in two ways. Firstly, it provides local connections between true or 
approximately true laws, from special sciences to fundamental physics (synchronic 
reduction). Secondly, it shows continuity in the history of science, despite theory 
changes and paradigm shifts (diachronic reduction). The unity of science in this 
sense is a contingent fact that must be examined case-by-case60. Reduction as defined 
here does not carry any necessity. The reducibility of a law is a contingent matter 
that depends on many factors, including the time of reduction. To test the unity of 
science (in historical or current cases), the defined reduction is a reliable tool. 
Reduction does not entail conceptual or nomic simplicity, but it produces networks 
of interconnected laws and theories (whether true, approximately true or false), with 
valuable epistemic gains. 
9.3 Non-Formal Features of Reduction 
I mentioned Nagel's non-formal conditions of reduction in Section 1.6. However, 
non-formal features of reduction are not restricted to these conditions. In this section, 
I outline three main sources of non-formal conditions for reduction. As Hull (1974, 
654) has pointed out, some (logical empiricist) philosophers assume that extracting a 
scientific theory from the scientific literature and the raw scientific materials is a 
straightforward and unproblematic process. They assume that received scientific 
theories exist right out there in nature without any ambiguity and there were not any 
partially incompatible versions of those theories. However, a close look at the real 
development of any particular theory shows that at any time in its development 
'numerous partially incompatible versions of this theory can be found in the primary 
literature of science. When these clusters of theories are traced through time, the 
multiplicity only increases.' (Hull 1974, 654) As an example, Hull considers the 
case of Mendelian genetics. 
The unity of science in this sense is different from the versions that were discussed in Sections 4.2.1 
and 5.6. The scope of those accounts was limited to special sciences, while the scope of the contingent 
unity of science is not. Moreover, metaphysical reflections can prove those accounts, while the 
contingent thesis of the unity of science needs empirical evidence to be proven. Those accounts of the 
unity of science at most can insure that searching for contingent unity of science in the case of special 
sciences is not fruitless. 
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At the turn of century, when Mendelian genetics was rediscovered, a half 
dozen geneticists set out different versions of it. During the first ten years 
of development of Mendelian genetics, these versions changed radically. 
(Hull 1974, 654) 
However, in reduction debates, e.g. the reduction of Mendelian to molecular genetics, 
(logical empiricist) philosophers do not consider these raw theories. They have an 
analysis of what a scientific theory is. According to this analysis, they make a 
'rational reconstruction of a scientific theory'. Then they consider reducibility of this 
reconstructed theory. For example, in the case of Mendelian genetics various 
versions of this theory, belonging to different times, can be found in the literature. 
However, by considering the reducibility of this theory, we only discuss one rational 
reconstruction of these raw theories, which is known as the received Mendelian 
theory. 
The process of making rational reconstructions of scientific theories is one of the 
issues that we know very little about. There is no explicit account of making rational 
reconstructions of theories. Al l we know is that this is a non-formal activity, which 
does not follow a common structure in different cases. This process is the first source 
of non-formality in reduction. 
The second source of non-formality is the presence of approximation in reduction. 
As discussed, in many cases it is not possible to reduce a received version of a theory. 
To reduce it, we have to make some modifications to it, i.e. we have to make an 
approximation of it, and then reduce this modified version. On the other hand, in 
some cases the reducing theory needs modifications to fit in our structure of 
reduction. In other words, like the first case that philosophers make rational 
reconstructions of theories according to their analysis of scientific theories, in this 
step they make reconstructions of the received scientific theories according to their 
analysis of reduction. As mentioned earlier, the notion of similarity (analogy) 
between laws and theories needs more work in the philosophy of science. For 
example, we need to know how far we can change a theory and still claim that we 
have an approximation of it. Currently, we do not have an explicit and sophisticated 
analysis of this notion to capture its non-formal character. Making approximate 
counterparts of scientific laws/theories or bridge principles is the second source of 
non-formality in reduction. 
Sklar presents an example of modifying a theory to fit into our analysis of reduction. 
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Like nearly all examples, this one [the reduction of the physical optical 
theory of light to the theory of electromagnetic radiation] fails to be quite 
adequate. There are predications of traditional physical optics 
incompatible with some of those of electromagnetic theory, e.g. the 
latter's predication of the exponentially decaying penetration of electro-
magnetic waves into the surface of a reflecting opaque object. But the 
reduced theory can in this case, as in others, be suitably modified, without 
loss of any of its idiosyncratic concepts, so that the modified version of 
the theory is properly totally reducible to the electromagnetic theory. 
(Sklar 1967, 118, n. 1) 
Hull (1974, 662) believes that rational reconstruction and modification of scientific 
theories, which are necessary for reduction, are two main sources of non-formality in 
reduction. According to him (1974, 662), 'So far very little has been said about these 
processes. In the absence of any explicit analysis of these currently informal aspects 
of theory reduction, the claim that Mendelian genetics can or cannot be reduced to 
molecular genetics seems to be premature.' However, there is another source of non-
formality in reduction, which exists in Nagel's original account, although Hull and 
other philosophers did not pay attention to it. As discussed in Section 1.6, Nagelian 
reduction is more than the derivation of a set of sentences. According to Nagel, 
reduction must be a significant scientific achievement that brings valuable empirical 
gains. His non-formal conditions of reduction are set to guarantee that a reduction 
has empirical gains: increases degrees of confirmation of laws or theories, and opens 
new horizons to discover new laws and regularities. The real value of a particular 
reduction, according to Nagel, is evaluated by the non-formal conditions. To the 
extent that degrees of confirmation of laws are increased by reduction, and to the 
extent that a reduction facilitates new discoveries, reduction is valuable. 
As pointed out earlier, in addition to Nagel's consideration, in my view a reduction is 
valuable i f it shows continuity in the history of science. In other words, when the 
reduced law or theory is false, its reduction might still be valuable i f it explains why 
scientists believed in a false theory for a while, and how a theory replaced a false 
theory with which it is inconsistent, but of which it entailed a good approximation. 
For these reasons, I would like to emphasize that the epistemic value of reduction is 
not limited to empirical gains. Historical gains are another alternative. In sum, the 
non-formal conditions of reduction, as Nagel set, are the third source of non-
formality in reduction. In the case of reducing false theories, although these 
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conditions are not satisfied properly, another set of non-formal considerations are 
present. A valuable reduction of a false theory must provide evidence for continuity 
and unity of that discipline during the history, it must explain how scientists 
rationally believed in a false theory and how the successor theories reduced the false 
theory and entailed a good approximation of it61. 
9.4 Reduction as a Spectrum 
Many philosophers have tried to distinguish homogeneous and heterogeneous 
reduction. As mentioned in Section 1.1, according to Nagel reduction of T2 to Tl is 
homogeneous i f the laws of T2 employ no descriptive terms that are not also used 
with approximately the same meaning in 77. In other words, the reduction is 
homogeneous i f all descriptive terms of 72 are also used in 77, and each of them has 
approximately the same meaning as its counterpart in Tl. Sklar (1967, 110) believes 
that 'Two theories wil l be said to be homogeneous i f they share the same conceptual 
apparatus, and inhomogeneous i f one contains a concept not found in the other.' 
Friedman (1982, 20) mentions other criteria, 
It has been claimed that in heterogeneous reductions the entities of the 
secondary theory are collections of entities of the primary theory, while in 
homogeneous reductions the two theories deal with the same entities; that 
in heterogeneous reductions at least some of the concepts of the 
secondary theory are shown to be eliminable, while in homogeneous 
reductions none of these concepts may be eliminated; that heterogeneous 
reductions are reductions from a higher level to a lower one and are 
transitive ( i f one theory reduces to a second and a second reduces to a 
third then the first reduces to the third), while homogeneous reductions 
are intralevel and are not generally transitive. 
I see no reason to commit myself to any of these distinctions. As discussed in Section 
1.3, Nagel's definition of homogeneous reduction faces problems, among them the 
fact that there is no articulated account of similarity among meanings and the point 
6 1 In the case of reducing a false theory, we can use the notion of approximation. This means that the 
reducing theory might entail an approximation of our original false theory. This point makes my 
account of reduction consistent with 'Kuhn-loss' phenomenon. According to Kuhn (1970, 169), in 
some cases in the history of science the new theory could not explain some phenomena that the old 
theory had explained. In these cases, the new (reducing) theory infers an approximation of the old 
(reduced) theory, such that this approximation does not explain some phenomena that the original 
reduced theory explained. 
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that it is very difficult to find a concrete homogeneous reduction in the history of 
science. However, the main reason to reject all distinctions between homogeneous 
and heterogeneous reductions is that the defined schema of reduction in the previous 
sections can easily cover both homogeneous and heterogeneous reductions. For 
example, in an imaginary case where we have a pure Nagelian homogeneous 
reduction, the set of bridge principles is empty and the reducing theory itself 
concludes the reduced theory (or a good approximation of it). Therefore, Nagelian 
homogeneous reduction is a special case of our general structure. 
Another distinction posed by some philosophers is the distinction between retention 
and replacement (see e.g., Sklar (1967, 111) and Hooker (1981, 42)). Roughly 
speaking, in the former, the reduced theory (or as some philosophers put it the 
ontology of the reduced theory) is retained as correct after the reduction. However, in 
the latter, the reduced theory is replaced by the reducing theory. Our previous 
considerations show that I do not agree with this distinction either. I think the 
proposed formal structure of reduction (a good approximation of the reducing theory 
and a set of approximately true bridge principles conclude a good approximation of 
the reduced theory) can cover both of these cases. As to the non-formal conditions, 
as I pointed out earlier, any valuable reduction/replacement must have epistemic 
gains, including empirical and historical. 
As a result, like some other philosophers (e.g. Yoshida (1977) and Hooker (1981)) I 
take reduction as a spectrum. This spectrum covers homogeneous and heterogeneous 
reductions as well as the replacement of theories. Al l these cases follow the same 
formal structure. However, what distinguishes them and makes some of them 
outstanding and valuable is how they satisfy the non-formal conditions. Bringing 
more epistemic gains means the reduction is more valuable. A reduction of a current 
theory might be less valuable than a reduction of a false theory, i f the former brings 
few empirical gains while the historical gains of the latter are considerable. Similarly, 
obtaining the laws of a special science from physical laws might not be qualified as a 
reduction, i f this activity 'diverts needed energies from what are the crucial problems 
at this period of the discipline's expansion, without being compensated by effective 
guidance from the primary science in the conduct of further research' (Nagel 1961, 
362). In a word, reduction is a spectrum containing homogeneous (if any), 
heterogeneous and theory changes with a common formal structure, but what makes 
a reduction valuable is epistemic gains obtained by it. 
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There is another sense that we can say reduction is a spectrum. As mentioned, 
approximation is a vital component of reduction. It is an accepted point that 
approximation comes in degrees; T* is a closer approximation of T than T**. This 
characteristic is transmitted from approximation to reduction. Suppose that we have 
two reductions: 77 +BP1 \- T2* and 77 +BP2 \- T2**. I f T2* is a closer 
approximation of T2 than T2**, then the former reduction is more valuable than the 
latter. In other words, to the extent that approximate versions of the reduced theory, 
reducing theory and the bridge principles are closer to their original items, the 
reduction is more 'reductive'. I f a good approximation of the reduced theory is 
inferred, then the reduction is more reductive. I f a weak approximation of the 
reduced theory is inferred, then the reduction is less reductive. Reduction is a 
spectrum and comes in degrees. What determines the degree of reduction is the 
proximity between the approximate items used in reduction and their original 
counterparts. 
9.5 Directions of Reduction 
There is a powerful tendency to take it for granted that physical order and 
logical order correspond to one another. We often yield to the prejudice 
that the physical relationship of things determines the logical relationship 
of properties referring to them. It is usually assumed for instance that 
propositions describing the properties of a physically 'complex' whole are 
logically more 'complex' than those referring to the properties of its 
constituent parts. Statements about the behaviour of the 'elements' or 
'simple' parts of a material system are regarded as i f of necessity also 
logically more 'elementary' or 'simple'. (Schlesingerl961, 215) 
What Schlesinger describes is an example of a general tendency to connect (micro)-
reduction to some underlying ontological relations, and thereby determine the 
direction of (micro)-reduction and provide 'necessity' for it. We can categorize this 
tendency into three main groups: ontological priority (atomism), supervenience and 
determinism. According to atomism, any whole is composed of basic and elementary 
particles (atoms). A whole is nothing over and above the aggregation of its atoms. 
Atoms have ontological priority over wholes. We can have a possible world 
containing atoms and not the corresponding whole. However, we cannot have any 
possible world containing the same whole without the constituting atoms. Given this 
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ontological relation, an argument for the direction of (micro)-reduction and its 
necessity would be like this: macro-behaviours, macro-properties or macro-theories 
relating to a whole are nothing over and above their micro-counterparts. In other 
words, because of atomism, macro-features are reducible to micro-features and 
(micro)-reduction has necessity. 
The second argument is based on mereological supervenience: 'An object's intrinsic 
qualitative properties supervene on the intrinsic qualitative properties and (restricted) 
interrelations of its constituent atoms' (Merricks 1998, 59-60). This means that i f two 
objects are indiscernible in respect of intrinsic qualitative properties and (restricted) 
interrelations of their parts, they are (necessarily) indiscernible in respect of their 
intrinsic qualitative properties. An argument might connect supervenience and 
(micro)-reduction as follows: because of supervenience, macro-behaviours, macro-
properties and macro-theories relating to a whole are necessarily (micro)-reducible to 
their micro-counterparts. 
Finally, the third argument is based on evolution and ontogenesis hypotheses. 
According to Oppenheim and Putnam (1958, 9) scientific theories are arranged in six 
different levels of universe of discourse: 1) elementary particles, 2) atoms, 3) 
molecules, 4) cells, 5) (multicelluar) living things and 6) social groups. 'The 
hypothesis of evolution means here that (for n= 1...5) there was a time when there 
were things of level n, but no things of any higher level' (Oppenheim and Putnam 
1958, 14). 'Similarly, the hypothesis of ontogenesis is that, in certain cases, for any 
particular object on level n, there was a time when it did not exist, but when some of 
its parts on the next lower level existed; and that it developed or was causally 
produced out of these parts'(Oppenheim and Putnam 1958, 14-15). 
Now their argument for the necessity of (micro)-reduction is this. 
Let us, as is customary in science, assume causal determination as a 
guiding principle; i.e., let us assume that things that appear later in time 
can be accounted for in terms of things and processes at earlier times. 
Then, i f we find that there was a time when a certain whole did not exist, 
and that things on a lower level came together to form that whole, it is 
very natural to suppose that the characteristics of the whole can be 
causally explained by reference to these earlier events and parts; and that 
the theory of these characteristics can be micro-reduced by a theory 
involving only characteristics of the parts. (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958, 
15) 
199 
Two points are common in these three arguments. First, they determine the direction 
of reduction according to the direction of some other relations. For example, the first 
argument says that because of the direction of the whole-part relation and because 
parts have ontological priority over wholes, micro-theories must appear as reducing 
theories and macro-theories as reduced theories. In other words, this argument allows 
micro-reduction and rejects macro-reduction (reduction of a micro-theory to a 
macro-theory) because of the part-whole relation. Second, all of the mentioned 
arguments attribute necessity to (micro)-reduction. Ontological relations necessitate 
(micro)-reductions. 
I wil l consider the first point in this section, and leave the second to the next section. 
As far as I can see, directions of ontological relations do not determine the direction 
of reduction. As Schlesinger observed, the presupposition of the claim that directions 
of ontological relations determine the direction of reduction is a deep-rooted 
conviction that there is a parallel order between physical and logical orders. 
Whenever we have a physical order (e.g. the whole-part relation), the logical and 
reductive orders must be in the same direction. However, this presupposition lacks 
objective foundation. Two things determine the direction of reduction: the possibility 
of deduction and satisfying the non-formal conditions. The possibility of deduction 
(the formal structure of reduction) depends on the logical forms of the premises (the 
reducing laws), the bridge principles and the conclusions (the reduced laws). This is 
independent of whether or not the entities that the premises and conclusions are 
dealing with bear particular ontological relations to each other. 
As a result, ontological relations do not determine the direction of reduction. We can 
have micro and macro-reductions. I f a micro-theory is drivable from a macro-theory, 
and this derivation has epistemic gains, then the macro-reduction is acceptable (e.g., 
Mach's principle according to which the inertial mass, even of micro-particles, 
depends on how matter is distributed throughout the universe is positively macro-
reductive (cf. Crane and Mellor (1990, 190)). 
Another relation that does not determine the direction of reduction is causation. I f the 
formal and non-formal conditions of reduction are satisfied, the following cases are 
acceptable in principle: reducing a theory dealing with effects to a theory dealing 
with causes, reducing a theory dealing with causes to a theory dealing with effects, 
and reducing a theory dealing with a set of effects to a theory dealing with another 
set of effects of the same causes. To illuminate this point let us examine Sklar's 
example that was presented in Section 3.3. According to Sklar (1967, 118-121), in 
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some cases we have a correlation between two attribute-predicates (e.g., electrical 
and thermal conductivity of metals are correlated by means of the Wiedemann-Franz 
law ) and therefore we can derive laws of one theory from another, but we still do 
not have reduction. Sklar argues that both thermal and electrical regularities are 
determined by a common cause, (say microphysical arrangements), and therefore 
both must reduce to a third theory dealing with the common cause. My point is that 
there is no a priori reason to reject this case as a reduction, simply because it is a 
relation between two macro-theories dealing with effects of a common cause. Apart 
from formal considerations of deducibility, we have to pay attention to the non-
formal conditions. I f by reducing the laws of thermal conductivity to the laws of 
electrical conductivity we obtain empirical and scientific achievements, for example 
i f this reduction facilitates new scientific discoveries, then it must be qualified as a 
reduction. On the other hand, i f this reduction is simply a logical exercise between 
two sets of sentences without any epistemic gains, then it is not a reduction. 
The same argument can be used to reply Nickles' point, which I presented in note 32 
in Section 3.5. According to Nickles (1973, 192-3), Nagel's account of reduction 
faces the problem that the DN model of explanation does not have a causal direction, 
i.e. in some cases we can explain a cause by its effect as well as explain an effect by 
its cause. Therefore, using the DN model in reduction has also this problem, i.e. we 
can reduce the primary theory to the secondary one as well as reduce the secondary 
theory to the primary one, which seems absurd to Nickles. Nickles was right to 
suppose that using the DN model of explanation in reduction makes reduction 
insensitive to the direction of causality. In fact, my main point in this section is that 
ontological relations, like causation, do not determine the direction of reduction. 
However, it does not follow that in any case of reduction we can substitute the 
reduced and reducing laws/theories. In any valuable reduction, the non-formal 
conditions must be satisfied. Now, if, by substituting the reduced and reducing 
theories/laws, the formal structure of reduction is satisfied and the new derivation 
brings about genuine scientific/historical gains, then there is no reason to hesitate to 
K = <TLT(K: thermal conductivity, a: electrical conductivity, T: temperature and L: Lorenz number 
which is equal to 2.45 xl0~8 W-fi K - 2 ) According to this law, the ratio of the thermal conductivity to 
the electrical conductivity of a metal is proportional to the temperature. Qualitatively, this relationship 
is based upon the fact that the heat and electrical transport both involve the free electrons in the metal. 
The thermal conductivity increases with the average particle velocity since that increases the forward 
transport of energy. However, the electrical conductivity decreases with particle velocity increases 
because the collisions divert the electrons from forward transport of charge. This means that the ratio 
of thermal to electrical conductivity depends upon the average velocity squared, which is proportional 
to the kinetic temperature. 
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accept the new derivation as a reduction. On the other hand, i f the substitution of 
theories/laws makes problems for the formal structure of reduction or lacks 
scientific/historical gains (which is more probable in concert examples), then there is 
no reason to accept it as a reduction. To sum up, contrary to the explanation that the 
direction of causation may distinguish valid from invalid explanations, in reduction 
satisfying the non-formal conditions does this task. There is no need to determine the 
direction of reduction by the direction of causation. 
9.6 Necessity of Reduction 
As discussed in Section 1.6, Nagel presents a reduction without necessity. This 
means that formal or ontological considerations cannot guarantee the necessity of 
reduction in a particular case. Reducibility is a contingent feature of laws/theories, 
which depends on many non-formal factors like the particular theories available at 
that time. Contrary to Nagel's account, we have explored some accounts of 
'reduction with necessity'. The three accounts of reduction mentioned in the previous 
section are examples of this kind. We have explored one of them (reduction by 
means of supervenience) in detail in Chapter 7, and have seen that this account faces 
many problems, among them the problem that it is insensitive to the nomic contents 
of reduced and reducing theories. This problem applies to other accounts of reduction 
with necessity. They claim that ontological relations guarantee epistemic reduction, 
whatever the content of theories. One way to remove this problem is to add the 
clause ' in principle': i f for some logical or practical reasons the current laws/theories 
are not reducible, the future comprehensive laws/theories are reducible in principle. 
Nagel's account of reduction, and any developed version of it that commits to the 
non-formal conditions of reduction, lacks this ' in principle' feature. There is no 
guarantee to ensure that some future theories are reducible. Reduction is sensitive to 
the content of theories and must be examined for particular cases at particular times 
individually. 
Although I defend a version of reduction which does not have ' in principle' clause 
with the mentioned meaning, in the case of reduction of special sciences it has an ' in 
principle' clause in a very different sense. As I argued in Sections 5.7.1-5.7.4, 
multiple realization is not a problem for reduction. The mere fact that a law/theory 
contains multiply realizable properties/predicates does not block the possibility of its 
reduction. Of course, we do not have any a priori reason to suppose a special science 
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reducible, but on the other hand, we do not have any a priori reason to suppose it 
irreducible. Bridge principles connecting multiply realizable properties/predicates to 
their realizers are suitable for reduction. Therefore, i f other formal and non-formal 
conditions are satisfied we can reduce a special science. In this sense, we can claim 
that special sciences (or any science with multiply realizable properties/predicates) 
are reducible 'in principle'. Here ' in principle' means there is no unique and peculiar 
problem with reducing them. Their situation is similar to physical laws/theories. I f 
the conditions of reduction are satisfied, they can be reduced to other laws/theories. 
9.7 An Alternative View 
In this last section, I will consider an alternative account of reduction, then compare 
and contrast it with my account. Smith (1992, 19) argues 'that there is a conception 
of the unity of science, more modest than some but still far from trifling, which 
remains untouched by representative arguments for disunity.' His conception of 
reduction is 'explanatory interfacing': an explanatory interfacing of T2 to 77 means 
'an explanation in terms of theory Tl of why theory T2 works as well as it does' 
(Smith 1992, 22). 
Smith accepts an ontological principle, P, which underlies the possibility of 
reduction. According to P, 'the behaviour of wholes is in general causally produced 
by the behaviour of the parts' (Smith 1992, 25). Now whenever this principle holds, 
we expect explanatory interfacing (i.e. reduction), i.e. i f P, then 'our explanatory 
stories about wholes must be consonant with our stories about the causal mechanism 
constituted by their parts' (Smith 1992, 25). In other words, in the cases that the 
principle P applies, i.e. where there are lower-level theories describing micro-causal 
mechanisms and higher-level theories describing macro-behaviours, it is very natural 
to demand explanatory interfacings (reductions). 
Smith puts the point as follows, 
Suppose, in other words, that we hold that there are causal mechanisms 
fairly well described in terms of Tl, mechanisms which generate the 
events that are redescribed and re-explained by T2. Then the question is 
pressing: how in that case do the causal mechanisms, discerned at the 
level of Tl and thus specifiable without any reference to T2, come to 
generate the new patterns discerned by T2 explanations? (Smith 1992, 23) 
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Smith believes that by showing an explanatory interfacing of T2 to Tl we can answer 
this question. In short, Smith first presents an ontological relation (principle P), and 
then claims that wherever this relation applies we expect a modest reduction, in the 
sense that the lower-level theory explains why the higher-level theory works as well 
as it does. 
Smith's proposal has strong similarities with my version of reduction, which I will 
consider first. Smith (1992, 22-3) argues that even in the cases where we have 
explanatory interfacing, the reducing theory might not answer some why-questions 
that the reduced theory answers. This is exactly the point that I have argued for in 
Chapter 7. It is very interesting to point out that Smith's argument, like mine, is 
based on the point that some why-questions are contrastive and the reducing and 
reduced theories answer explanatory requests with different contrast classes. 
Therefore, according to both accounts, reduction does not bring the dispensability of 
the laws and concepts of the reduced theory. A reduced theory might be 
autonomously explanatory. 
Moreover, Smith asserts that reduction (explanatory interfacing) does not need type-
type correlations or identifications between kinds, and therefore does not conclude 
elimination of the reduced theory. 
...explanation can come in a variety of flavours. There is no necessary 
implication, for example, that the mode of explanation in question has to 
involve type-type correlations or identifications between kinds recognized 
by the two theories. Nor is there any necessary implication that explaining 
the applicability of T2 in terms of an underlying theory 77 must mean that 
Tl absorbs, supersedes, or eliminates the reduced theory 77.' (Smith 1992, 
21-22) 
Similarly, in my account, bridge principles are not limited to biconditionals, identity 
between things, identity between properties or kind-kind relations, and we do not 
expect elimination of the reduced theory. 
Finally, Smith (1992, 36) holds that 'modest reductions can still subserve the old 
programmatic aim of demonstrating unity, i.e. of showing how science hangs 
systematically together, with higher-level theories being shown to have application in 
virtue of lower-level facts, with basic physics presumably at the most fundamental 
level of the hierarchy.' More importantly, he (1992, 38) rejects that the unity of 
science has an a priori basis. This empirical question must be answered by reduction. 
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Smith's view on the unity of science and the role of reduction is very similar to my 
view, which was explained in Section 9.2. 
However, there is an important point that separates Smith's account from my version 
of reduction. As mentioned earlier, Smith backs up his account of reduction by an 
ontological relation (the principle P). Therefore, in the cases that this relation does 
not hold we do not have any reason to expect reduction. The principle P is about the 
part-whole relation; therefore, Smith's account of reduction is applicable only to 
micro-reductions. However, in some cases, the principle P does not hold but we 
expect reduction. Take for example the reduction of classical celestial mechanics to 
the general theory of relativity. Here we do not have a part-whole relation and the 
principle P is not applicable. However, we expect an account of reduction to cover 
this example. In other words, Smith's model depends on an ontological relation and 
has a narrow domain of application (micro-reduction), while the defended model is 
independent of any ontological relation and can cover more cases, when the principle 
P is not applicable63. 
Smith (1992, 28) thinks that in Nagel's account of reduction (or even in 'quasi-Nagelian' accounts 
that the notion of approximation is used), bridge principles must be type-type connections. According 
to this supposition, in Section 6 of his paper he presents some examples of non-Nagelian explanatory 
interfacings (reductions). He calls them non-Nagelian because the requirement of type-type bridge 
principles cannot be satisfied in them. However, Nagel's examples and my previous discussions show 
that type-type bridge principles are not necessary even for Nagelian reduction. Initial conditions and 
one-way conditionals with nomic necessity are examples of acceptable bridge principles that are not 
type-type connections. 
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